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Abstract
This essay is an examination of the multifaceted reasons humanities education in
American colleges is losing standing and funding. Historical, cultural, and philosophical
perspectives are used to analyze the grounds that have justified the decreasing levels of
support for humanities education. Historically, there is no longer any external
justification provided, as there was when Sputnik was launched and the Cold War was
endured. Culturally, the high culture model of ascension through the accrual of cultural
signifiers is no longer the dominant form of raising one’s status, as it was when the
humanities could be justified as cultural initiation. Philosophically, market-based
capitalism has become the dominant framework for the current vision of humanity under
neoliberal ideology, and the humanities is being cut as being tangential to that purpose.

The thesis is organized in an expanding framework, starting from a historical discussion
to a cultural analysis to a philosophical examination. Many types of theorists and thinkers
are used, including Marxists, post structuralists, feminists, critical race theorists, literary
theorists, and educational philosophers. Reading and personal experience are the primary
sources of research. This project concludes with a searching series of reflections on how
humanities education has been compromised and what new perspectives can be
incorporated in order to renew it. In summary, marketization must be disrupted with the
use of text-based education that refuses commodification by way of a relational
pedagogy.
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Personal Introduction
This project arose directly out of my experiences as a student and my problematic
history with engagement during my time as an undergraduate student. I have been
passionate about education since grade school, ever since I found my greatest source of
personal development in it, but my experience has always been marked, but not marred,
by a frustration with the ideals that school did not live up to. These ideals changed
throughout my life, sometimes picked up directly from what the school attested or
sometimes from what I thought the school should be doing. The ideals varied but the
disappointment did not. Though this disappointment burgeoned into cynicism in late high
school and early college, most of my educational career has actually been defined by
great passion, the disappointment only existing by way of my grand hopes. I was ever the
optimist, appreciating what school offered but wanting more.
By and large, my criticality took the form of petty rants and discussions turned
debates. I would often get into friendly arguments with my parents, my friends, my
teachers, and myself about what education should do, what it was capably of doing, and
what I dreamt of it doing. Strangely enough, I thought teaching and education in general
too important for me to participate in its practice. I never wanted to be a teacher because I
thought I couldn't handle it. In some ways, that's still true.
The rare teacher that took my criticism always impressed me but I didn't find a
powerful example of this until college. In my undergraduate career, there were plenty of
similar frustrations, but the Honors College represented the apex of idealism and
frustration to me at the time. They used the highest language and aimed for the furthest
goal, and, due largely to this ambition, they were the farthest from hitting the mark. I also
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discovered in the student community a group of students that shared many of my
frustrations and were responsive arguers when discussing what should be done. Again,
our critiques did little but circulate amongst students as we mired in a frustration that
turned into cynicism.
Ironically, I became more alienated from these students as I grew less alienated in
my education. During my third year, a Business and Technical Writing class asked me to
recommend solutions to a problem for an organization I was involved in, and, being the
overambitious Honors student I was, I tried to take on the entire Honors preceptorial
program. I interviewed a few preceptors and students, surveyed many other students
anonymously, and did a lot of other research to complete a long technical report that
captured some of the most significant problems I saw. This report was largely a cathartic
academic experience at this point that involved using my writing skills to summarize and
analyze all the problems I wanted to express.
I was shocked however, to find the Honors College almost wholly receptive to my
criticisms. This report was circulated throughout the school and a discussion was held
about it with some faculty, me, and other students. My recommendations were taken
more seriously than I ever imagined. Though I had the advantage of working with a small
school that had the responsiveness to actually engage with me, it was still a hugely
inspiring experience to interact with an organization that respected me. I was still a
student but I could be an important part of the constitution of engagement. This was my
turning part for critical engagement, not just in educational theory but in my life. It was a
moment I discovered my political awareness, a moment I took my most significant step
in lessening my alienation. Life around me, even in an institutional form, could change
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with my will. This was the inspiration behind this project.
Though much of this project is focused on criticism, a continual effort is made,
one that is culminated in the final section, to direct criticality toward creativity and how
the humanities can be renewed. The greatest burden of Marxism is also one of its greatest
beauties. A criticism such has been written cannot leave without being accompanied by a
creation; a critical theory cannot feel complete without a creative practice. Though I am
merely an undergraduate student, I must still put forth what effort I have to recommend
something, to act in a positive direction.
I have been confident throughout this piece that my perspective at the very least
would provide an interesting interpretation to the modern state of education but I am less
confident that such a perspective, without much experience in first hand teaching, will be
able to recommend something substantial. From here, I must limit myself to being unable
to come up with anything as practical as a lesson plan, as useful as a reform, or as
inspiring as a revolution – I must be happy with theory. As bell hooks said on the subject,
theory can be a process of healing, and, in that sense, the theory I present is one that heals
my problems with education – not fully, but well. It results not from expertise but from
lived experience. By theorizing the problems of education up until this point, I have
engaged in a cathartic analysis that in itself reconstructs my experience as something to
be understood, problematizes my seemingly natural experience as something to be
developed. bell hooks says further:
"When our lived experience of theorizing is fundamentally linked to processes of
self-recovery, of collective liberation, no gap exists between theory and practice.
Indeed, what such experience makes more evident is the bond between the twothat ultimately reciprocal process wherein one enables the other. Theory is not
inherently healing, liberatory, or revolutionary. It fulfills this function only when
we ask that it do so and direct our theorizing towards this end," (61).
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I can only hope that my theory achieves something toward closing this gap. Though I
may not be able to put much of this into practice, practice is indeed the goal and this
reciprocal dialectical relation was always in my mind.

Formal Introduction
As with the recommendation report, this thesis is too ambitious. I am trying to
cover more than I possibly can and this involves stretching my experiences, my
knowledge, and my capabilities to their absolute limits. I have tried to dig into my core as
a student and bore out from there through reading and discussion to reach as far as I can
beyond my immediate experience. Though I don't always directly reference this core, it is
constantly and simultaneously my foundation and my blinder for this analysis.
My thoughts themselves are irreparably nonlinear so the organization of this
thesis is entirely a retrospective design. I have tried to follow a path that will make sense
and be approachable for a reader. Any piece, organizational, theoretical, or rhetorical that
is not fairly easy to understand is a failure on my part. I do not consider it a success or an
achievement to couch myself in intellectual language but a failure in ensuring my theory
can enable practice for anyone who reads it.
I start with a short history of American education through the Cold War and the
Vietnam War eras in The Sputnik Moment and the Vietnam Betrayal. This section is
necessarily brief and is used to provide historical context to the developing discussion.
Though this is largely an analytical and philosophical analysis, this section proves there is
a valid historical and cultural precedent for such analyses. This section generally covers
the boom in education resulting from the Cold War, specifically the launch of Sputnik, in
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comparison with the Vietnam War, wherein general society suffers a countercultural
revolt. These two events cause massive waves in the way education functioned and how
we perceived education as functioning. This is not meant to be a comprehensive study but
is simply the setting of historical grounds for understanding the resulting analysis.
I then go into a detailed analysis of the natures of culture, identity, and ideology
in Culture and Identity. Though this does not immediately connect to education, I
believe a proper analysis of these ideas is essential to understanding the damaging effects
of a market-based society as well as the potential for other visions. Neither culture nor
identity are subsumed into the other but are situated as aspects of a dialectical
contradiction. Ideology is placed between them as a calcified set of ideas that are denied
the ability to change based on social determination and rigid rationalization.
With a basis in culture understood, The Disintegration of the Cultural
Framework explains how the changes from the 50s to the 60s evinced a shift in how
higher education could be justified. Without a universal high culture to be assumed,
higher education could no longer situate itself as the peak of culture. It begins to lose its
traditional power, as it cannot promise the transferring of culture to students.
Classical Humanities and the Encroachment of Neoliberalism then examines
how traditional forms of humanities education made this subject area vulnerable to the
developments of capitalism. Classical great book programs that relied strictly on
canonical texts disengaged themselves as critical political entities and withered as their
foundation in culture was disrupted. This section also examines many of the problems
inherent with this traditional vision and how most of it is recalled with nostalgia.
The next section, The Rise of Neoliberalism then explains the foundations of the
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market-based ideology that then took dominance in education and throughout the nation.
Neoliberalism is a new mutation of a number of philosophies, including enlightenment
era thinking, liberalism, and positivism, all combined and mixed with the new dominance
of the capitalistic market. Markets came to be the dominant depiction of reality, and, with
that, reality was to be shaped to the market.
The Long March of Marketization then focuses on the efforts to commodify
everything in life to be within the range of market reality. The university is focused on as
a site that has been largely commodified, reshaped into another instance of the market.
This naturally leads to Student Alienation, a section that focuses on the
subjective and structural alienation of students within the marketized system. Cynicism
and lack of engagement are examined as consequences of structure. Though other models
have inflicted this as well, the current form of the university as a corporate business and
reality outside of it as a universal market is blamed for the majority of student alienation.
The final section, Renewing The Humanities, is a series of reflections on how
the critical and creative spirit of the humanities can be renewed despite the threat of
commodification. Focus is placed on pedagogy as an artistic effort with the text being
given a primary place for the mediation of discussions. Thought is reconsidered as
something that should not satisfy itself as an answer but open itself up to the future.
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The Sputnik Moment and the Vietnam Betrayal
The Rise of Sputnik, The Rise of Funding
Without going into a detailed analysis for which I do not have the space, we have
to begin with a depiction of the Cold War. The Soviet Union and the United States stood
against each other in a standoff of mutually assured destruction, circling each other like
schoolyard bullies waiting for the other to punch. This was fundamentally a masculine
power struggle over who would be the most dominant in the world. Naturally, this
struggle bristled the most with who had the most firepower and we still feel the vestiges
of this impact today, as the United States pours as much funding as it can into national
defense, even as individuals in the country see themselves as armed guards of their home
properties. From the local to the national, there is a fundamentally masculine ideology of
weaponized self-defense, a defensiveness that can of course creep into a defensive attack,
such as the imperialist invasion of Iraq.
Unique to the Cold War however, is the Sputnik moment, wherein the Soviet
Union launched the first satellite to break the confines of the Earth and orbit the heavens.
Suddenly, it was less about who had more guns, though there was certainly mass concern
this technology could be weaponized, and more about the primacy of culture and
education. While the United States dumped money into the space race, the consequences
of the Soviet's transcending this as yet universal historical boundary went deeper than a
mere technological jealousy.
Space was a universal stage, an expanse that people had gazed into for the whole
of human history, and the Soviet Union being the first to break this barrier was an
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absolute affront to the supposed dominance of the United States, not only as a physical
power but as a cultural power. There was no question to be had around the globe, no
debate or doubt. The Soviets had crossed a line no one had crossed before and anyone
could equally look up with amazement. The Soviets had become the best at something,
and their ability to broach something universal cast them as the greatest nation on the
globe because they were first to transcend it.
In this way, the very ego of the US nation was threatened and had to be
compensated in other ways. To reassert itself as the dominant nation, the US engaged in a
deep process of nature building or rebuilding, depending on how you look at it. What was
best in the nation had to be drastically improved; everything that distinctly and
characteristically marked the spirit of America had to be remade and improved. In other
words, we were suddenly swimming in money. All kinds of government investments took
off with unheard of levels of money. The government, as independent representatives of
their constituent peoples, funded almost anything and everything that would contribute to
the building of the nation.
In this grand process of making and remaking, the national culture had to be
cleansed, purified, and brought to its best, most distinct condition. The age of
McCarthyism followed this closely, a period that seems entirely alien and impossible to
those looking back, largely because this cultural threat doesn't have the conditions to
exist anymore. Anyone with Communist and Soviet connections was hunted down and
forced to relent their ties or be blacklisted, sometimes even killed. Throughout the
country, but especially in Hollywood and the government (one creating pop culture and
the other political economic culture), Communists were purified from the nation. Our
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culture could have nothing to do with the Soviets as the Sputnik moment solidified the
divide between our country and theirs.
In accordance with this purification, what was American had to be strengthened.
When it came to culture, the best way to do this was by funneling money into the
university. Even before this moment, educators had long been held as the custodians of
culture, as initiators for young folks (assuming the correct class, race, and gender) into
their inheritances of national culture. These gentlemen were to be taught the greatest
things written by the greatest minds, to be enrolled in the long and hypothetically never
ending line of cultural development. By isolating themselves in the university, with only
the company of long dead men, they were supposed to emerge like pupae from a cocoon
after having gestated on the universal ideas of these geniuses (geniuses who were also the
correct class, race, and gender).
But in the Sputnik moment, these bearers of culture were called upon for their
"true" mission, not to be the benign gifters of culture but the active weaponizers of
culture. The best could not simply be the best, it had to be better than them, the
other: "[i]n the wake of Sputnik, an assessment that American schools were falling
behind their Soviet counterparts became commonplace, a consensus codified by the 1958
National Defense Education Act (NDEA), the first extensive federal involvement in
educational policy and funding," (Hartman, 175). Especially with the GI Bill funneling
more students than ever into universities, this pool of potential cultural warriors could not
be wasted. This became especially important in the context of Soviet and American
cultures alternately producing two opposing political systems, socialism and capitalism.
The economic base and the super structural culture were one and the same as we
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struggled to be purely “American” and not at all “Soviet” in every regard. Anything
“Soviet” was a weakness to be expunged.
From this moment on, the institution of the university as a place of a worry, of
concern, even of crisis became a common political point. The universities as bearers of
cultures and bearers of a new nation in its infancy began to take on the responsibility of
upholding the nation's values and ensuring the new generation carried them on. In a
sense, the university became culturally nationalized as an essential part of the growth of a
nation. "The contentiousness of federal aid to education was finally overcome because it
was wedded to a topic around which a consensus existed: the need to beat the Soviets in
the race for technological supremacy. And, yet, despite this marriage of convenience,
consensus in education never really developed, signaled by the continued animosity
directed at progressive education," (Hartman, 186). Any educational divisiveness was to
be stamped out or swept under the rug, tradition becoming dominant and progression
becoming threatening.
In this period the university received windfalls of money that thereafter would be
inconceivable. Everything from theoretical physics, to engineering, to English was
pumped full of money. Almost anything could be justified when the core of our culture
was threatened from outside, but with a special focus on anything that could be seen as
defeating the Soviets. Opposite to this, anything that challenged this focus was
threatening. "In the months following Sputnik, the schools were widely cited as the weak
link in America’s race against the Soviet Union. Progressive education and the
philosophy of life adjustment were singled out," (Hartman, 176). There were concerns
that while the Soviets were becoming a national super power, American university
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education had too long focused on weak and implicitly feminine ideas of progressive
education that involved thinkers such as Dewey's ideas of educating the whole child, not
merely disciplining them.
The universities were then seen as fawning mothers, coddling their children and
thus weakening them through feminization, which became diametrically problematic now
that the country had to prepare for a possible war with the Soviets. What needed to be
educated now was not the whole student and certainly not the feminine student but the
masculine student, the one most capable of defending the country and attaining victory
over the Soviet menace.
Part of this victory involved the elimination of supposed Soviet influence, so
more progressive educational strategies were often attacked and "[a]s the multi-faceted
rhetorical attack on progressive education intensified throughout the 1950s, the schools
were widely assumed to be failing in their mission to train enough scientists and other
high technicians for the national security state, considered a perilous development in the
race against the Soviet Union for global supremacy," (Hartman, 175). Though most
subjects received funding at least from proximity to this cultural defense fund, a special
focus was inaugurated and instituted in fields we now call STEM (Science Technology
Engineering Mathematics) for their abilities to not only figuratively but literally defeat
the Soviets if it ended up coming down to that. "The Soviets' beating us into space
shocked the nation and, for a moment, leveling education was set back on its heels. […]
Survival itself depended on better education for the best people. External necessity
injected into the easygoing educational world the urgency that should always be there.
Money and standards emerged in the twinkling of an eye. The goal was to produce
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scientific technicians who would save us from being at the mercy of tyrants," (Bloom,
49). The university was then and forever situated as something that could connect the
young to external reality, initiate them in what was important, and send them out to do
what the nation needed them to do, in this period, defeat the Soviets.
The important turning point in this conception of the university was the next
understanding of the university as a research center. There had long been tensions within
the university between defining it as an independent learning facility and as a dependent
research center, but the Sputnik moment, with its vast sums of government funds, gave it
a decidedly strong push toward research. Aronowitz says, "the main task of the research
university was to become a knowledge factory. Its scientific/technological discoveries
and inventions would be directed toward the means and the ends of economic growth and
of Cold War public policy," (Aronowitz, 38). However, money so overflowed the
university that other studies were funded as well, so long as they could be justified in
some indirect way to the cause.
Even the most obscure of philosophy projects could often be traced back in some
way to a government grant, some of its money maybe absorbed from a diffused fund or
even manipulated from a naive funder. The university became inextricably linked up to
the government with its hand over hand consumption of cash. The unspoken transaction
would be that in exchange for this funding, the university would bolster the national
culture both by producing research (in the forms of technology, knowledge, and cultural
product) and students (in the forms of leaders and true Americans). Even universities,
departments, and professors that had sympathy with the Communists or were
Communists themselves, or even those who simply didn't align themselves with this
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narrative of nation building, were complicit in this new institutionalization. Everyone
needed money, and in that period, almost all money went back in one way or another to
the government and their goal of rebuilding culture and the nation.
Within the goal of building something in the University to support culture was the
goal to rebuild culture through the university. Progressive education was one of many
signs that national culture was changing, differentiating itself in ways that conservatives
were not comfortable with. Society was seen as being in the early stages of splintering
within itself, fracturing along the lines of progressivism, race, and gender. The war with
the Soviets then not only constituted an additional threat to the destruction of national
culture but a justification for the overtly massive reassertion of national culture through
the university. "In the heady days of the early Cold War, when a genuine consensus
existed regarding the need to stave off Communist advances, the only issue capable of
trumping the divisiveness of race and religion was national security. Washington insiders
who had been laboring for federal aid immediately recognized Sputnik as a blessing in
disguise," (Hartman, 184). For a time, the University could then be trusted, as it was
inextricably tied to federal funding, to assert and transmit a universal culture to pupils
that could eventually go on to be cultural and political leaders themselves, with the
university being a mill of cultural reproduction.
Within the American capitalist context however, this culture was essentially seen
as a market one: "[i]n the twentieth century, the United States—the most powerful
capitalist country in world history—created an educational system to aid capitalism and
fight the Cold War. In grooming a generation of Cold Warriors willing to fight global
communism, the American school was central to the United States victory in the Cold
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War, and the broader twentieth-century triumph of the capitalistic economic system,"
(Harman, 197). Intimately tied together with democracy and freedom was the American
life of market capitalism, so the defense of the nation and its values became bound with
the defense of capitalism. The university was then trusted to defend and reproduce the
nation in all of its values, including capitalism and a long American tradition of moral
conservatism.
The Vietnam Betrayal
This trust, however, was irreparably broken during the counterculture movements
of the 1960s and the Vietnam War. This splintering culture could no longer be contained
as it asserted itself not as a fracture but as a self-differentiation, as a new culture
immanently emerging from an old one. While the war with the Communists had a
semblance of consensus, the war in Vietnam had its foundation continually worn away by
detractors. The cold war succeeded partially because it never quite happened. The threat
was kept in the abstract, with impending doom always hovering just above reality in a
zone of imminent potentiality. The Vietnam War actualized this, but in the process of
making this real, material reality asserted its own consequences.
One of these consequences was the circulation of images and understandings of
the realities of such a war: "[i]n the Vietnam War, it was the pictures of the children
burning and dying from napalm that brought the US public to a sense of shock, outrage,
remorse, and grief. These were precisely pictures we were not supposed to see, and they
disrupted the visual field and the entire sense of public identity that was built upon that
field. The images furnished a reality, but they also showed a reality that disrupted the
hegemonic field of representation itself," (Butler, 150). The humanization process of this
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discourse corrupted government’s ability to represent the war as necessary, as something
that absolutely required a consensus of culture for an objective evil to be defeated. The
culture behind the war soon remade itself as something against what culture used to be.
Reality asserted itself and in that movement, culture's development reestablished itself in
an explosive reimagining in the counterculture movements of the 60s. The repression of
this development could only lead to its explosive re-creation.
The undercutting of the university was then all but assured during the Vietnam
War, wherein the classical great books tradition of humanities education could not
withstand what would become a massive cultural civil war. Surely, the vanguard of the
patriotic American tradition could only feel betrayed by the university, the university
they had always distrusted but had to retain, when the products of these institutions
turned not into national leaders but into national rebels. The students of the 60s turned
against the very institutions that educated them and against the very nation that raised
them. As the university, the bestower of the national higher culture fractured, so did the
culture itself. The explosion of the student insurrection left culture in fragments and the
university on the brink of a vast change. After the 60s, the Sputnik moment was
inconceivable. The idea that we could pour that much money into college and culture
building is impossible,
Nostalgia
From this point on, the presence of the nostalgic voice calling for a time past, a
time of peace and order and common sense, grew in a fervor that hasn't dissipated much
since. Represented by people like Allan Bloom, we hear the constant call for a
revitalization of the humanities, which is really a call to reclaim the past. In a sense, the

16
cultural civil war has never ended, and these memorial thinkers want to return a time to a
time of peace. A noble idea perhaps, but it is roughly analogous to a southerner wishing
the Civil War had never erupted, in that they do not seek for the problems to be solved
but for them to go back to not being mentioned again. This is revealed as these
traditionalists hardly disguise their explicit racism and sexism in implicit traditionalism,
claiming that
"the alarming collapse of higher education [was] because of the infiltration of
students and professors of color (assumed to be students or scholars only because
of preferential admissions or hiring policies, not because of their own abilities),
the fearsome power of feminists, and the abandonment of the classics of Western
thought (the best of all that has been written) by inferior works by women and
people of color (inferior by definition, since they aren’t included in collections of
the classics of Western thought—the best that has been written, etc.) In this
nightmare vision, teachers and students were said to have been silenced and
intimidated by the powerful cabal of African Americans, Latinos, feminists, gays,
lesbians and who knows what other undesirables who supposedly controlled US
higher education," (Weiler, 219).
Traditionalists come close to sounding like conspiracy theorists, blaming the new state of
education on the supposed insurrection of these voices of influence. A classic example of
this mindset is Allan Bloom, one of the many things he claims being that: "[t]he latest
enemy of the vitality of classic texts is feminism. The struggles against elitism and racism
in the sixties and seventies had little direct effect on students' relations to books. The
democratization of the university helped dismantle its structure and caused it to lose its
focus," (Bloom, 65).
We must recognize that this nostalgia is not in fact a call for peace but a return to
a safely dominant order, a return to a silencing of these voices. The "focus" Bloom
speaks of is not an objective, natural focus but is his focus, the focus of those dominant
and those who benefit from the way the system used to be. The nature of tradition and
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inertia within ideological formation gives them the illusion of objectivity: "[t]he politics
of race and gender within white supremacist patriarchy grants them this 'authority'
without their having to name the desire for it," (hooks, 81). The conservatives can then
take on the mantle of traditional authority without naming this desire as a political grasp
for power, a privilege only granted by way of a history of subjugation and oppression.
It is consistently forgotten that an educational peace or unity never existed but
was merely pretended. For example, even during the inception of the university, there
were arguments about the German professionalization of literature study in the
1800s (Graff, 55). Professionalization is not a new issue but is one that has existed
throughout the history of education, turning up and returning again in different adapted
forms depending on the historical context. There has been a constant debate about
extrinsic (historical context based) or intrinsic (isolated poetic function based) criticism
for a long time. This eventually resulted in there being the creation of a duality between
scholars and critics. Even the rough fusion of these two classes in the 50s did not so much
combine them as save the historical stuff as advanced extra knowledge for advanced
classes.
With a dialectical historical perspective, we can remember that these elements
among many, both contradictory and both flipping in dominance, have always existed
together. It's not that wholly new ideas have been introduced and taken over like an
infection, but that different elements have consumed new ideas and received different
levels of prominence in history. Again, the research model we now take as standard was
at one point introduced, and even then, strongly contested. This is not to say that all
developments emerge immanently but that, analogously to natural evolution, new
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energies are taken in (as this is not a closed system) and fresh developments are added to
older frames. As environments change, so does the adaptive potential of certain
functions. Evolution is always a compromise between the future and the past; both must
be studied to understand the present (and similarly in both cases, this is not a linear
progression of betterment but a historical development of adaptability, not what is the
fittest but what can fit best).
Even in the traditional past dominated by the old books program, there was some
eye toward preparing students for a life of work, though that work was preordained to be
of the dominant order. And even now, there is still some, though dying, idea that
graduates of college leave more cultured, an intellectualism that is both revered and
despised in common American culture. Americans have the contradictory notion that one
should ascend to a higher culture but those that have ascended are usually pretentious
scholars or snobs. Even when it comes to specialized sets of knowledges, the laboring
businessman will always have the last word with his common sense over the academic
and their book learning. Though this kind of hands on work has dissipated in recent
history, or at least those that do it rarely ever reach the publicity of the top, this still holds
sway in the American mind. Knowledge is not supposed to come through research or
experience with a multiplicity of people, but is supposed to come from a source inside, a
wellspring of pure rationality that is not created but honed by disciplined hard work.
It is the nostalgia of humanists now that erase this always-unstable discourse to
replace it with a supposedly ideal past. The humanities and the university in general has
always been a thing up for debate, constantly in a state of mutability according to the
forces of fashions of the time. Any perception otherwise is simply nostalgia. Any defense
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of the humanities must in itself be a reconstruction, a creation of a new humanities for a
new future. Though we need not abandon everything in the past simply because it has
passed, our perspective must be aimed toward the future, revitalizing and recreating
based on what will work now.
A Last Gasp
Going forward, we can see this war cry for the revitalization and transformation
of culture is actually the last gasp of a culture corroded from the inside by capitalism.
Fitting for America, that the last cry its national culture could respond to was the rally for
battle. After the Soviets fell and during the shuddering foundation of the Vietnam War,
the universities were left with little but the echoes, their sound imprinting on the future
ideology that the universities were to have. They were left with a languishing respect for
the humanities and for cultural initiation and a newfound drive toward the positivistic,
rational, instrumental, and technological. As Marx reminds us in Capital, even during
moments of radical change, the situation is always built on the vestiges of the past, but in
this case the machinery of reproduction is the collegiate machinery of cultural
reproduction. Left with the tools of the old order, a new order was made both in its image
and in a reflection. The roots of education always nourished themselves on the culture,
even as it changed, of the American superstructure. But it wasn't long until this soil soon
became arid and dry, and the roots had to find another source of justification. Ultimately,
the Sputnik moment signaled a point wherein the United States dove headfirst into the
neoliberal course of restricting culture to markets and demanding that the university in
particular produce value in the form of market exchange value, not use or cultural value.
The betrayal of national culture by the university in Vietnam and the era of
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counterculture then constitute a unique moment in this historical construction. Despite the
always-divisive nature of history, the university had always been predicated on national
culture. "In its attempt to construct and conceptualize the school, philosophy has
oscillated between positioning the school as a propaedeutic, as a prophylactic preparation
for society, and positioning the school as microcosm, as a mini-society. Despite this
oscillation, philosophy has remained constant with regard to one basic proposition: we
school to set the city-state right," (Feltham, 68). The internal debate between whether the
university should practically prepare students for reality or create their own model reality,
a translation of the struggle between the university as being a path to society or as a self
contained reinforcement of such a society, was then collapsed beneath an external debate
on the very nature of whether one should support the national city-state at all.
Though the nostalgic voices call for a history that has never quite been unified,
the counterculture represents a moment wherein that unity cannot even be pretended,
wherein culture is overtly divided against itself. This is a chance for radical re-creation
and re-imagining or an evil that must be quelled, defeated, and repressed. We must move
forward into the brave unknown or neutralize the threat of the future and reestablish the
past as a permanent present. Fredric Jameson largely agrees with this definition of
cultural revolution, describing it as "that moment in which the coexistence of various
modes of production becomes visibly antagonistic, their contradictions moving to the
very center of political, social, and historical life," (Jameson, 95). In the counterculture,
invisible contradictions became visible and overt, these contradictions becoming the focal
point of life. We must then examine whether or not the university used this contradiction
as a way to move forward or as a conflict to repress and ignore. As Hartman warns
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however: "[e]ducational struggles were dialectical: education was not the pure instrument
of the ruling class, it was a stake in a very bitter and continuous class struggle. Liberty
and order were mutually constitutive components of education. […] But inequality
tended to win out over democracy, reproduction over transformation, domination over
deliverance, reification over utopia," (199). The past can never be purely viewed in any
way, but Hartman shows that with modern progress, the trend has been dominated by a
particular direction.
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Culture and Identity
The Struggle To Define Culture
Before moving on, we have to define something that resists definition - the word
culture. “Culture” was understood as something the university could found itself on, but
that foundation has now changed. To understand this more clearly, we need to understand
culture.
“Culture” is a word most people would attest to understanding but be unable to
define. It's one of many concepts of which the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein would
argue that a definition does not constitute its meaning. “Culture” certainly means
something, but it cannot be defined in terms of an absolutely common meaning: "these
phenomena have no one thing in common in virtue of which we use the same word for
all," (Wittgenstein, 35). Rather, it functions more on the basis of familial resemblance,
wherein no characteristics are universally shared, but there is a certain system of common
recognition. There is not a strict category that delimits what is and what is not culture but
a "family of cases" (Wittgenstein, 72) that bears the commonality of resemblance but
with no particular feature common to all. His classic example of this is the concept of
"game," wherein no absolutely common idea can link such games as chess, baseball, and
tag. This does not leave us in a void of vagueness but rather forces us to rely on the
fluidity of recognition, something we already do quite well. Wittgenstein is the antiphilosopher of philosophers, telling us to think less and look more. Though we are about
to launch into an analysis of the ways culture manifests itself, we must remember the
need to occasionally step back, look around, and know that though we don't know what
culture is exactly we know it when we see it.
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It will be my contention that the reason culture is so hard to define is because it is
not a concept with a specific content but is in fact a relational concept that only exists
with any conceptual clarity when in it's in tension. Instead of deducing its parameters,
we'll have to design our own model for culture and see how it weathers our recognitions
of culture's variations. The point is not to confine culture to strict limits but to design a
schema that can explain its various permutations.
I'd like to position culture as a mutable but ultimately hierarchal structure. As
Marx said, the precondition for all life is the means and reproduction of the means of
subsistence, so around this core cell, culture grows. In a sense, culture is that "everything
else" around the economic center, with varying amounts of specificity based on whom
you ask. Of course, we don't want to get into the trap of something like Maslow's
hierarchy of needs, wherein certain needs such as shelter and hunger must be solved
before one can contemplate or care about culture. We must more recognize that "[t]he
ultimate condition of production is therefore the reproduction of the conditions of
production," (Althusser, 100) and what conditions are being reproduced here are
essentially cultural.
Economic subsistence is a necessary precondition but the model for its
continuation always already exists for the subjects engaged in it. Culture itself too, exists
alongside as well as on top of the economic foundation. This vagueness only becomes
clear during confrontation, as culture becomes something recognizable only when it is in
conflict or tension with itself, other cultures, persons or communities within it, or the
economic base.
We know from Raymond Williams that the base and superstructure (roughly, the
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economic foundation and the societal building) are not as hierarchal as the terms imply.
Both the base and superstructure are processes embedded in a historical struggle; they are
not continuous states that retain a kind of metaphysical order. Dialectically, they
contradict each other and in so doing develop each other in various ways, pushing against
each other, flipping subordinate and dominant roles, etc. Though they certainly take the
roles of structures, they are not wholly determining forces: "[w]e have to revalue
'determination' towards the setting of limits and the exertion of pressure, and away from a
predicted, prefigured, and controlled content," (Williams, 6). The narrative that the base
and superstructure struggle with each other to impose is not one that forces its players to
read from a script, but rather impels them and incentivizes them to act, see, and think in
certain ways.
Along these lines, we must remember to drop the vulgar interpretation of Marx
and the base/superstructure theory as economic determinism: "[w]e have to revalue
'superstructure' towards a related range of cultural practices, and away from a reflected,
reproduced or specifically dependent content. And, crucially, we have to revalue 'the
base' away from the notion of a fixed economic or technological abstraction, and towards
the specific activities of men in real social and economic relationships, containing
fundamental contradictions and variations and therefore always in a state of dynamic
process," (Williams, 6). To cordon off the base and superstructure from each other is to
make a metaphysical mistake, to assume that this methodological dichotomy is actually a
material one. What we must remember instead is that this duality is primarily a tool for
analysis and that between these two structures, there is a vast multiplicity of mediatory
layers.
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Recognizing that there is a deep interplay of interactions between the
superstructure and the base, we must continue on with a focus on analyzing the
superstructure, the container of culture that will frame our discussion of humanities
education. Superstructure has what Althusser would call a "relative autonomy" in
relationship to the base. Neither is merely a reflection of the other and both are
"overdetermined" by the other to be shaped in certain ways. Suffice to say, this complex
relationship cannot be reduced to a merely causal one. Culture both stands with the
economic base and apart from it, dependent and independent.
It is this tension of contradiction that begins to define it. Still, we are left with a
foundation but no identifiable building. It's as this point we have to let go of the
foundation/building metaphor, as we try to understand the dialectical structure not only
between culture and economy but between culture and itself. Culture is ever-present but
only exists with any power and clarity when it's in tension, a tension that is largely
produced by culture's essential grip on the past and history's continual development, a
tension between the maintenance of old meanings and the creation of new ones. As
Raymond Williams diagrammed, culture is constituted through the interplay of
movements, one being dominant and two beneath being residual and emergent. Culture
becomes clearer as tensions arise among the three. Fundamentally, there is a dialectical
tension between what is and what could be, whether that “could be” is a call to the past or
a call to the future and whether each actually opposes the present or merely provides an
alternative is to be discovered in practice.
Despite working from Marx's foundation, the positing of economic subsistence as
the foundation of all life, we must remember that it does not precede culture. There is no
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ahistorical point wherein humans fought to survive but then struggled to make that
survival meaningful. Economic subsistence only precedes cultural meaning in a
methodological sense, in that meaning must be founded on survival and that this basis of
subsistence is the center around which culture forms. It deviates from it in a multiplicity
of ways due to the vast differences produced by historical development, but it is the basis
upon which all things can be traced.
Ever-present Culture
People are conceived and born always already in culture. There is no ahistorical
or acultural human nature outside of history and general human development. Hegel
based his entire philosophy on the idea that consciousness is always developing in the
course of history, and each instance of consciousness in the form of a human being is a
product of this history, an instance of something universal. Marx's genius turn was to
replace the spirit with material reality itself and show that historical development does
not need an absolute spirit developing through it but that humanity itself, humanity alone,
works with reality to develop themselves.
Just as there is no human outside of history, there is no human outside of culture:
"men unmodified by the customs of particular places do not in fact exist, have never
existed, and most important, could not in the very nature of the case exist," (Geertz, 35).
Any concept of human nature that is "purified" from the "containment" of external, social
influences has no grounding in material human life: "there is no such thing as human
nature independent of culture," (Geertz, 49). Such ideas as social contract theory posit an
ahistorical state when people fought amongst themselves in a "state of nature" wherein
the human nature of savagery was displayed until an powerful group of humans together
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demanded a coherent social structure that forced organization. Such ideas can still work
as thought exercises to elucidate some ideas on values, but it cannot work as a basis of
human nature because it is ahistorical, not in the shallow sense that such a state didn't
materially exist, but in the deeper sense that this and theories like it do not take into
account the essential development of history itself.
The elements that constitute this historical process are essentially semiotic. What
culture is then, is a multiplicitous web of signification. Echoing Max Weber, Clifford
Geertz defines this cultural development of signification as the weaving of a web, man
being "an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun" (5). This web is
artificially created, always being the result of human historical development, but always
disguised in the form of naturality. This is largely because people are always born into a
cultural role before being conscious of their active power, although there is also a
dominant active force that seeks to reproduce a certain norm that benefits them.
"Culture" then "denotes an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied
in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of
which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes
toward life," (Geertz, 89). This understanding of culture captures the Wittgensteinian
vagueness of culture as a concept while retaining a methodological clarity. These signs
are not some merely abstract quantity but are observable, public, and essentially social
nodes of meaning: "[t]hey are all symbols, or at least symbolic elements, because they are
tangible formulations of notions, abstractions from experience fixed in perceptible forms,
concrete embodiments of ideas, attitudes, judgments, longings, or beliefs… Cultural acts,
the construction, apprehension, and utilization of symbolic forms, are social events like
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any other; they are as public as marriage and as observable as agriculture," (Geertz, 91).
These signs are not abstract notions set over and against reality but are embedded within
and throughout the very constitution of reality itself as a process of lived life. With this
understanding, culture can then be wide but clear, mutable but not indefinable, general
but meaningful.
Culture lends itself to being casted as natural because it is always already present,
an artificial but organic system that one is born into and realized in. If one were simply
born tabula rasa into this system and were capable of confronting it, the force it would
take to convince the vast majority of people this state is natural would have to be
incredible. This process is eased because people are not only born within culture but
realize themselves in it, meaning that their identity as human beings are constructed from
the significance of culture itself: "[b]ecoming human is becoming individual, and we
become individual under the guidance of cultural patterns, historically created systems of
meaning in terms of which we give form, order, point, and direction to our lives,"
(Geertz, 52). Within this external form for identification, individuals then find an
externally provided cell around which to grow themselves: "Individuals find in them a
culture which shapes to a large degree their tastes and opportunities, and which provides
an anchor for their self identification and the safety of effortless secure belonging,"
(Margalit, 83). Each birth is in a sense the creation of another in a multiplicity of nodes
within a vast web of human signification.
Within this web, all of reality is woven in a historical development of
significance. At different times, different things are valued that compose different
cultures, so at different times, different kinds of people are conceived. The basis of
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historical materialism founds itself in the idea that not only is economic subsistence
historical but that everything in life is historical. If it were only the economy, people
would have the freedom to confront culture with a decent degree of clarity, but all of life
in the form of culture is part of their realizations as individuals so identity itself is a
cultural product. "Individual well-being depends on the successful pursuit of worthwhile
goals and relationships. Goals and relationships are culturally determined. Being social
animals means not merely that the means for the satisfaction of people's goals are more
readily available within society. More crucially it means that those goals themselves are
(when one reaches beyond what is strictly necessary for biological survival) the creatures
of society, the products of culture," (Margalit, 83). In Geertz's terms: "We are, in sum,
incomplete or unfinished animals who complete or finish ourselves through culture–and
not through culture in general but through highly particular forms of it…" (49). This
wording trends toward reading it linearly, that man exists and then finishes in external
realization but we must retain the understanding that this realization is always already
occurring. Man is never incomplete in these terms, always completing himself in his own
actualized realization.

Identity
If man is necessarily a creature that must extend itself to operate in life, then man
is necessarily a social creature. Because of this, the historical production of man is the
production of humans determined by a cultural milieu of signification, and, as Geertz
asserts: "[s]uch symbols are thus not mere expressions, instrumentalities, or correlates of
our biological, psychological, and social existence; they are perquisites of it. Without
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men, no culture, certainly; but equally, and more significantly, without culture, no men,"
(Geertz, 49). Culture and man are not merely connected but essentially constitutive of
one another.
Of course, we must resist the vulgar materialist notion that men are but machines
put together by the assembly line of history, because men themselves have an active hand
in the construction of their history. However, each man is always preceded by men in
general so that whatever they are born into and whatever they may try to interpret, reject,
or change is always something created by historical development. Language itself is a
product and process of human history that the individual must realize itself in. Analogous
to the rest of culture, one must first learn language before one can articulate the fact that
one has learned it. Culture always precedes the self-consciousness of culture and thus
necessity always precedes freedom. The very capability of articulation in an individual is
predicated on culture. Even as one speaks about culture, one always speaks within it.
The individual thus constitutes itself as variably active assimilator of a certain set
of cultural products it was predetermined it could consume. Try as one might, no one can
now realize themselves as a Victorian era gentleman or a Renaissance era man because
the cultural context, the language in which to make an utterance, no longer exists. That
said, there is no particular general culture within which anyone at any time constitutes
oneself. Culture varies from epoch to epoch, from nation to nation, from household to
household, in manifold stark or subtle ways so that the very narratives of defining human
life are in a constant stage of change: "the determinate form the larger social situation
takes can itself vary, for different societies can build into their own organization a wide
variety of different 'narratives' for defining human social life," (Russon, 69). “Narrative”
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is then an apt metaphor to describe this because it contains the historical direction of
humans and humanity in development while defining linguistic parameters to any
individual utterance, which has some but not complete freedom.
Culture, even as it is a vast social web, is also a process of individuation, as the
realization of one's self involves finding a way to articulate one's own identity within this
varying cultural system. To understand culture, one must understand the ways it is
individuated: "[b]ehavior must be attended to, and with some exactness, because it is
through the flow of behavior–or, more precisely, social action–that cultural forms find
articulation," (Geertz, 17). Each behavior is then a socially determined act, a space
defined by society and shaped by the individual wherein narrative is honed: "it is as an
appropriation of one's society's narratives that one develops a sense of who one is. It is as
a social member that one is someone–that one can be recognized by one's others, and
thereby recognize oneself, as someone…" (Russon, 71). The establishment of one's
individuality depends on the appropriation and individuated use of one's sociality.
This sociality comes at us in many forms, and, especially when discussing race,
gender, and class, these forms are often combined where these three “particular stands of
social relations and ideological practices of difference and power are seen as arising in
their own specific social terrain, and then crisscrossing each other 'intersectionally' or
aggregatively. It is a coming together of social issues to create a moment of social
experience," (Bannerji, 144). Concepts like intersectionality show how one's experience
is constituted by a variety of social experiences intersecting together. Essential to this
though is the recognition that despite this vastly uneven distribution of experiential
terrains, for each individual, "[t]heir sense of being in the world, textured through myriad
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social relations and cultural forms, is lived or felt or perceived as being all together and
all at once," (Bannerji, 144). Though this experience can become fragmented into
discontinuity by conflicting contact with the social world, the basic mode of lived being
is one of continuity. Identity functions as individuation.
An essential idea for understanding how one composes oneself in such a cultural
context is the idea of narrative, which was alluded to previously. Freed from the confines
of writing, narrative is essentially the process by which an experience is given a
particular direction and form. Though it is not exclusively relegated to memory, one can
get a sense of it by recalling a past event and realizing that only some facets of this
continuous stream of life were safe from the proverbial cutting room floor. Narrative is
always a process of writing, reading, and rewriting wherein the constant influx of life is
honed and shaped into a narrative that can be comprehended, into a particular role from
which one can realize and articulate oneself as a meaning maker and meaning center.
As Fredric Jameson says, narrative is "the central function or instance of the
human mind," (13). While the senses are constantly absorbing and interpreting a
torrential barrage of raw information, the human mind creates its meaning by a process of
selection and organization, an articulation of individuated signification. Again, we must
keep in mind that these individual articulations always take place within the context of a
wider social language, so no identity is pure and free, but neither is it wholly determined.
Culture and identity are much like two sets of filters wherein the individual is a collection
of ever specified information: "[f]amiliarity with a culture determines the boundaries of
the imaginable. Sharing in a culture, being part of it, determines the limits of the
feasible," (Margalit, 83). Identity is always in tension with culture but the culture
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ultimately determines the limits of imaginable resistance and difference.
John Russon describes this conflict and cooperation in detail:
"The demand with which one's situation confronts one when growing up, then, is
to learn from it who one is going to be by interpreting its portrayal of who we are.
This context of other people calls upon one to be a specific sort of person and
learning who one will be is the process of finding a place for oneself within its
narrative, which amounts to taking on its traditions while transforming them in a
way that allows them to fit one's own new and developing situation. The
institutions by which we carry on the memory of who we are and the vision of
who we will be–the family first, but others as we become integrated into a larger
social life–educate each of us into who each of us is, which means they teach us
what there is, how to behave, and so on; in short, they articulate for us the
parameters of our human world," (70).
Within the form and formatting power of narrative, that which is already
determined as socially significant takes on the shape of being personally significant. In
other words, there are a multitude of gradations to this filtering system, such as family
and neighborhood as well as intersecting ones such as religion and ethnicity. To retain a
methodological coherence retaining a dialectical tension however, it will be clearest to
focus on culture and identity.
The human condition is to be birthed in ignorance, and in that ignorance, to be
little more than siphons for the surrounding sign, casts to be filled with certain modes of
being. Even as we mature to take a more active part in this self-development, the material
around us that can be used to construct our selves is limited. Fundamentally, it all
originates in the social world, from a system of intersubjective and interconnected values
that we soon find our own place within. In this sense, the development of our own
personal narrative is like stitching ourselves to an ever-growing cloth, weaving from the
material around and achieving definition by attaching to this collective material. To
function as any kind of particular individual, we must gain a particular corresponding
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social recognition: "human interpreters–free, self determining, bodily agents–are
fundamentally involved in an intersubjective project of mutual recognition or
confirmation, and that it is this that provides the core to the formation of our identities,
whether healthy or neurotic. The real substance of our lives is to be found in our dealings
with other people," (Russon, 51). Even for a characteristic like independence, we only
learn what it is through intersubjective signs and build this identity through the
replication of these same signs in us. Our identities are always enmeshed in a dense
system of interconnected intersubjectivity, so "to be a person is to be involved in a
struggle to establish a secure sense of oneself, a sense that can be mutually recognized by
both me and that other," (Russon, 55).
Body As Mediator
To be clear, this is not a spiritual, idealist description of a web of being uniting us.
Rather, this is, despite appearances, a material account. To understand this, we need to
understand the manner of transmission for these signs, which is through the body. First,
we need to remind ourselves that there is no individual before the social, that there is no
tabula rasa introduction. Second, we must know that life is lived continuously, and that,
despite our memories, despite our conscious narratives, there is a constant barrage of life
being lived streaming through our selves. At no point do we stop, able to pause things
and take a look at what to assimilate as if looking at a menu. We are always already
immersed in our life that is itself immersed in the lives of others.
Our selves are inherently permeable layers, else we would not be able to absorb
our culture and build our identities as readily as we do. That being said, not all of this or
even very much must be done through the conscious mind. Just as the self must use
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material from culture, so must the mind use material from something outside. Again, this
is not some unconscious spirit that glides along one's brain like a phantom, lest we would
then have to figure out how something ideal attaches itself to something material. Rather,
we have to look to the body. Here, the body is not strictly restrained by flesh but by
everything that is also bodily, in other words, that which falls below the level of
consciousness. It is a semiotics that can only make itself known through mediation, that
only exists and functions by way of the fact that it cannot be symbolized and thus
understood as we would understand something consciously.
As culture and identity are texts being written with the signs around them, so is
the body a text always being written by the life within and without it. The process of
living itself, in a much more concentrated way, is the language by which the body is
inscribed and then articulates itself. In his phenomenological psychological study of
human experience, John Russon shows how narrative is to be an embodied action through
the process of living life:
"[s]uch narratives are the intersubjective equivalent of the original determinacies–
the hands and the mouth–with which the organic body is born; they provide the
fundamental categories–the basic grasps–of intersubjective space by which the
child can negotiate her dealings with others and with her own sense of itself. The
child, thus, must develop a sense of things–a narrative–that meshes with the way
'we' are narrated to her through the behavior of the others," (66).
These intersubjective narratives then take on a material substance through the
embodiment of feelings and inclination resulting from the individual enmeshed in the
openness of sociality: "each one of us is 'embodied' in a specific set of narrative practices,
and we can see how these (different) practices are in fact routes by which–and the only
routes by which–individuals can develop for themselves both a self identity and a sense
of that self identity," (72). The conscious self, the identity, then establishes itself through
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a social realization of embodiment. The body constantly imbibes a narratively motivated
set of feelings, emotional and textural, and reproduces those feelings through the
mediation of conscious awareness. Life always seeks to reproduce that which engenders
life, and, through the body, life replicates itself. Narrative then passively establishes itself
and retrospectively solidifies into conscious realization.
To organize this vast understanding, we have to bring in Bourdieu's concept of the
habitus. Without it, we would be left stranded, absolutely immersed in an ocean of
feeling that our body somehow reproduces with some design. Bourdieu gave us a blue
print for such a design by way of his analysis of the habitus. The habitus is essentially a
mutable, mobile, ever adapting, ever subsuming constellation of habits: “[t]he ‘choices'
of the habitus [...] are accomplished without consciousness or constraint, by virtue of the
dispositions which, although they are unquestionably the product of social determinisms,
are also constituted outside the spheres of consciousness and constraint,” (51). What
survives is what is repeated. Habits build upon themselves, solidifying and congealing
with time and repetition. This repetition creates patterns that exist beyond any singular
action, these strong or weakly reinforced patterns folding into feelings, which further
motivate this link between the body and the conscious mind. Habits speak in the language
of feelings; they take up what is around them from repetition (for we must remember that,
as in music, there is no such thing as a continuous state but a state so consistently
recreated that it appears continuous, a note repeated so often one cannot hear the spaces
in between) and articulate their utterance in feelings.
Feelings are generally what governs one's "sense of place" (Bourdieu, 82), the
essential layer of mediation between an individual and reality. Despite positivistic
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concerns to the contrary, this layer cannot be merely removed as if it were a shroud
covering our eyes. They are the very tools, among others of course, with which we
interpret reality. While we may be able to conceptualize much of what we do, feelings
constitute the spaces around our concepts, the auras in which they glow. Feelings then
constitute the structure of thought with thought being the content.
Feelings emerge consciously in a number of ways, none of them distinctly clear
from another but broadly categorizable as emotions and inclinations. Both mobilize our
consciousness in certain ways, always set to repeat and reconstruct habits and ways of
being unless there is critical, conscious intervention. The body is the closest thing to a
central mediator for the outside and the inside as we can get. It is constantly being
bombarded with the totality of raw sensory information; that which is focused on with
awareness becomes conceptualized, that which is repeated becomes embodied in
sediments of habit, and that which is merely negligible either lying dormant waiting for
enough habit to make it repeatable or tossed to the wayside as one cuts through life.
Culture Over Identity
This process of consumption is mirrored by a process of reproduction, a
reproduction that constitutes the social self (the identity by which we are recognized) as it
interacts with the social world. Interposed between the self and non-self is a thick layer of
mediation so dense that it cannot be parsed, constituting an absolute immersion. Through
reproduction into this layer, human action is sedimented and ossified into systems,
institutions that cement themselves into external cultures. Even as people always already
exist within this cementation, the externality of this culture is paramount as these cultural
and systematic patterns of information "lie outside the boundaries of the individual
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organism as such in that intersubjective world of common understandings into which all
human individuals are born, in which they pursue their separate careers, and which they
leave persisting behind them after they die," (Russon, 92). Culture always exists in an
intersubjective space that is both external to humanity but in which humanity is
constantly and essentially immersed.
In agreement with Marx, though there is a dialectical contradiction between selfdetermination and external determination in this immersion, the dominant aspect of this
contradiction is external. Geertz modifies the identity model as it is translated into
culture, arguing that “culture is best seen not as complexes of concrete behavior patterns–
customs, usages, traditions, habit clusters–as has, by and large, been the case up to now,
but as a set of control mechanisms–plans, recipes, rules, instructions (what computer
engineers call 'programs')–for the governing of behavior," (Geertz, 44). Culture is
ultimately the container of identity and sets the parameters for its realization so in its
realization within the individual, it is not only an embodiment of narrative repetition but
is the external determination of that embodiment by way of externally motivated
prescriptions. Culture has the generative power of motivation, of a prescription for
behavioral feasibility and action. Culture defines the individual before the individual
defines culture.
Dialectally, we reconstruct our personal narratives based on our feelings, feelings
that have themselves been generated both by a culture around us and by environments
that we have influenced ourselves. Feelings and identity are then always in tension,
recreating and reconstructing themselves, adapting themselves to themselves. At our
core, humanity is not composed of any one nature but is constantly remaking itself in
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tension with that is within and what is without. We feel inclined to do one thing and
justify it with a conscious narrative, a narrative that can then plot a course for its further
repetition. We are socially determined, whether familiarly or culturally, to repeat a
certain action, way of thought, or way of feeling, and it becomes an embodied sensation,
a sensation from which we craft our personal narrative and the understanding of the
social narrative in which it fits.
Here we can see that there is then an essential need for mutability because, as
Marx said, man is nothing if not a historically situated animal. This complex system of
interlocking mediatory semiotic layers cannot lay at rest, and thus cannot be completely
analyzed, because man is at the same time in a constant state of individual and collective
development, not always in an upward direction but at least in a forward one. As Walter
Benjamin notes, the vast development of history funnels all the way down to individual
sense perception: "[d]uring long periods of history, the mode of human sense perception
changes with humanity's entire mode of existence. The manner in which human sense
perception is organized, the medium in which it is accomplished, is determined not only
by nature but by historical circumstances as well," (Benjamin, 222). To understand this
analysis of the human not only as a signifying creature dialectically constructing itself
between culture and identity but as a historically developing being in such a process is to
understand that the mutability of these vast complexes of signs change with time and
circumstance.
These changes do not merely occur in the overt forms of culture but occur down
to the very sense perceptions of individuals, always constituted and directed toward the
social space in which they were conceived: “[t]he categories of perception of the social
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world are essentially the product of the incorporation of the objective structures of the
social space,” (Bourdieu, 235). Despite the vast complexity of this structure, it does, with
time, change throughout history, and, in that change, it changes us, and through that
change, we change it. History itself is the grandest stage for this dialectical development
of humanity, ever expanding and ever changing.
Introduction of Ideology
Despite this seemingly vast, complex edifice of human historical construction, our
understanding of it can be shaken to the very core by a simple ingredient: the element of
wrongness, the idea that any such signified representation of society can exist through
ideological adherence rather than actual accordance with material reality. The possibility
of any such sign, any such node in this multiplicitous web of being wrong makes the
entire thing tremble, makes what seemed to be an abstract diagram into a political
struggle.
When Marx accuses such things as religion and proponents of political economy
as having a "false consciousness," he is truly making a radical, if not original or
unfounded, claim. Though we may have implicitly drawn a picture of signs being in some
sort of harmonic coherence, with tension being merely a methodological term, friction
does often emerge from these systems at any point along their course, in feelings of
wrongness, in conscious claims of wrongness, in narratives that try to cut a true path, and
cultural narratives that try to purify themselves of incorrect elements. At any point, at any
sign, two humans can meet across it in conflict. In these intersubjective spaces, any
person or group can demand the recognition that the other is wrong, the difficulty being
that both sides, while working within different sign spaces, can only use signs against one
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another.
There is a material reality deeply, deeply embedded beneath these signs, but
social reality always trumps it. The human historical edifice built on material reality
always shapes it in an artificial way. For instance, though nature can equally starve and
feed a person, it is only within particular historical situations that people are alternately
full or hungry. At this moment right now, there is enough on the planet to supply the
world with food, but it is not equally distributed. Though the content is made of material
reality, the situation is designed artificially. What exists is always being manipulated to
exist in a certain way. Any accusation of falsity then builds at least some part of its
veracity from social construction.
Here, we begin to see that any theory of ideology lies somewhere in between
individual identity and collective cultures. Ideology cannot be that which is merely false
but must be too something somewhere in between any duality of wrongness and
rightness. The very definition of whatever may or not be ideological will itself change
with time and perspective, always within the sway of sociality. The question becomes,
within this vast social construction, is there any room left for the concept of ideology?
Ideology is a concept that resists definition. It has been in popularity and disrepute
depending on the fashion of the time, fluctuating until it has expanded to fill everything
and consuming itself until it meant nothing. Proponents of its use want a term that refers
specifically enough for it to be significant but detractors always seem capable of
puncturing the concept until it deflates. Any definition seems liable to being either too
limited or too wide, either pointing too specifically to be generalizable or stretching so far
as to lose meaningful reference.
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Ideology tends to fall to one of two sides, leaning too hard on what I have now
defined as the poles of identity and culture. Generally, identity theories tend to posit the
individual as the locus of ideology, with ideology not merely being an illusion upon the
person but actually constituting the individual’s identity. Ideology is then reduced down
to a core that subsumes the individual and everything in its perception, losing its bearing
without specificity. Opposite to this, culture theories generally tend to posit the external
cultural situation as ideological, as particular systems become the loci of ideologies while
they implant these ideologies upon the individual. While identity theory subsumes
agency, culture theory consumes it; while identity theory absorbs the social, culture
theory stretches it.
Neither of these general theoretical methodologies is satisfying, and both are
liable to being too limited or too general. The schema I will design does not so much
strike entirely new ground but widen the conception of old grounds, namely by taking
identity and culture and putting them in conversation with each other. If they are each
liable to fall into metaphysical calcification, then they can rupture and free each other if
put in a dialectical discourse.
In my analysis, ideology functions as a dialectical mediator between culture and
identity. Ideology does not have a specific form or shape but operates within the
historical space between culture and identity, themselves spaces for social signs. Even as
we try to bring clarity to it, it is this obscurity that makes it difficult to clarify. It is this
unstable movement between these spaces that make other definitions limited. We can
even claim that this very definitional obscurity works in its favor, for whatever theory of
ideology one may be working with, one must certainly agree that it does not want to be
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found out as such.
Due to its existence in the dialectical tension of culture and identity, we have to
understand ideology through its constraints. Both culture and identity function through
the assimilation of content, throughout the consumption and reproduction of social signs
individualized, recreated, and returned. As historical life processes, they can become
congealed or mutable depending on particular developments. As opposed to ideology
however, culture and identity, as opposite poles, retain a certain self-conscious mutability
that ideology doesn't. Culture is at enough distance from the individual to recognize that
it can change, that it exists differently for different people, not just in other parts of the
world but for people with different positions in it. Identity exists with enough closeness
for each person to know that it changes; its history inherently exists within the history of
a lifetime. Though we may be able to sustain some sort of coherent narrative throughout
our existence, we can never deny twists and turns in its plot; though we can deny
improvements or regressions we cannot deny that they do exist. Ultimately, what is
ideological is what resists this self-conscious history.
What becomes calcified and resists self-consciousness is then not any specific
content but the very structure of social reality. "The dominance of the bourgeoisie and of
its ideology is not expressed in the content of the knowledge but in the structure of the
environment in which it is transmitted," (Ranciére, 6). Ideology does not exist within any
idea but between, in the spaces between contents. It is the very frame of what is that
determines ideology. While everything is historical and in those terms artificial, human,
and mutable, ideology is unique in that it is all those things without appearing that way
(the closest we will get to "false consciousness"). Instead, it is overdetermined by its
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opposing sides from culture and identity.
The dense network of signs we are encased in is not an even immersion but
loosens and tightens in different areas, looser by the edges of culture and identity and
tightest at its middle of ideology. By constituting itself as the shape, the frame, the
structure of content, ideology takes on a sense of firmness by its function of mediation
between those two contents. By taking on the weight of upholding both poles, in a sense,
almost everything, the heaviness contracts it with an unconscious stability. Ideology then
gains a mutability of content because any part of culture and identity can become
ideological when it takes on the stability of form. Once any aspect of culture or identity
congeals into being conceived as a natural structure rather than an artificial content, it
becomes ideological. When ideas lose their sense of being distinct things to be
contemplated and interpreted but instead reify into filtering structures of perception, they
become ideological.
Further, as Geertz says, "[t]he function of ideology is to make an autonomous
politics possible by providing the authoritative concepts that render it meaningful, the
suasive images by means of which it can be sensibly grasped," (Geertz, 218). Ideology is
the reification of a seemingly autonomous system that, through the creation and
reproduction of authoritative concepts, conditions the reception of its own meaning.
Ideology is that which slips through the perception of reality as relation and illusorily
stands on its own as objective.
This objectivity is then supported by a dominant class (as Marx legendarily
said) who are always already the dominant disseminators of ideas, the ones in the
position to back up the claim that their ideologies are objective. "Typically, those with
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power assert that their narratives are objective because they are reiterating commonly
held beliefs. To be objective effectively limits one’s basis of knowledge to commonly
held beliefs about what is true and the accepted means for deriving those truths.
Objectivity takes a position which serves to silence," (Zamudio, 5). This objectivity is
traded among people not as a fantastic revelation or rigorous scientific conclusion but as
common sense. In a vast culture of exclusions, the one thing we are all supposedly
included on is the recognition of ideology as obvious. Gramsci called common sense the
philosophy of non-philosophers, the a priori objective answer to any question that sought
to push past conservative values. It’s always effective because it is disguised as obvious,
with anything opposing it as obscure. Louis Althusser calls this function of making
something appear obvious the "elementary ideological effect" (Althusser, 129). Common
sense always has the upper hand because social reality is already suited to understanding
it. New visions do not have that privilege. Still, people will cling to their common sense
as fact, ignoring the simple idea that ideology will of course never overtly reveal itself,
that "ideology never says 'I am ideological,'" (Althusser, 131).
For instance, capitalism itself is not an ideological idea but for many, it has
solidified into something natural and unquestionable, a framework within which we can
make reforms but a structure that we cannot question because of its supposed naturalness;
that is ideology. We must remember too that ideology, while still being a negative term,
does not imply that anything in its bound is the worst of the worst. There are plenty of
harmful ideas within the bounds of culture and identity as well; just because we have
reached a historical stage where we can step back and contemplate certain ideas doesn't
mean they aren't harmful. At this point in time for example, we have made great progress
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in being able to critically think about modern sexuality, making specific progress for
homosexual people (though always best progress for white men), and even though we can
contemplate formerly ideological things with more distance, those who hold these ideas
are still harmful. Anti-gay sentiments become no less damaging once they are loosened
from the grip of general ideology, although their collective political effectiveness does
get eroded.
To bring it back into a narrative context, ideology is the narrative that defies its
own narratology. Ideological texts "come before us as the always-already-read; we
apprehend them through sedimented layers of previous interpretations, or—if the text is
brand-new—through the sedimented reading habits and categories developed by those
inherited interpretive traditions," (Jameson, 9). Within these vast intersections of
narratives between identity and culture, every reaction and act constitutes an act of
reading and rewriting, not an act pure from context but an act always within a changing
context. Ideology is that which pretends itself already read, a text that rebels against its
own textuality. To overextend the metaphor a bit, ideology is text that wraps itself around
other text in order to seem like a cover, as if it were merely the natural and necessary
frame for containing the text within.
Ideology as Aesthetics
Identities are constructed within culture, using the cultural set of languages as
building pieces from which to construct individualized articulations. At the same time,
there are dominant, residual, and emergent cultural narratives running on top of these
personal ones. Personal narratives interlock with these cultural narratives but rarely in
exact correspondence. Narratives conflict and often run counter to each other, as
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everyday human conflict shows. Each narrative tries to resolve these intersubjective
conflicts within its own bounds, as the capability of revision can justify a certain
narrative inertia. The goal is always coherence, so that even when things get nonsensical,
the narrative can be written in retrospect to make sense of the world.
Any narrative, being what Jameson would call an "aesthetic act," "is to be grasped
as the imaginary resolution of a real contradiction," (Jameson, 77). Narratives are then
essentially aesthetic acts because their ultimate goal is not a rational or scientific or
philosophical product but a coherent, symmetrical, beautiful product. Some sort of
coherence must be drawn between one's personal identity narrative and the outside
cultural narratives. Despite a multiplicity of small term conflicts, there must be brought
an ultimate resolution, not a resolution on one's deathbed but a constant activity of
resolution that happens at almost every moment. Even during and immediately after
tragic moments of great discontinuity, the first effort of the human mind is to bring it
back into coherence, back into a realm of understanding, of justification – it is this
reliance on structure which is inherently ideological, because life itself is not coherent,
not harmonious, not beautiful. In order for such an aesthetic act to occur, ideology must
be engaged with in order to repress what is discontinuous, dissonant, and ugly about life
so that one can pretend it is beautiful in order to sustain the structured narratives that one
has committed to but would ultimately conflict with each other and/or material reality if
one became truly self conscious of it.
The desire for coherence is essentially an aesthetic desire and "the aesthetic act is
itself ideological, and the production of aesthetic or narrative form is to be seen as an
ideological act in its own right, with the function of inventing imaginary or formal
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‘solutions’ to unresolvable social contradictions," (Jameson, 79). Ideology is then that
which merely makes aesthetic resolutions to real contradictions, making inherently
contradictory material social texts imaginatively resolved. Ideology is what "enables men
to live their relation to their conditions of existence," (Ranciére, 8). As Marx said so long
ago on the topic of religion, it is the "sigh of the oppressed creature," the rationalization a
subjugated person must enact in order to live their life.
Further, ideology defines this resolution in a way that motivates people to commit
to it as they are subjected to its subscription. Ideology "names the structure of situations
in such a way that the attitude contained toward them is one of commitment," (Geertz,
231). The very structure of reality is named, made understandable and communicable,
through the acceptance of a commitment to it. Commitment is then cemented through the
cutting away and making unthinkable of other situations by the severing of externality, of
context:
"the literary work or cultural object, as though for the first time, brings into being
that very situation to which it is also, at one and the same time, a reaction. It
articulates its own situation and textualizes it, thereby encouraging and
perpetuating the illusion that the situation itself did not exist before it, that there is
nothing but a text, that there never was any extra- or contextual reality before the
text itself generated it in the form of a mirage," (Jameson, 81).
Ideology is a text that purifies itself, that attempts to deny its own textuality by severing
itself from the sociality of its accompanying texts. Ideology is the convincing that there is
nothing beyond what is.
Ideology too is a narrative but a narrative that has naturalized itself into appearing
as a framework, as a background. Ideology, like all narratives, is artificial, human, and
free, but what becomes ideological is what seems necessary. An outside social culture, an
inner personal identity, both are two poles of human life that are necessary, but between
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them, there is a vast set of dialectical contradictions that constitute who we are. The
elements of that that are ideological are what defy their own humanity, that rebel against
their artificially in favor of disguising themselves as natural. It is the framework, the
background, the assumed plot of a story wherein other narratives can only be sub plots.
Any narrative, from the most intimate identity story to the grandest cultural myth can
become ideological with the false consciousness of its rigidity (and of course, because
they are necessarily intersubjective, they intersect and tie themselves together).
All narratives are subject to ideological reification, the infection of the habitus by
"the reifying habit of thinking of a given narrative as an object, or as a unified whole, or
as a static structure" (Jameson, 45). An example for identity might be the concept of
sexuality, which is held so tightly close to the chest that the very idea of a man loving
another man or a woman loving another woman can make a heterosexual person deeply
uncomfortable. An example for culture could be the American Dream myth, wherein a
particular rags to riches narrative is vaunted as the exemplary path any worthwhile person
must go down; anyone who doesn't fit this path must try to modify their personal
narratives to fit it.
Allan Bloom is one of many that tries to stretch this particular cultural myth to all
of its nation's people, to every citizen and every immigrant that comes to this country:
"America tells one story: the unbroken, ineluctable progress of freedom and equality,"
(55). Bloom is correct in that America only does tell this one story, but it does this by
ignoring and silencing other stories, narratives that would counter this one, which
reinforces the dominance of the status quo. As Michael Apple says, such a totalizing
narrative about immigrants coming to pursue the American Dream forgets that "[s]ome
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immigrants came in chains, were slaves and faced centuries of repression and
government-mandated segregation. And there is a world of difference here," (17). This is
one of what Fredric Jameson would call a "master narrative", one that, as the name
suggests, necessarily subjugates other narratives beneath its dominant retelling.
These examples show just a glimpse of the complexity of narrative intersections
that run counter, alongside, and near each other. What is essentially ideological, for
Jameson in particular, is the idea that any reading of this complex of texts is complete.
What should be a vast but fluid, constantly rewritten set of narratives becomes,
ideologically, a written and completed text. Any of the multiplicity of narratives between
identity and culture can congeal into a false consciousness of its completion, of its
rigidity, of its naturalness, which sends it to the background as an assumed framework for
what else is actively written. This ideological framework "maps the limits of a specific
ideological consciousness and marks the conceptual points beyond which that
consciousness cannot go, and between which it is condemned to oscillate," (Jameson,
47), which in this analysis is between the poles of culture and identity. While the
individual consciousness is, as has been said, always limited by its sociality, ideology is
what enforces the limitation of becoming self-conscious of this determinism. Ideology is
which has been accepted and the ignorance that it can be rejected.
The absolute frustration with ideology is that it exists right under our noses. While
identity is in an intimate closeness with our selves and culture is at an appreciable but
socially encompassing distance, ideology exists and functions right in front of us, right
around us as if it were an aura within sight but unseeable. Seeing ideology is like trying
to see one's own eyes; it is not close enough to simply be reflected on inwardly but not
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far enough away to see, it is rather the very function and structure of seeing. It is too
close to question but far enough away to seem separate and independent, close enough to
seem natural but far enough to not seem artificial.
Despite being so front-and-center, so centrally staged, so universally present, it
can hardly be touched. Even brushing up against ideology is like touching an exposed
nerve (largely because it is normally immersed in what it is mediating with culture and
identity then metaphorically constituting the flesh). Questioning ideology shakes the
entire system, forces the pain of potential or actual change throughout culture and
identity. When questioning structure, everything atop it must tremble.
To ask how important culture and/or identity is to a person is almost a stupid
question: the answer is always some degree of "very." To rupture what holds either but
always both up will cause pain as it corrodes that which makes both meaningful. Geertz
explains: “it is the attempt of ideologies to render otherwise incomprehensible social
situations meaningful, to so construe them as to make it possible to act purposeful within
them, that accounts both for the ideologies' highly figurative nature and for the intensity
with which, once accepted, they are held," (Geertz, 220). Questioning ideology, by
definition, does not question something but questions the structure of somethings,
disrupts a narrative of direction and order and stability. It is both a material reality of the
body and of society and the immaterial reality of identity and culture. The question for
ideology is then not to bring it into absolute clarity by separation (because that is
impossible), destruction through scientific investigation (because ideology will always
already constrain investigation), or accept it as an unchangeable reality (because all
things are historical and thus mutable, and ideologies can do harm). The question for
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ideology is that which it resists the most, how can we become conscious enough of it to
recognize that it can change and where it must change?
Ideology in Social Reality
We must recognize that despite the difficulty, ideology is not purely invisible. In
big and small ways, it can be discovered and examined and even changed. The continual
process of life lived also grants one a developing process of self-consciousness, though
this is not linear. In some ways, children are much more conscious of how they are
socially determined than an adult is. Similarly, even cynical teenagers have a point too
when they question the meanings of institutions that have long been accepted by adults.
Ideology does not just solidify in an ideal space of the mind but ossifies in the material
world as an institution. Despite hiding the movement, both of these aspects dialectically
maintain themselves. Foucault elaborates, using the concept of relations of power:
"[r]elations of power are not in themselves forms of repression. But what happens
is that, in society, in most societies, organizations are created to freeze the
relations of power, hold those relations in a state of asymmetry, so that a certain
number of persons get an advantage, socially, economically, politically,
institutionally, etc. And this totally freezes the situation. That’s what one calls
power in the strict sense of the term: it’s a specific type of power relation that has
been institutionalized, frozen, immobilized, to the profit of some and to the
detriment of others," (Foucault).
Ideology is not so much what is repressive in culture and identity but is a power relation
that has frozen into seeming natural and unquestionable.
We must keep in mind that as individuation is a process of the individual
becoming conscious of itself as itself, it is also the process of the individual becoming
conscious of its social determinism. This consciousness is never complete and never
empty, but lies in some developing space in between. If it sounds like I'm repeating
myself in a cycle, it's because I am. Clifford Geertz reminds us that "[c]ultural analysis is
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intrinsically incomplete," (Geertz, 29) largely because this dialectic can never completely
resolve itself. The human is essentially caught in a dialectical contradiction between
individual and social that runs its development between a constant tension of these two
forces, not merely compromising in the middle but conflicting and contradicting in the
center. The very force of individual development cannot be enacted by a settled middle
but is pushed onward by the force of a center in contradiction, movement being generated
by the friction of contradictions struggling for dominance. So again, even as the
individual realizes itself, so must it realize outside of itself.
An Uneven Distribution
Louis Althusser re-articulates this contradiction in the form of interpellation,
wherein the very subject of a self realizes itself as being called upon by an external social
force. In his words, “all ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete
subjects, by the functioning of the category of the subject,” (130). Althusser uses the
example of a man on the street being hailed by a police officer. In this moment, as he
turns around, he becomes a subject because he has “recognized that the hail was ‘really’
addressed to him, and that ‘it was really him who was hailed’ (and not someone else),”
(131). The person realizes itself, actually assumes subjecthood (a process which is always
already ongoing) through the force of social constitution.
Though this is a universal element of culture, we can see through Althusser’s
example how interpellation takes on special significance for people of color and women.
The call of a police officer takes on a more dangerous edge for a race presumed guilty
and a call from from any man forces the treatment of woman as unwillingly sexual
objects in the configuration of the catcall. In interpellation, we can see that the subject is
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always already in the process and the product of self realization at the beckoning of
culture but that the authority of the social realm in general functions not only for
particular individuals enacting particular personal narratives but for people unwillingly
fulfilling social roles in a particular social hierarchy. A person as an articulation does not
exist in a free cultural framework but within one that is necessarily a hierarchy of
oppression, subjugation, and dominance: "[t]here are no subjects except by and for their
subjection," (Althusser, 136). Culture is in fact not a neutral web of values but an
artificial web of signification wherein a certain dominant order naturalizes a certain
hierarchy of significations. Not every narrative is legitimated equally; rather culture is
further filtered from the social to the individual and back to the social in the shape of a
hierarchy that further narrates and privileges a certain set of significations. The particular
signifiers are always arbitrary, as they change with history, but the tension of a hierarchy
is always present within culture itself because the persistence of any cultural system
needs the generative power of contradiction.
Just as in a story, the supposed protagonist of dominant culture needs a foil to
work against to keep the story going. Because culture is always historical, there can never
be a pure space of peaceful culture; it is always a moment constituted by past and future
struggle, with residual cultures residing in the background and emergent ones rising in
the foreground. Those that benefit from the state of the current moment are always
heavily invested in the reproduction of the material grounds for said moment. Any call to
end history and remain can never work and will always fail, but any call to value one
signification over another has the power to be lasting, whether that is a frightful form of
dominance or an emergent progressive movement.
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Culture is always in contention with itself as a composition of contradictions. In
order to persist, these contradictions cannot persist peacefully but must confront
themselves combatively, thus creating a hierarchy of legitimated winners and invalidated
losers. Though everyone is equally realized in culture, not all said cultures are made
equally, and it is this constant tension, disguised illusorily as natural peace, which
constitutes any moment of culture. Cultural contradiction is the basis for class struggle,
which is why Marxists can accurately say it is eternal and essential to history; there is
always a hierarchy. As said before in other guises, the eternal facet of human history is
class struggle, dialectical contradiction. Though class is the animating property for the
dialectical history of struggle between those who profit and those who labor, this struggle
must always occur within a cultural context that both creates it, justifies it, and is in turn
dialectically created by it: "[t]he class struggle is always already a cultural struggle,"
(Readings, 94).
Culture as Hierarchy
We can then understand that at any moment when someone is interpellated as an
individual within culture they are not only positioned in a structure but implicated in a
hierarchy. While this all corresponds to a vast minutia of historical specifications, we can
generally break this interpellation into categories: those of high culture and those of sub.
Keeping in mind the essential movement of cultural identification, even as it is
ideologically disguised as stable, one's place in culture is always defined by one finding
one's place in culture. The ideological unity of cultural and identity narratives are made
coherent only by an ideological configuration of stability. Though we may think our
culture and our identities are neutral locations or assemblages of materials, they are
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embedded in a social historical hierarchy that ideologically reconfigures how our
assemblage of narratives will be cohered.
High culture is what people refer to when they talk about someone becoming
cultured, going out and getting some culture, and going to university to become initiated
in culture. Implicit in this function of culture is an ascending motion, a movement and
struggle toward transcending what one once was to become a better version. Going to the
opera, watching the best films, reading the greatest literature, and associating with the
best people are all signifiers of high culture, and some of them may be necessary but
none of them are sufficient. High culture is defined by its constant movement upward, a
motion of reaching but never grasping. There is not a king of culture astride the throne as
the pinnacle of highest sensibilities. Perhaps at a party, one person may be seen as the
most stylish, as the life of the party, but the entire company, them included, knows that
any person perched high is one faux pas away from tumbling down. There is no resting in
high culture because one must always be in ascension, which essentially means that one
must always be reaching. One must constantly be accruing more signifiers because high
culture relies on social recognition as well as the further strengthening of the buttresses of
their social positions, i.e. wealth accrual.
These signifiers have no specific permanent, natural content but change with
history. In ages past, people of all kinds would go to see plays for instance, (of course,
even those were split into better and worse ones), but nowadays, that is seen as a largely
high culture thing to do. Further, high culture can easily appropriate any signifier that
used to exist in the general social world and remove it to a higher realm. The writings of
Shakespeare used to be for the common people until his work was appropriated and
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locked away in a world of high culture. Poor William has probably been spinning in his
grave for years knowing that his work is most commonly seen as something for an elite
class, most often as something to do in college behind a huge paywall.
With these examples, we can begin to see that throughout history there aren't
consistent examples of things that are naturally high culture. The idea of a natural,
objective, even real (in the sense that it is not a social construction) culture is simply a
fabrication used to further reinforce the power of such a hierarchy. The force of higher
culture is thus an ideology of exclusion. In a power structure like white supremacy for
instance: "[w]hiteness has more value in relation to other races as long as it maintains its
exclusive privileges. The more other races are granted the rights and privileges of
whiteness, the less value it maintains," (Zamudio, 33). The value of a race is of course
not based on the color of its skin but on the arbitrary choice of skin as signifier and the
material reinforcement of oppression and subjugation of one signifier as being better than
the other, as excluding and thus becoming valuable in opposition to an Other. Higher
culture deals in a line of thinking Boaventura de Sousa Santos calls "abyssal thinking":
"The invisible distinctions are established through radical lines that divide social
reality into two realms, the realm of “this side of the line” and the realm of “the
other side of the line”. The division is such that “the other side of the line”
vanishes as reality becomes nonexistent, and is indeed produced as nonexistent.
Nonexistent means not existing in any relevant or comprehensible way of being.
Whatever is produced as nonexistent is radically excluded because it lies beyond
the realm of what the accepted conception of inclusion considers to be its other.
What most fundamentally characterizes abyssal thinking is thus the impossibility
of the copresence of the two sides of the line. To the extent that it prevails, this
side of the line only prevails by exhausting the field of relevant reality. Beyond it,
there is only nonexistence, invisibility, non dialectical absence […] These forms
of radical negation together result in a radical absence, the absence of humanity,
modern subhumanity. The exclusion is thus both radical and nonexistent, as
subhumans are not conceivably candidates for social inclusion. Modern humanity
is not conceivable without modern sub humanity. The negation of one part of
humanity is sacrificial, in that it is the condition of the affirmation of that other
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part of humanity which considers itself as universal," (45).
Those that are excluded are then made to be radically absent from any discourse, thus
unavailable to constitute themselves as social beings. A culture of exclusion defines itself
by what is negated; similarly, humanity then defines itself based on what is defines as
subhuman. This oppression is not done through a mode of explicit repression but is
maintained thorough systems of legitimation that exclude such sub-humans from even
being socially considered.
To ascend, one must learn to exclude, make others descend, or at least take on the
signifiers of having enacted such movements. Importantly, this ascension is to be
metaphorically understood as a motion more than a structure. Though terms such as these
and others like hierarchy and base and superstructure always imply linear vertical
structures, we have to remember the influences of structuralists and post-structuralists,
primarily Michel Foucault, who showed that a more functional metaphor is one of "center
and periphery." Bill Readings goes on to describe this as a model that isn’t in the mode of
“speaking of power in terms of the vertical ascendancy of the rulers over the dominated
(the classical model of class domination),” instead, “we speak of multiple marginalized
positions in relation to a hegemonic center." This kind of diagram allows us to map the
"relations of power among transverse groups (groups that include members of all social
classes, such as women or homosexuals)," (Readings, 105). Though Marx still has a point
in that social groups can largely be split into the owners of production and the laborers, of
the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, modern divisions of oppression necessitate practice
that involves the acknowledgement of intersectional lines of power relations in order to
create such class consciousness that would allow for the union of oppressed groups. High
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culture in fact maintains its dominance through such ignorance by excluding different
people in different ways, dividing them away and against each other, always pushing
them away from the "hegemonic center."
Sub Culture
Any concept involving the democratization of high culture is then a contradiction
in terms because the very act of disseminating and generalizing high culture destroys it.
In most modern day industries, and I include the university in this, walls are being
continually broken down for the inclusion of other races and genders in predominantly
white male fields. The main reason this produces such destructive tension is not just that
a privileged and elite class has to learn to share, but that the very entrance of other
cultures into high cultures ruptures what it used to mean. Once high culture becomes
inclusive, its exclusive nature is corroded, and the entire concept collapses in on itself. It
is naive to think that high culture can simply be taught or forced to become more
inclusive. Culture cannot merely be reformed; it must be destroyed and remade. The
entrance of sub cultures into high cultures cannot be anything but an explosive
revolution.
The temptation here is to compare high culture to low culture, and, though there is
some value in this critique, it is too small a picture. The dominant tension is not between
high and low culture but between high culture and sub culture. Low culture is largely just
a negative reflection of high culture, holding on to the remnants of what high culture
hasn't taken and what they are allowed to get without high culture's systematic
advantages. Dialectically, low culture does not contradict high culture but compliments it.
High culture needs low culture to exclude in order to function. A contradiction is feigned,
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but in truth, as discussed, any signifier can pass up and down between the levels through
the passage of history.
Sub culture is culture that is not simply excluded or pressed down by high culture
but is actually marginalized and erased. Sub cultures do not participate in the race to the
top, because they are not considered to be part of any spectrum of culture; they are
attached but not within. As with high culture and culture in general, there is no strict
definition and boundaries to draw, but with the advent of the 60s counter culture, we have
been given a clear language to at least draw some lines. In America, these lines are
largely of race and gender, black and female. In the 60s, largely springing from the
universities, students emerged that demanded their sub cultures be recognized, the two
largest claims coming from black people and women (groups that also intersected).
Suddenly, the universities, which had previously been the bearers and legitimators of
high culture, the badge givers of entrance into high culture, had to recognize a
fundamentally different type of culture.
If high culture is constituted by exclusion, dialectically, sub culture is constituted
by the opposite function, inclusion. As with high culture, if we were to ask a
representative of a sub culture what defined their culture, we would probably get a host of
different answers, none of them being necessary or sufficient to strictly define sub
culture. We are working with recognition of familial likenesses, not of any specific
content. High culture is defined by an absolute exclusion, a core void that pushes
everything out so that people must continually reach for signifiers to grasp a center that
cannot be touched. The essential difference is that sub culture actually unites people,
founding itself on inclusion rather than exclusion.
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If we were to eliminate every signifier that wasn't universal to each person in a
sub culture, we would be left with one thing (one thing more than high culture) –
oppression. At its limit, the sub cultures of such groups as black people and women are
united by the socially constructed aspects that signify their inclusions in groups that are
systematically oppressed. For black people it is the color of their skin and for women it is
their gender. There are a multitude of other signifiers that contribute to the social
recognition of such people as belonging to oppressed groups (e.g. music choice, clothing,
dialect, etc.) but they always symbolically point to their group signification, a situating of
oppression. Members of a sub culture are essentially united by their oppression, a
fundamentally social, inclusive recognition. These sub cultures are based not on
excluding on the basis of achievement but including on the basis of group recognition of
oppression.
I must again make a note here that this is a methodological diagram for culture,
not a blue print that will apply to every specific instance. Dialectically, we have to
remember that every instance contains both aspects of a contradiction. There are certainly
members of high culture that will include people in their circle, but generally this is an
exception to a rule, and those chosen to be pulled into inclusion are usually still
originating from certain systematic castes. Similarly, there are cases of sub cultures
excluding people, e.g. a black person not recognizing someone from a mixed racial
background. Again, there is still a fundamental basis of inclusion because suffering and
oppression still unites them despite recognition.
One of the great advantages of the cultural hierarchy for the dominant is that high
culture gets the privilege of modeling what it even means to be a culture. The more a sub
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culture tries to define itself as a true culture in the terms of what high culture defines, the
more they become exclusive and corrode themselves from within. Further, high culture
comes to an ascendent singular point that can, in moments of history, take on the
semblance of a specific, objective content while sub cultures are fractured by the very
oppression that unites them into fragmented groups.
Once again, we can look to the 60s wherein women and black people both took on
the mantles of sub cultures to define themselves against high culture but did not
necessarily unite together. Though they were both oppressed by the system at large, the
specifics of their most pointed oppressions focused their in- group recognition of things
that divided them. This is simple to understand when recognizing that black people would
understandably be focused on what oppresses them as black people and women would be
focused on what oppresses them as women. This reveals the important idea that, even
now, those people that intersect between those sub cultural lines are often erased or
marginalized within their own sub culture. While sub cultures are divided, sometimes
even explicitly against each other, we can get cases of black men employing the
patriarchy and white women employing racism to suppress black women. Again, the
grand model of culture is based on a high culture of exclusion so it's tempting to subsume
that in order to formulate a specific identity. Examining the specifics of oppression often
result in a fractal like pattern wherein exclusive patterns are repeated as one zooms in on
social actions. We have to remember that individual identities are comprised of many
contradictory elements, as are the social recognitions of such individual identities.
The key here is that the main contradiction in this hierarchy is not between high
culture and low but between high culture and sub culture. Low culture is merely a
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negative reflection of high culture, while sub culture, though it may indeed be maligned
as low, is in fact its own sufficient system. Low culture and sub culture are deeply
intermixed, an ambiguity that favors high culture's dismissal of sub culture as simply
being low. Low-riding pants for instance, were a signifier of black male identity but have
become in the larger social discourse a signifier of stupidity and lower class. Deriding
this style can be done without any explicit, intentional racism and can be defended as
such. This is further aided by the appropriation of this style by other groups, in this case
white men, which aids people in convincing themselves their disdain is across an
arbitrary line of fashion rather than a line of sub cultural racism.
Especially as previously sub cultural signifiers, positioned as low, such as rap
music, gain mainstream attention, always aided by the general perception that something
culturally significant is actually merely individually "edgy", sub cultural signifiers can be
appropriated and subsumed into the high cultural milieu. Jameson reflects on this in his
study of literature, "popular narrative from time immemorial—romance, adventure story,
melodrama, and the like—is ceaselessly drawn on to restore vitality to an enfeebled and
asphyxiating 'high culture,'" (86). Low and sub cultures are derided and dismissed until
high culture has made itself so bland as to need them. High culture, by always severing
itself from what it deems as other, tends to gradually smother itself within its own selfcreated vacuum. From here, we can understand the almost confounding situations
wherein a white rapper can be valorized as being an intelligent social critic while a
multitude of black rappers with deeper insights are silenced and erased in popular
discourse. Those sub cultures are told they are merely low with the possibility of maybe
doing what they do in a high way but in reality, they are deeply oppressed and
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marginalized, unable to ascend.
If there is a strong dividing line between high culture and sub, and even this blurs
with case-by-case analysis, it is between people who can ascend and those that cannot.
Though, as Marx said, the vast majority of people are oppressed in class based societies,
the ideologically constructed picture of this is of everyone as able to ascend and everyone
not ascended as having not done so by choice. In reality, even considering those that
desperately want to attain high culture, most people cannot climb because of social
factors outside of their control such as their gender, their race, and their class position.
These people are instilled with the individualist idea that if they all worked hard enough
and did the right things, they could ascend. However, these supposedly pure individuals
are ensnared in a social reality they cannot escape, an artificial hierarchy disguised as a
natural one wherein everyone is situated as being "not enough," so they can be induced
into the never ending race to get to the top.
Here, we can see that culture is at it its essence a reflection of its economic core
because the same rules apply there. People are blamed for their economic woes as if their
wealth was purely a reflection of their effort, as if they existed as individuals completely
separate from society and structural determinations. Just as in culture, the ideology of
ascension situates people as individuals competing for the pinnacle, rather than groups
tied together by mutual recognition of oppression. This is why such sub cultures that do
begin to recognize this systematic power must be further suppressed and quelled. It is not
enough for these sub cultures to be marginalized; ideally, their erasure from the discourse
would finally result in material erasure. Dominant high culture would rather absorb
everything about this sub culture that they deem of worth and leave the carcass to the
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side. High culture exists because of its exclusion of low culture; for high culture to
recognize self sufficient, differently organized sub cultures would be to destroy it. High
culture is predicated on the idea that culture is a universal construct, a general spectrum
in which people can rise and fall. Everything must be subsumed into its scope or it
implodes.
Before we leave from this analysis, we must acknowledge that the hierarchy alone
is a little too individualistic and voluntaristic. Though we have focused on lines of
oppression that are definitely socially constructed such as race, gender, and class, it's still
tempting to act as if the hosts of signifiers that collect to form recognition are still largely
a matter of choice. We would be operating from a framework wherein one may start off
female but then choose signifiers that push one up or down the cultural spectrum. It is
this kind of framework that lends itself to the liberal analysis wherein sub cultures are
told to merely be more like the high culture (implicitly assuming the high culture is not
also socially constructed, that its value is natural rather than contingent). If we put aside
the above discussion’s radical terminology of negations and implosions, we could work
from it to recommend that "oppressed" people simply take up signifiers of higher culture
and "teach" those individual racist/sexist people that these people too can be a part of
high culture. This puts the burden of education on the sub culture, as if they need to show
that they can be good as well in order to convince individuals (never systems, never
groups) that they can be "good."
This is why we must remember the aforementioned structure of culture and
identity that constructs who a person is and what material they have around them to
determine who they can be. When comparing the dominant high culture to the
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underrepresented sub culture, it is easy to ideologically see the former as normal and
human and the latter as abnormal and other. Both, however, are equally subject to the
human absorption of culture and identity from the social apparatus. The hierarchy is
imminent to that of culture itself. It is an ideological framework applied within culture
that has been selectively forgotten until it seems like a natural, a priori knowledge. Both
are in fact human artifices and must be treated as such.
Hierarchy as Immanent Structure
There is no linear temporal timeline one can draw that shows culture emerging
before the application of hierarchy. They always already exist together. As long as there
has been domination, there has been subjugation because the subject has always needed
an other to define itself against. The individual must be defined against a background,
upon a social stage that creates the space for its explication. Beyond these fundamental
articulations, the individual needs a narrative by which to point itself, a narrative implicit
in its formation: "[i]t is a loss of orientation that most directly gives rise to ideological
activity, an inability, for lack of usable models, to comprehend the universe of civic
rights and responsibilities in which one finds oneself located," (Geertz, 219). This loss of
orientation is a condition of being human, a condition of "desperation" that always
already prefigures a person as searching for cultural and personal order. Amidst the chaos
of intersecting and conflicting webs of signification, ideology is sought out for stability
and peace.
Any subject is interpellated both in culture and identity at large as well as being
interpellated within the hierarchy immanent to those poles. Just as identity and culture are
being narratively constructed alongside and against each other, so is a historical
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ideological framework always hierarchized and legitimating/delegitimizing certain
aspects of those constructions. This hierarchy creates a seemingly natural set of roles for
people to play, wherein everyone has a place to be and a narrative to enact: "operating
from these narratives amounts to remembering one's place and establishing one's
expectations," (Russon, 66). Society creates a certain niche, a controlled space in which
one can realize oneself. Especially given the dominance of this ideology both in the
weaving of cultural and personal identities, there is a certain amount of comfort given to
any role because it does not depend on any individual effort but merely in a certain mode
of existence: "[i]dentification is more secure, less liable to be threatened, if it does not
depend on accomplishment," (Margalit, 82). This identification is secured by the
establishment of personal narratives that are predisposed to fit in with cultural ones, by
the creation of roles that establish a set of expectations and a place for one to sustain this
realization.
The hierarchy does not survive merely by the strong-arm power of repression but
by a certain tradeoff wherein almost anyone receives some place in the collective (of
course, the term "trade off" implies one exists before sociality and makes a trade, similar
to the social contract arguments, but we always already exist within this social tie). We
exist as we are within society, so there is no human nature before entrance, emerging out
as either oppressed or not. As John Russon reminds us, "[w]e are never isolated
individuals who only subsequently enter into contact with others. On the contrary, we are
from the start inescapably engaged with the experience of other people," (Russon, 56),
and that experience is always unequally, unevenly, and unfairly distributed.
So, though we may recognize that social power actively creates roles for people to
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enact and find meaning in, oppression still enacts mental and material damage on the
oppressed with "pressures to perform one’s identity so as to avoid being the subject of
stereotyping or to fit prevailing norms [which] imposes psychic costs on those who have
to compromise or ignore significant parts of themselves, or who are denied opportunities
because they are not willing to compromise," (Zamudio, 38). The oppressive roles
created are especially limiting, and this has a detrimental effect on the development of
oppressed people, further limiting their ability to rebel against such ideologies. Still, even
without a pure identity that one has before entering into oppression, one can still learn to
become conscious of one's own oppression.
Power As A Creative, Active Force
That said, we still can’t merely see power as a repressive force. Rather, as
Foucault repeatedly reminds us, power does not work purely as a repressive mechanism
but as an active one: “[w]e must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in
negative terms; it ‘excludes’, it ‘represses’, it ‘censors’, it ‘abstracts’, it ‘masks’, it
‘conceals’. In fact, power produces, it produces reality; it produces domains of objects
and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong
to this production” (Foucault, 194). Power creates roles for people, in a sense, creates
certain kinds of people. Power creates narratives for people as it creates people to
interlock with those narratives. The people however, as social beings, are both their own
and the roles they exist in. Power does not constrain some pure individual but actually
constitutes people, the idea of pure individuality itself only being an illusory ideological
framework.
With this as a basis of power, oppression is transmitted through people by way of
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a conduit, with individuals being the "vehicles of power, not its points of application,"
(Foucault, 98). Rather than individual beings the sites or points of active oppression, they
are the socially defined nodes that circulate within a certain "net" of power. We are
always already ensconced in a certain oppressive discourse, a matrix of cultural-identityideology-hierarchal structure, a towering edifice of man made social reality that we both
exist in and are constituted by, of which we do not as much become conscious as become
self conscious.
Narrative is still a useful term here because people can then be seen as
constituting themselves in their articulations and being constituted by the availability of
the social language from which they can speak, that discourse being constituted by that
collectively human generated historical power matrix. Truth itself is defined by such a
discourse:
“[t]here are manifold relations of power which permeate, characterize, and
constitute the social body and these relations of power cannot themselves be
established, consolidated or implemented without the production, accumulation,
circulation and functioning of a discourse. There can be no exercise of power
without a certain economy of discourses of truth which operates through and on
the basis of this association. We are subjected to the production of truth through
power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth,"
(Foucault, 93).
Discourse is inextricably linked up with power, both of them defining how a person is to
act through the roles society makes available to them, to the kinds of responses that are
legitimated and acknowledged. As Marx originally said, as historical beings, we are what
we are determined to be and what we determine ourselves to be, with the important
clarification that the human never enters history but exists by way of it.
We have also mass-produced and repackaged the idea that one should be happy
with one's place, so resistance is often seen as ungratefulness or ignorance about what is
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natural. Resistance can also be a dangerous position to act in because, thanks to culture's
essentially ascending/descending movement, any form of truly outlying behavior can get
one booted from the game entirely. In this sense, it is safer and more comfortable (at least
appearance wise) to remain in one's station than thirst for too much more. Even as culture
is always moving, people are told to stay in their place. This becomes fundamentally
difficult to resist because, as said, humans are social and cultural creatures. To try to be
an individual against one's social determination by bucking cultural narratives can be
incredibly difficult and impossible to do in a total sense. Even as a black man in New
York, for example, tries to cut his own narrative through racist American culture for
himself as a respectful, educated person, the material culture around him in the forms of
the police can easily disrupt that by treating him as a criminal. Further, trying to live
while absolutely denying one’s sociality in the form of oppression is to take on a
significant mental pain that may not even recognized or respected by social reality. To try
to deny one's social determination is to try to survive on one side of a dialectical
contradiction.
Cultural Productions
Even as cultures define themselves by limitations and negations, they also begin
to recognize themselves by their productions. Up until now, culture has been a vaguely
metaphysical, abstract notion that we somehow embody and by which we delimit
ourselves. Until this analysis too is brought into a social understanding, it still seems
individualistic. To understand this, we have to understand recognition. This is the process
whereby someone from a particular cultural group recognizes and includes someone else
in that group. This is done by a process of semiotic recognition wherein certain signs are
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interpreted as signifiers of group identity.
For some, this is easy, such as people of color recognizing each other based on
skin color and women recognizing themselves from feminine signifiers (and there is
argument that oppressed groups are oppressed partially because these signifiers are easy
to recognize one by, difficult to extricate oneself from, and provide a distinct stage on
which to design an oppressive matrix). For others, it can be more difficult as the range of
specification draws as close to a neighborhood and as wide as a country (and of course,
these specifications often do intersect). For this multiplicity of interlocking and
interplaying groups to recognize each other, we cannot merely assume a cultural
background but must recognize each other too on a cultural present and future, a cultural
production.
Cultures are not just defined by who they are but what they have done, largely in
the form of cultural products that take shape by way of books, music, film, and more.
Especially in modern America, one's cultural production is largely recognized by way of
one's contribution to American popular culture production. Culture is then not just seen
as external but is seen as something one can own: "...culture is used to designate not
merely something to which one belongs but something that one possesses," (Said, 8-9).
For humanities education in particular, for that is what we are actually talking
about after all, it takes as a framework culture as something someone must be initiated
into by way of these cultural products. Humanities education has always been implicated
and has often actively positioned itself as the top of the cultural hierarchy, taking in
students to initiate them into their cultural ascension. Even today, there often exists a
cultural tension when first time college students return home and they are seen as being

72
more cultured, both to their respect and their denigration. Humanities education, by way
of its monopoly on cultural texts, has historically been seen as the bearer and legitimator
of culture.
With this analysis of culture, we can now return to the starkly contrasting
historical moments of the Sputnik rise and the 60s fall of the cultural institution of the
humanities.
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The Disintegration of the Cultural Framework

The Institution of Sub Cultures In Higher Education
The Sputnik moment can now be seen retrospectively as the last great call for
culture, the last foundation on which a grand supporting of our cultural heritage in the
form of the university could be supported. The 60s can now be seen as the rise of a
multiplicity of sub cultures to take the reins of this support and demand recognition as
equally valid cultures within the university, proclaiming that if the university were to
initiate people into culture, it must initiate them into all of its varieties.
I fervently wish I had more time and space to explore this topic but I can only
draw on so much to build a context for the present moment that will be analyzed in some
depth. With the radicalism of the 60s came the call for representation, for minorities of all
kinds to be represented in all kinds of narratives. Rightfully, certain groups, subordinated
and marginalized by the dominant societal narrative, felt that the figurative erasure
throughout society worked hand in hand with the material struggle that oppressed them,
symbolic violence tying directly to material violence. In higher education, this meant the
fight to have different voices from different sources included in the curriculum as well as
entire course subjects dedicated to the exclusive study of these oppressed voices, such as
Women's Studies and African American Studies.
Again, I would love more than anything to embark on a long and worthwhile
study of the rise of these subjects, but time is not on my side. Rather, we must stick to
others' comments on the rise of these subjects and put not their rise but their plateau and
possible fall in the context of this evolving modern situation. Thanks largely to the efforts
of activists and a demanding public, subjects like Women's Studies, African American
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studies, and LGBT studies have gone from subjects ignored by the dominant culture to be
institutionalized subjects in higher education. They broke up the hegemonic image of
higher culture and through that, the hegemony of the university.
As Raymond Williams reminds us: "[a]bove all we have to give an account which
allows for [hegemony’s] elements of real and constant change. We have to emphasize
that hegemony is not singular; indeed that its own internal structures are highly complex,
and have continually to be renewed, recreated and defended; and by the same token, that
they can be continually challenged and in certain respects modified," (Williams, 8). This
modification transformed an erased subject to being at least a marginal one, though
neoliberalism (among other ideologies, including sexism and racism) has stymied the
progress of such subjects from exceeding their statuses as electives.
This has still been a huge step forward for the visibility and the critical work on
such thought.
"Indeed, the admission of women and people of color into predominantly white
universities and colleges forced new modes of interpretation and new institutional
visions within the American academy. At the same time, the student movements
and student demands had to negotiate with and appeal to prevailing institutional
structures. The student movements of the sixties and seventies constituted and
inspired interpretative communities that would propose institutional models that
were both disruptive and recuperative of existing institutions," (Ferguson).
Even though these subjects have been absorbed into the dominant cultural framework, we
have to remember that even without their sharpest subversive edge, they still do vast
amounts of good.
Though there may be concerns raised about the institutionalization of such studies
laying the ground for further marginalization, we must remember the multitude of
students that achieved critical consciousness because of classes such as these. Though we
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may choose to reimagine how higher education is structured entirely, we must remember
the struggle that was waged for these subjects to have even the precarious position they
do now. By providing students with an opportunity to critically reflect on the structures
around certain identities, these subjects have done an overwhelming amount of good.
Going forward, we must remember the great strides they have given us and the lessons
they have taught. No matter what sweeping critiques we may have for higher education in
general, we cannot lose sight of the fact that there has been a lot of good done and, a lot
of that good remains. The best kinds of critique not only dismantle what is bad but take
apart to reveal and amplify what good remains inside. As bell hooks reminds us about
feminism in particular: "[t]he institutionalization of women's studies helped spread
the word about feminism. It offered a legitimate site for conversion by providing a
sustained body of open minds. Students who attended women's studies classes were there
to learn. They wanted to know more about feminist thinking. And it was in those classes
that many of us awakened politically," (21).
By the nature of humanities education and its influence on culture, its changes,
even without radicalism, float through and are accepted without much credit. Natalia
Cecire, for instance, is one of many writers that demand the acknowledgement of the
reclamation of oppressed literature in the public consciousness, asking us to
"thank the scholars, artists, and activists who have recovered that work—often
obscured by a racist publishing culture and by an academy that didn’t think it was
important at the time. There’s a reason that students protested and sat in to fight
for the establishment of ethnic studies and women’s studies departments in the
1960s and 70s. It wasn’t a fashion statement: serious formal engagement with the
cultural contributions of women and ethnic minorities was urgently needed,"
(Cecire).
As Cecire goes on to say, "[w]e may not always notice the ways that academic concepts
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are circulated and reinterpreted in popular culture, but that's because we live and breathe
it every day. Just like scientific research, humanities research constantly crosses in and
out of the academy, and it’s so much a part of everyday life that most of the time we
don’t even bother to think of it as 'humanities.'" With culture and identity being the very
substance of everyday activities and consciousness, the humanities, as the educational
area that most directly treats culture and identity as academic objects, has its reputation
suffer from its very success for imprinting its knowledge on society at large.
Before we move on, we must then recognize that this movement is without a
doubt a great success on the part of sub cultures achieving greater renown. As Michael
Apple warns: "[a]ll too often we forget that in our attempts to alter and 'reform' schooling
there are elements that should not be changed but need to be kept and defended." He
requires "a much clearer and more historically informed appraisal of what elements of the
practices and policies of these institutions are already progressive and should be
maintained. Not to do so would be to assume that, say, radical teachers, people of color,
women, working class groups, and physically challenged groups (these categories
obviously are not mutually exclusive) have been puppets whose strings are pulled by the
most conservative forces in this society and have not won any lasting victories in
education," (xvi).
Ever retaining a dialectical perspective, we must remember that in constant and
universal contradiction, that which is dominant also exists in opposition to something
subordinate. In Raymond Williams' terms, there are always alternative and oppositional
strands to the dominant narrative, some of them being emergent and some of them being
residual. We must recognize and support efforts that have already been made to make
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education progressive. In our effort to revitalize education, we must continue support for
that which is emergent so that there is space for it to flourish in our analysis.
Our culture as a whole has benefited greatly from that, but in this movement, we
see the subtle background disintegration of such an idea as "our culture as a whole."
Certainly, sub cultures have always existed, but their marginalization and silence has
been a nearly uninterrupted one in history. For the university, the radical movements of
the 60s would be more radical than many imagined. As discussed in our culture section,
the institutionalization of sub culture into high culture cannot be seen as a mere
integration of low culture into high but a necessarily radical restructuring of culture itself.
The inclusion of voices cannot simply be a curricular addition but must in fact be a
radical change as the resolving of culture's defining contradiction would irreparably
change it.
Of course, with the university and capitalism at large benefiting from the
ideologically hierarchal shape of culture, there has been resistance to this potentially
explosive change. Conservatives across the board have continually denounced these sub
cultures with strategies alluded to before, by decreeing them illegitimate, by accusing
them of being worse, by construing them as low culture, and more. Though these attacks
are certainly dangerous and have certainly had major success in wearing down the
popular idea that these curricular inclusions are essential or even important, the more
insidiously dangerous process has been the very institutionalization of these subjects.
A Radical Change
Though sub groups oppose high culture, as it gets institutionalized, which in a
capitalist framework implicitly means commodified, that contradiction gradually strays
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into the university's dominant narrative of high culture. What this means is that even
cultures based on inclusion can gradually be institutionalized into being shaped by
exclusion. This takes the form of Women's Studies courses that fill themselves up with
jargon that exclude women of color and those that are not formally educated to be
comfortable with such language, it means valorizing reformist strategies that
privilege academic positions, it means emphasizing theory over practice so that academia
can remain the stronghold of this sub culture, effectively turning a place for freedom into
a place of restriction. Again and again, we see how what was inclusionary can become
exclusionary. What was once radical can become a commodity that only those with a
certain privilege can afford. Considering some of the most radical progressive ideas seek
to save those without privilege, their full audience is then barred from being reached.
Instead, they get those that often tokenize these subjects or treat them as tangential,
further contributing to the general narrative that these subjects are not important. With
these modifications and compromises, even the most radical movements of the 60s were
either rejected and defeated or grudgingly accepted and gradually absorbed into the
university model.
What's particularly special about the rise of this genre of subject is its
representation for marginalized cultures and its relatively recent rise. Ideally, we would
like people to see that all subjects and the particular methods of studying them are
contingent and historical; certain amounts of time sediment these ideas too compactly for
questioning. There was a point in history where the very thought of professionally
teaching literature was a new one: "the idea that literature could or should be taughtrather than simply enjoyed or absorbed as part of the normal upbringing of gentlefolk-
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was a novel one, and no precedents existed for organizing such an enterprise," (Graff, 1).
For every aspect of culture we take for granted as natural and solid, there has been a
historical precedent created by the work of human beings before us. More importantly, of
the vast number of historical decisions that have been made, the few that survive tend to,
though not always, represent the interests of the dominant class: "if we fail to see a
superstructural element we fail to recognize reality at all. These laws, constitutions,
theories, ideologies, which are claimed as natural, or as having universal validity or
significance, simply have to be seen as expressing and ratifying the domination of a
particular class," (Williams, 7). The feelings of naturalness and common sense are
especially significant signs of history accepted rather than examined.
The Institutionalization of Radicalism
Of course, the rise of cultural studies is one of the rare examples of a historical
change not institutionalized through gradual tides but through a titanic force of activism.
To make them seem natural, to retrofit them and then justify their institutionalization,
some fantastic tricks would have to be pulled. As Gerald Graff notes,
"'[p]rofessionalization' and 'academicization' are not neutral principles of organization,
but agents that transform the cultural and literary-critical ‘ims’ fed into them, often to the
point of subverting their original purpose, or so deflecting them that they become
unrecognizable to outsiders. What goes in is not necessarily what comes out, and this is
one reason why the things the institution seems self-evidently to stand for to insiders may
scarcely register on outsiders," (5). Though the inclusion of these subjects has by far had
a net benefit, their inclusion in a different order has certainly dulled their subversive
edges.
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As Graff examines in detail, the very structure of higher education set the game
against these subjects. True subversion and revolution cannot be commodified but must
cause a rippling change that reorganizes the entire system. Higher education, with what
Graff calls its "field coverage model," eases absorption under the guise of fluidity and
adaptability: "[i]n the coverage model, [...] innovation even of a threatening kind could be
welcomed by simply adding another unit to the aggregate of fields to be covered,"
(7). Within a neoliberal context, this eases commodification and neutralization. In
Williams' analysis, this kind of assimilation can transform an oppositional culture into a
merely alternative one. Students have the option of taking these electives if they want to,
but they don't have to, and the outside culture certainly doesn't recommend it. Beyond
being merely alternative, they are also seen as tangential, notes barely sticking to the
main document of one's education.
"The field-coverage principle made the modern educational machine friction free,
for by making individuals functionally independent in the carrying out of their tasks it
prevented conflicts from erupting which would otherwise have had to be confronted,
debated, and worked through," (Graff, 7). This is a classic example of Marx's division of
labor, wherein capitalism divides different forms of labor from and against one
another. "The tacit assumption has been that students should be exposed only to the
results of professional controversies, not to the controversies themselves, which would
presumably confuse or demoralize them," (Graff, 8). This model assumes as central and
unquestioned what Paulo Freire called the "banking" model of education, wherein
students are passive sponges that absorb information without question. Implicitly, the
banking model in this context trains students to see knowledge as an objective product
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worked out for them by experts behind closed doors. They do not take part in the defining
and legitimizing of these knowledges, rather, they are merely recipients of the products of
these arguments. Of course, when the authorities behind these doors are authorities over
the dominant class and culture, they overwhelmingly tend to be white, rich, and male.
With these kinds of kings in charge, it is no wonder that it took this long for such cultural
studies to be accepted at all, and when they were finally forced to begrudgingly accept
them, they were sidelined as subjects marginal to "real" knowledge.
Within this context, the institutionalizations of such subjects divided them from
their counterparts in real world practice. "While academic legitimation was crucial to the
advancement of feminist thought, it created a new set of difficulties. Suddenly the
feminist thinking that had emerged directly from theory and practice received less
attention than theory that was metalinguistic, creating exclusive jargon; it was written
solely for an academic audience. It was as if a large body of feminist thinkers banded
together to form an elite group writing theory that could be understood only by an ‘in’
crowd," (hooks, 22). Due in part to a combination of the marginalizing of these cultural
subjects within the academy and the inherent institutionalizing process of higher
education itself, these subjects became microcosms of sub cultures unto themselves. With
all sides embattled, it is understandable how they too became partially subject to the
structure of exclusivity. At its worst, this process almost completely neutralizes the
radical nature of these subjects. "Work was and is produced in the academy that is
oftentimes visionary, but these insights rarely reach many people. As a consequence the
academization of feminist thought in this manner undermines feminist movement via
depoliticization. Deradicalized, it is like every other academic discipline with the only
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difference being the focus on gender," (hooks, 22), resulting in the all too often situation
wherein "[f]eminist thinking and theory were no longer tied to feminist movement,"
(hooks, 22). Blame is not to be leveled primarily at the subject heads themselves but at
the consumption process of higher education as well as the nearly all-powerful base of
market ideology.
Here, we see a microscopic study of what we will expand in later analysis, namely
the assimilation, neutralization, and commodification of all thought within capitalist
ideology. Even with these harsh modifications, under neoliberal's cutthroat market
ideology, these cultural studies have not thrived. Many face steep budget cuts and
deletion entirely. From my point of view, this is a sign of their worthwhile nature. Even
the vast cultural power of the current dominant force can swallow subjects such as these,
subjects that inherently subvert the values of capitalism. Though we certainly can’t smile
at their removal, we can be proud that they constituted threats. Eventually, it became
more worthwhile for them to be cut entirely than to refit them and reduce them. This is a
huge sign that there are inherently subversive elements to these subjects, and we will take
this into account later in the recommendation part of this analysis.
We must now understand that the mere introduction of new content, even
subversive and revolutionary content, will not be enough to reform education. To truly
revolutionize education, we would have to change its fundamental ideological structure,
not just reform its cultural and personal contents. Of course, these relations being
dialectical and highly mediated, new contents do subtly change structures but even at the
vast level of the 60s, we were still looking at what was essentially a reform rather than a
revolution.
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Disintegrating Culture
This all being said, the radicalism of the 60s did strike a blow that reverberated at
the heart of the university, that not only changed humanities education but ruptured the
foundation of education theory itself. Even reforms can cut deep. In the background of
explicit demands for the inclusion of sub cultures lay, as has been alluded to, the
fundamental destruction of culture itself. We can see this in the fear of an enemy of such
reforms by way of Allan Bloom: "[y]ou don't replace something with nothing. Of course,
that was exactly what the educational reform of the sixties was doing," (320). The
"something" replaced was the universality of culture and the "nothing" that replaced it
was the plurality of culture. What is seen as destruction by Bloom was rather a radical
reconceptualization. The institutionalization of a sub culture into the dominant high
culture could not result in anything but some substantive change to the idea of culture
itself. Even as the university consciously absorbed and institutionalized it, unconsciously,
the foundation on which the university stood swayed.
This can be seen most clearly in the rise of cultural studies, an umbrella term that
encompasses both traditional humanities disciplines and new ones introduced in the 60s
and beyond. We can see in its terminology that culture has now been objectified from its
ideological status as a framework to an object to be studied: "the rise of Cultural Studies
becomes possible only when culture is dereferentialized and ceases to be the principle of
study in the University," (Readings, 17). Though the humanities has always meant
studying culture in one way or another, culture had been assumed as a framework to be
entered into. The students were generally not critical of culture, not because they had
been suppressed or brainwashed, but because culture had reified into an ideological
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framework to be assumed and not critiqued. It was the container of the content to be
analyzed, not the content itself. Further, it was the framework, the stage upon which all
content was analyzed and all content was justified. The major difference to understand
after the Sputnik boom and the post 60s bust in educational funding is that culture could
no longer be used as a justification for the university: "Cultural Studies must be
understood to arise when culture ceases to be the animating principle of the University
and [...] becomes instead an object of study among others, a discipline rather than a
metadisciplinary idea," (Readings, 92).
The 60s brought new perspectives, but this also brought fragmentation. No longer
could the university assume culture to be a unitary, singular, cohesive, and coherent
narrative by which to justify the continuation of its existence. If the university told the
nation at large that it needed to be sustained so that people could be initiated into high
culture, the nation could now very well reply, "Which?" As Bill Readings said when he
studied this disintegration in detail:
"The liberal individual is no longer capable of metonymically embodying the
institution. None of us can now seriously assume ourselves to be the centered
subject of a narrative of University education. Feminism is exemplary here for its
introduction of a radical awareness of gender difference, as are analyses that call
attention to the ways in which bodies are differentially marked by race. Both are
targeted by the old guard, because they remind them that no individual professor
can embody the University, since that body would still be gendered and racially
marked rather than universal," (10).
Later, he says "[i]n an entirely welcome sense, they signal the end of "culture" as a
regulatory ideal that could unite community and communication so as to allow the
analogy between the University and the modern state to function," (Readings, 89).
Without such a regulatory ideal, the university could neither progress forward into a new
era of study nor turn back to its habits, allowing itself to sink into a foundation that has
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become quicksand.
The very fragmentation opened up the critical idea of there being cultures, some
being defined as legitimate and some not. While this is a fantastic critical opportunity for
students, the national culture at large, in a capitalistic context, can no longer see the
university as offering an objectively good product. The university has now become a site
of conflicting and differing visions of what the university should offer. Though there has
always been division and debate in the past, the new explication of this debate in the rise
of sub cultures demolished the ideological foundation of culture to the university.
To be clear, I am in no way leveling blame on the movements of the 60s for the
present day crises in the humanities. These movements forced a worthwhile progression,
but, in their fragmentation of culture, they revealed a long festering problem the
humanities had been able to ignore up until then. Until then, the humanities had justified
itself largely on that central mission of the university at large, the initiation into culture
and thus into the ascending movement into high culture. Without the natural ideological
ability to be assumed as legitimate just by virtue of being the path to high culture, the
humanities had to deal with a fractured sense of responsibility. To what and to whom
must the humanities pledge its allegiance?
Its internal confusion rippled out into general confusion. Ideally, the humanities
would have been able to take the radicalism of the 60s and truly restructure itself around
it, retaining the radical energy in an institutional spirit. Instead, the humanities consumed
the new subjects and tried to march on like it had been before. As Allan Bloom
recognizes "[v]ague insistence that without the humanities we will no longer be civilized
rings very hollow when no one can say what ‘civilized’ means, when there are said to be
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many civilizations that are all equal. The claim of ‘the classic’ loses all legitimacy when
the classic cannot be believed to tell the truth," (374). The destruction of the split between
civilization and barbarism into a pluralization of culture ruptured the foundation of the
humanities. Though Bloom wants to return to the split, he does recognize that once it has
been exploded, the same rhetoric will no longer work. Education will have to find another
justification.
Despite this, much of its current meta-theory stubbornly marches on anyway past
the changing context of its practice; it still gives the canon primacy of content and the
initiation as primacy of mission. Ultimately, the humanities' past made itself vulnerable
to the twin futures of multiculturalism and neoliberalism by being unable to fully take
advantage of the first and remaining too weak to withstand the second.
To fully understand where we are now, we need to take a specific look at the
humanities’ past to see how its practice, even when it was strong, withered itself until it
could be corroded by the present context of market forces. Cultural studies only revealed
what had been there all along, so we must understand what it revealed to understand how
the market forces could dismantle it.
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Classical Humanities and the Encroachment of Neoliberalism

Classical Humanities
Unfortunately, this is not the space for a detailed history of the humanities,
something that would be essential for really understanding how its current incarnation
came into being and where it might be headed. While I can include a few glimpses of its
history (largely from Gerald Graff's Professing Literature and Stanley Aronowitz's The
Knowledge Factory, both of which I recommend for more history), the focus will have to
be on how the humanities is selectively remembered to have been.
In the current climate of humanities education, wherein literature, classics, and
history departments receive little funding and are often seen as tangential add-ons to
professional education, political conservatives and leftists often find an odd space of
agreement. Anyone who supports humanities education seems to find agreement that
what it currently is must change. When political agreement is impossible to find around
an issue like healthcare for instance, this agreement is astounding. Of course, from this
agreement, there is a great disagreement about where we must go.
Conservatives, as in much of their politics, tend to posit an idealized vision of the
past that current changes have tarnished, a past that we need to reclaim. Especially in
American politics, conservatives tend to espouse an Eden-like narrative in every political
issue, as if the past was as good as it could get and it was only naive temptation for more
that made us fall from grace. Supposedly bulletproof arguments include citing the
thoughts of centuries old founding fathers, strict interpretations of historical documents
treated as absolute truth, and, most importantly for this discussion, the resting of most of
their arguments on a particular vision of human nature that casts it is an objective fact to
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be recognized or dangerously ignored. Though the "conservative" moniker is too general
a one to use in every context, both moral conservatives and market conservatives (and
their frequent intersections) can be grouped together by their use of this fundamental
argument. Both settle on the idea that we have fallen from a naturally balanced place in
the past, and that progressives of any kind, whether they be feminist women, radical
African Americans, leftist educators, or simple reformers, have pushed us into an
imbalanced, unnatural aberration of the way things are supposed to be. We must either
allow the natural market to decide or reassert the natural moral authority of conservative
Christian values, or both.
The Strict Canon
In humanities education, this emerges in a number of ways but most distinctly
through the force of the canon. The canon is simultaneously a specific content of books
and a specific set of standards for accepting books into such a canon. This is a tense
contradiction, but conservatives embody it by way of neutralization. The books mostly
firmly embedded in the canon are the ones that have long ago been accepted, books that
are almost always flattened, sucked dry of whatever radical potential they may have had,
to leave them with a conservative ethos. This becomes overt when calls for censorship
and complete curriculum elimination are called for but this usually takes on the much
more sophisticated form of neutralization, wherein a text is husked from anything that
might incite radical change.
The humanities would never have had a significant hold in education if they didn't
include some change though. The change tends to be severely localized to the individual,
limited to a nostalgia for a romantic era vision of authorship and interpretation. Change is
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meant to occur as a one way process from text to reader, as an objective transmission of
meaning from, as Matthew Arnold legendarily said, "the best that has ever been thought
or said" to the reader. John Stuart Mill, a philosopher from a similar time, distilled much
of the romantic vision into the idea that the author must cleanse himself of social
inclinations and retreat into an absolute solitude, a supposedly pure space wherein the
individual can access a truth universal to all humanity: “[what] we have said to ourselves,
we may tell to others afterwards; what we have said or done in solitude, we may
voluntarily reproduce when we know that other eyes are upon us. But no trace of
consciousness that any eyes are upon must be visible in the work itself,” (1216). Truth
was reached not through self-consciousness of the social self but through the purification
of the self as an isolated being. Even beyond the fact that such solitude was politically
limited to a specific class of individual and validated as such for the same individuals,
this idea is fundamentally predicated on the notion of a universal human nature.
Conservatives have inherited this justification as well as this standard for their
canon formation, expecting or rationalizing the writers to have written under such
circumstances and demanding, in an educational context, for readers to do the same.
Readers are expected, even disciplined, to be able to read a canonical text deeply and
emerge from a solitary reading with a deeper insight into the human condition.
Communal discussions, if they are used, function in order to discover an individual and
universally applicable definition of humanity. The canon can then be seen as
transhistorical because it evinces a certain objective humanity. The canon is continued on
the basis of its abilities to reach and display this supposedly universal status of human
nature.

90
As many of these texts were difficult, some because of historical distance and
some because of pure density, this process took a strict regime of discipline and hard
work. Analysis required the best academic version of wrung hands hewing, cutting, and
sawing to discover a kind of nugget of truth embedded in these words. The kinds of men
that could afford this education and could weather its labor were supposed to emerge as
leaders, as new bearers of the universal truths found in these texts. Emerging from a
solitary reflection, these men could graduate from the university not quite to share the
knowledge in democratic fashion but to lead with it in an authoritative fashion. This is the
classic form of culture as a path of ascension, and these men, as more cultured and
knowledgeable beings, could lead their fellow men on the correct paths.
Especially in American cultural narratives, this kind of labor could almost stack
up to respectable blue-collar jobs that also involved working hard with objective material
to fashion a certain product. When applied to kids, to students, it was all about discipline
and confidence, discovering the leader within that could further propagate these values.
"When our students are taught such things as 'the humanities' they are almost always
taught that these classic texts embody, express, represent what is best in our, that is, the
only, tradition. Moreover, they are taught that such fields as the humanities and such
subfields as 'literature' exist in a relatively neutral political element, that they are to be
appreciated and venerated, that they define the limits of what is acceptable, appropriate,
and legitimate as far as culture is concerned," (Said, 21). The narrative that then transmits
the canon is one that neutralizes itself as a political framework, erasing its power of
legitimation so that its selection appears natural. By claiming to embody tradition and
humanity itself, they marginalize that which it doesn't select. At all points, a transcendent
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poetics tries to forget that "a literature curriculum embodies a theory of the text and seeks
to do more than simply have students read works," (Purves, 8). There is no such thing as
a neutral transmission of text, and the ideological framing that masks any canon as such
is motivated by a politics that wants to sustain its dominance.
Restricting The Moving Canon
As history progresses however, even the staunchest of conservatives will have to
allow new texts to enter the curriculum, though the oldest and most revered are still given
the highest status. The standard is then always based on whether or not additions to the
canon can instill, or, rather, reaffirm a certain idea of human nature. Texts with any
radical potential are then disqualified, usually delegitimized, exactly because they are
radical, because they pose a certain idea of change or posit something that needs to be
changed. If a text at all internalizes change as something necessary, then it shows its
color as a political work rather than a canonical one. Political texts, or political readings
of texts, found themselves on the idea that that history and readings of it are historical
and thus, changeable. Such texts, often from those in minority power such as women and
people of color that need change the most, are delegitimized on the very political basis
that should make them valuable. By positioning themselves as forces for change, these
texts and these readings weaken the force of universal human nature so they must either
be eliminated or neutralized.
Of course, the texts that are currently canonized have not been cherry picked
entirely based on their values. Rather, they have been retrofitted, reinterpreted in the very
process of canonical institutionalization to be conservative, to support the status quo. This
is proven when different interpretive schemas, such as psychoanalysis, feminist, and
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Marxist interpretations, are accused of being mere projections, whereas the traditional
interpretation is somehow objective and natural. Canonical texts are thus neutralized both
by restricting the texts themselves and restricting the kinds of legitimate interpretation to
such readings that allow them to "transcend" their histories by confirming our present
visions of history.
Divisive texts and readings that open themselves up to different and competing
meanings are delegitimized as lesser because they do not transcend all conflict to a pure
space of objective meaning. Especially when drawing a canon on which to base an
education, "[t]he curriculum, it is thought, should represent the enduring masterpieces
and truths that are left standing after ephemeral turf wars and arcane controversies have
fallen away. It is also thought that the heat and acrimony of controversy are threats to
intellectual community and curricular coherence and a distraction from students’ primary
experience of literature" (Graff, vii). Conflict internal and external to the text is
repressed, marginalized, silenced, and delegitimized. Only texts that can be and have
been purified from such divisiveness can be allowed within a teachable canon. John
Dewey shows how such a methodology can be traced back to a nostalgia for the
grandness of Greek ideas warped by a Medieval age that treated the Greeks as gospel
(147). In this period, human writing from the Greek age was cast in the divine glow of
the holy canon, similarly treating it as something revered and unassailable, beyond
critique. This nostalgia is then linked to treating the canon not as an authority but as the
final authority. They pretend to repeat the Greeks but they actually repeat the
Medievalists repeating the Greeks.
Though even the classic texts have all gone under historical changes, these are
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ideologically masked, often with the idea that the author's intention was the truest truth
(though it sometimes takes time to fully discover it) or by simply focusing on the parts of
the texts that are most easily generalizable. Each text is, historically, a complex of
contradictions and differences but a transcendental interpretation can hide this, repress it
by vaunting anything general to the status of being universal and shedding everything
else. In Jameson's terms, any such interpretation is a "strategy of containment" which
seeks to "project the illusion that their readings are somehow complete and self
sufficient," (10). Texts and the canons they compose are ideologically forgotten as being
subject to a history of fashion and developing tastes: "[c]anons are capricious human
selections among artifacts and are subject to change as the criteria change," (Purves, 5).
As Jameson goes on to say, "[i]n the aesthetic realm, indeed, the process of
cultural 'universalization' (which implies the repression of the oppositional voice, and the
illusion that there is only one genuine 'culture') is the specific form taken by what can be
called the process of legitimation in the realm of ideology and conceptual systems," (86).
Universalization and the poetics that accompanies inherently involve a process of
legitimation, delegitimization, and oppression. Dialectically, every universalizing
approach is ideological because it attempts to objectify the textual and generalize it as a
framework, usually of human nature. "Every universalizing approach, whether the
phenomenological or the semiotic, will from the dialectical point of view be found to
conceal its own contradictions and repress its own historicity," (Jameson, 109).
We end up with a conservative canon and a conservative set of inclusive and
interpretive standards for such texts, all predicated on and supporting the essential,
fundamental core of modern capitalism: that of the pure individual divorced from
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sociality, severed from history, and free in its unconscious unfreedom. This is the
traditional form of the humanities, with professors as vanguards of high culture, truth as
universal but worked out by a select group of men, and students as ascending recipients
of knowledge. Of course, there is no divine curriculum that hands down which books are
the ones that must be read, so we must always remember that in the background, behind
the curtains, there is always a select group of people picking a select group of texts. This
canon starts in certain human actions, but beneath the sedimented layers of years
becomes fossilized into seeming natural, a framework for the construction of knowledge
that we no longer see as artificial. Questioning whether or not Shakespeare should be
included in a canon of essential literature, for instance, would be tantamount to heresy.
One need not even argue the reasons because one can simply heft the weight of history.
The Withering of Tradition
The texts, the interpretations, and subsequently the students are insulated from the
idea of anything other than an untainted individual, somehow pure from a contamination
that is essential to its formation. This is formally echoed as traditionalists call to a
supposed past wherein the text was analyzed on its own without the "superfluous"
interpretations of such people as literary theorists, deconstructionists, feminists, Marxists,
or whosever else they claim is merely a fad. Graff calls this "motif" an
"appeal to 'literature itself' against various forms of commentary about literature
as a cure for institutional dilemmas. The hope is that salvation can be achieved if
only the great literary works can be freed from the institutional and professional
encumbrances that come between students or laymen and the potency of the work
itself. For a long time it was positivistic scholarship that was the target of this
view, then it became analytic criticism, and today it has become literary theory
and various attempts to historicize literature. But the basic form of the 'literature
itself' argument remains the same, bespeaking the perennial wish to believe that if
the quality of individual instruction is good and the right works are taught, the
effect of the whole will take care of itself," (10).
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Within the idea of a canon and the idea of a pure literature is the ideology of a pure
individual, an essentially liberal notion. This is the narrative around which traditional
humanities education is tied, a narrative that itself espouses the ossification of ideological
frameworks justified by a vision of humanity as a natural and singular entity. In natural
order, all other narratives must then fall in line with this one, including the narratives of
education and culture.
Here, we can begin to see that this notion of text is not simply a particular line of
dry literary discussion but is indicative of a dangerously congealed ideological
framework that continues to justify the encroachment of marketization. Even moral
conservatives that would deny the desire for market values to corrupt Christian ones
implicitly allow for this invasion by insisting on a conservative narrative for human
nature. The further this forced naturalism narrativizes human nature, the further new
forms of market reality can be assimilated as natural and inevitable, entrenching their
status as irremovable. Even as some conservatives call for a backward reclamation
change, they make it impossible by embedding themselves in a tradition of inertia.
Unfortunately for them, this inertia has begun to run out, and, while a certain version of
that ideological framework remains, the power and content of the canon and the
traditional humanities has become weaker and has lost momentum. In education, this
means that the encroachment of marketization has both become the dominant force in
education and the standard for its own justification.
The humanities remains a withered, corrupted form of what it used to be,
malnourished by its self induced purification of the ability to both reflect on external
history and incorporate it in such a way so as to be a force of change and of itself.
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Without it being able to be oriented toward the future, the humanities has either pressed
its nose into the present to watch its own demise or turned away from this portent,
heedlessly calling back to the past. This desire is rooted in a number of things but there's
one that all educators can actually agree on: the reestablishment of education's
foundation.
The traditional humanities are inextricably tied to the idea of ascending culture –
to the ideological framework that culture is something hierarchal that one ascends or
descends. In the past, such statuses were tied to people's essential natures (one was noble
by blood rather than effort) but in its modern incarnation, one is supposed to ascend or
descend in culture by will (or failure of) alone. For much of education's history, this
model fit perfectly with the traditional humanities because they had built up a canon that
both justified a certain sense of values explicitly and justified the model of cultural
ascension. Even as the specifics of such ascension gradually and unconsciously changed,
the framework of this movement was ideologically congealed.
The traditional humanities sewed the seeds of its own destruction with this
framework by implicitly supporting it as they stepped aside from it. They stepped away
from it by supporting the illusion they were not political agents reinforcing a certain kind
of system and were somehow objective observers that simply called it as they saw it.
When the changing world finally began to change their values, or at least the symbolic
expressions of them, they were not engaged in a manner that allowed them to reverse the
process. Allan Bloom, a fierce defender of the traditional humanities, argues “the human
desire to know is permanent, that all it really needs is the proper nourishment, and that
education is merely putting the feast on the table," (51). If, however, education is merely
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the setting of a table, then it could not be prepared for what came beyond the dining
room. The traditional vision of the humanities is essentially a view of the student as
passive entity, as a consumer of universal knowledge objectified in a "feast." Students
and educators alike were not engaged in their education as something that actively related
to reality but relegated themselves to the passivity of hungry children.
Once this tradition passed, such traditionalists could only harken back to what
increasingly became through the glow of nostalgia a vision of a more peaceful, perfect,
content time. This time never quite existed because history has always been a progression
of divisive changes; at one point, literature itself was not considered central to the
humanities, much less to education in general. Still, this time has nostalgia, has a
powerful attraction, because this culture stood as a foundation on which education could
be supported. As previously discussed, education boomed after the Sputnik moment
largely because a vision of culture existed in such a manner to support education. After
the betrayal of the counter culture, the foundation of culture as a singular entity was
ruptured and so the foundation of the humanities and education in general was fractured.
Because of this repressed past, we have to remember that even when the
conservatives call for a return to a traditional humanities, they are implicitly calling for a
return to a powerful education. A traditional canon, a lecture based classroom, a peaceful
student body, all have become symbols for a stronger culture supporting a stronger
education. Even for those that do not align themselves with conservative values, this call
is a powerful one. People can always trick themselves into believing that if only we
changed the outward signs, the inner material conditions would change as well. The
above discussion has shown, with the boundless support of many other critics with even
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more robust arguments, that this kind of culture was never as united as we remember. As
Michael Apple says, "[a] uniform culture never truly existed in the Unites States, only a
selective version, an invented tradition that is reinstalled (though in different forms) in
times of economic crisis and a crisis in authority relations, both of which threaten the
hegemony of the culturally and economically dominant," (34). We aren't remembering
something that actually happened but are ensnaring ourselves in nostalgia for an image, a
picture, an icon that we have let determine our resistance rather than determine it
ourselves. We want the old humanities because of what it could do.
A Forgotten History
We, however, cannot and should not go back. Repressed beneath this memory,
this ideological image of a forsaken Eden, is the truth of a history of education sat flush
alongside imperialism, racism, sexism, and the general capitalist order as a reinforcer. By
positioning itself as the ascendent peak of higher education, the humanities, though it
didn't heft the guns, supported a system that subjugated people the world over. By taking
advantage of its place in the hierarchy, it supported the structure and the history that
constituted it. We have to be self conscious of the fact that despite conservative rhetoric,
they are calling for a political change. Within the guise of nostalgia, they will pretend this
call for tradition is merely an apolitical stance, a return to a history that never existed.
The past becomes natural and well remembered while the present and future are tainted
as unnatural intrusions and new fangled failures. This call though, is not apolitical but has
a particular political stance.
The canon had its birth in an essentially colonialist imperialist framework, simply
finding its focus more on cultural and mental colonization rather than physical. From

99
abroad to home, the canon was used as a cultural weapon, as a tool for the colonizing of
the mind, a symbolic imperialism tied in both a material and immaterial sense to material
imperialism.
An example can be found in the writings of Thomas Babington Macaulay, who
was one of the men in charge of demonstrating the value of British culture as power over
India was transferred from the East India Company to the British crown. It was largely
his influence that directed this imperialist power to adopt policies in line with implanting
the English language and its literature among the colonized peoples of India. A brief
study from his Minute on Indian Education reveals how the attitudes surrounding canon
formation existed alongside imperialist colonialist ideology.
First of all, it was taken as an assumption that the goal was the "intellectual
improvement of the people of this country," (1897) with the common understanding
that "the dialectics commonly spoken among the natives of this part of India contain
neither Literary nor scientific information, and are, moreover so poor and rude that, until
they are enriched from some other quarter, it will not be easy to translate any valuable
work into them," (1897). The canon had to be formed because "a single shelf of a good
European library was worth the whole native literature of Indian and Arabia," (1897).
This canon was then a weapon to oppress through education, displacing the Indian
identity with an English one. Further, this canon was explicitly argued on market grounds
as "English is the language spoken by the ruling class. It is spoken by the higher class of
natives at the seats of Government. It is likely to become the language of commerce
throughout the seas of the East […] the English tongue is that which would be the most
useful to our native subjects," (1898). The canon is then tied to both an economic and a
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cultural concern as the English recognized the impossibility of teaching everyone and
focused instead on installing a higher culture reflective of their own:
“it is impossible for us, with our limited means, to attempt to educate the body of
the people. We must at present do our best to form a class who may be
interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons,
Indian in blood and color, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in
intellect. To that class we may leave it to refine the vernacular dialects of the
country, to enrich those dialects with terms of science borrowed from the Western
nomenclature, and to render them by degrees fit vehicles for conveying
knowledge to the great mass of the population,” (1900-1901).
The canon is then explicitly not the transmission of truth but the transmission of high
culture, complete with its ascending motion.
Upon entering the university, either by force or choice, the entering mind must be
vacated for the entrance of dominant ideas, here disguised as the true and universal. The
students are ever positioned as passive recipients of knowledge, that knowledge
legitimated as objective and universal by a similarly objective and universal authority.
The ideological dominance and transmission is not in the content itself (Shakespeare and
Plato are many things but they are never one thing, so even as their interpretation has
changed never has the idea that one interpretation is right) but in the structure of the
transmission and reception. Disguised in the idea that these texts were ascension into
universal knowledge was the ideology of a very specific class trying to reproduce a
specific material context of dominance and subordination.
The history of the traditional humanities is inextricably linked up with
subjugation. From beyond our borders to within our own, this canon was used to
dominate and subordinate certain groups of people. The radical knowledge we must
remember going forward is that this canon cannot simply be reformed. Though we leave
room for the possibility of it being radically remade, it is, in a sense, beyond saving (not
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the texts themselves, but their organization). The canon's essence is founded on the idea
that culture is something that should be implanted into someone for them to achieve a
certain status as a legitimate person. The arbitrary artificiality of the canon is hidden, and
crushed beneath this sedimentation is the silence of marginalized voices. The very
construction of a legitimate set of texts implicitly delegitimizes texts that do not qualify.
Pushed to the side are certainly a number of texts of lesser quality, but mixed in among
them are texts eliminated for much more insidious reasons.
If the canon is meant to establish a certain historical social order, then one can't
include texts that conflict with that, so we see the disappearance of texts from subordinate
voices, the voices most likely to rebel. In the interest of peace and the desire for an
illusory universality, we construct a canon that is by and large filled with voices from
upper classes, male throats, and white skins. Though we may pretend these texts are
simply better, that it is simply more efficient to teach these canonical ones, to reinforce
the idea that these texts are actually universal in their truth necessitates the
marginalization of other texts. For this ascending form of culture implantation to
function, there must be a single path to a single higher culture. To allow for multiple
paths leading in different directions would be to introduce chaos and to rupture the
legitimacy of authority. With strong currents of racism and sexism, the canon had to
remain pure and untarnished, explicitly by texts that might question the content and the
organization, and even implicitly by the idea that only certain readings and interpretations
were valid.
In essence, humanities education and literature in general tried to keep itself pure
of external social reality (in accordance with liberal ideology) but in so doing, helped
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create the conditions for its own demise. Traditionalists were and are political agents in
that they support this form of culture and all of the oppressions it contains therein, but
that was largely done implicitly; explicitly, they stepped back from politics to pretend to
be objective observers. Without this engagement in external reality, the neoliberal market
intrusion discovered an educational framework ripe for corrosion, commodification, and
elimination.
Cultural studies As Lifting The Veil
Cultural studies destroyed the university only by destroying its past. The
university had long been in tension with the fear of a technocratic, commercialized future
and the idealized, cultural past but the rise of cultural studies showed that this past never
existed. The culture the old humanities represented was not a universal one but was
merely the dominant one represented as the total. By reforming sub cultures and culture
itself into objects of study, the university could no longer proceed under the assumption
that it was the bearer of total culture. Some students would take some classes and some
students would take others but it could no longer be fully assumed that any would emerge
with universal clarity. Cultural studies exposed universal study as specific study.
Conservatives then and still do fear this insurrection because of the idea that "any
de-centering of Western civilizations, of the white male canon, is really an act of cultural
genocide," (hooks, 32). They often fight it in their own ideological terms, afraid
that "everyone who supports cultural diversity wants to replace one dictatorship of
knowing with another, changing one set way of thinking for another" (hooks, 32) because
cultural studies actual holds a much more revolutionary force.
Cultural studies then takes the heat of the conservative traditionalists because it is
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seen as destroying the foundation of education by destroying culture, when, in fact, no
such singular identity existed, and cultural studies merely exposed this illusion. The
ascending form of culture and traditional humanities education constituted its
fundamental value from exclusion and marginalization, from legitimation and silence. It
survived by way of selective tradition and ideological ossification. At worst, cultural
studies exposed a weak point that neoliberalism exploited, but neoliberalism would have
found it anyway, or burrowed its own way through. After all, though we may personify
such political ideologies, they don't actually function like military strategists. The
encroachment of neoliberalism was a collective complicity, reinforcement, and creation.
Cultural studies pulled the veil off a culture that was already deeply corrupted
from the inside out, having marginalized a majority of voices, pacified students with
passive interpretations, insulated itself from external social and political reality, solidified
itself into specific canons, and become an education that founded its importance on being
the sharpest peak of a culture of ascension. By marginalizing all culture it situated as
below itself, low, popular, and sub, it made the fall and the harshness of it all the more
inevitable as it did nothing to change the development of capitalism. The format of
ascending culture still survives it but with lessening power every day, its supposed peak
having been shown to be a farce. The ideological ossification was far too much even for
the radicalism of the 60s to overcome though, so even as culture loses its power, the
hierarchal structure moves on. The peak is no longer defined by the amassing of cultural
capital though, rather it has transformed, reduced and condensed and distilled itself into
the hoarding of wealth, capital itself. Neoliberalism signals the death of culture and the
vaunting of the commodity into culture, bringing the market through to dominate all life
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right out in the open.
After the Sputnik moment and the cultural civil war of the 60s, the cultural
framework, the foundation of the university, was disintegrated as a meta-cultural concept
to be assumed rather than studied. As Marx long predicted in the spread of capital: "big
industry created everywhere the same relations between the classes of society, and thus
destroyed the peculiar individuality of the various nationalities [...] big industry created a
class, which in all nations has the same interest and with which nationality is already
dead; a class which is really rid of all the old world and at the same time stands pitted
against it," (185). As capital spreads across the globe, it flattens and homogenizes culture,
making it a subsection of the market rather than its own standalone idea.
As culture is globalized, it is disconnected from any particular nationality. With
this loss, so goes the national cultural foundation that held up the university. After
already having been corrupted from the inside, it was doomed to fall:
"the link between the University and the nation-state no longer holds […] the
University thus shifts from being an ideological apparatus of the nation-state to
being a relatively independent bureaucratic system. The economics of
globalization mean that the University is no longer called upon to train citizen
subjects, while the politics of the end of the Cold War mean that the University is
no longer called upon to uphold national prestige by producing and legitimating
national culture. The University is thus analogous to a number of other
institutions-such as national airline carriers-that face massive reductions in
foreseeable funding from increasingly weakened states, which are no longer the
privileged sites of investment of popular will," (Readings, 14).
Without a cultural foundation, the university and the nation at large found a new basis in
the market. With this shift, as left open by traditional humanities and pushed through with
capitalist ideology, the university was to be subsumed as just another business in the
neoliberal system.
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The Rise of Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism
As Raymond Williams says, "[t]he educational institutions are usually the main
agencies of the transmission of an effective dominant culture, and this is now a major
economic as well as cultural activity; indeed it is both in the same moment," (Williams,
9). Encased within any educational moment throughout history is the ideological
reinforcement of a certain dominant culture. As Williams himself sketches, there are
usually residual and emergent strands of resistance within this dominance but the force of
this contradiction almost always benefits the current dominant culture. As discussed
previously, traditional humanities education implicitly supported almost anything the
United States did by reinforcing a certain notion of culture that allowed for the
subjugation of other cultures. Even within the national narrative, humanities education
was based on the commodification and neutralization of texts that supported the status
quo by purveying a supposedly universal truth through the ideological framework of
passive consumption.
Now more than ever though, Williams' quote becomes all the more pertinent.
Though dominant culture has always signaled a certain dominant economics, the
disarming of high culture in the 60s revealed the invasion of a new ideology that sought
to shred all pretenses at superstructure and reduce culture to its base, to rend the flesh
from its bones. Capitalist ideology honed itself over history into the creation of its most
powerful justification: itself. No longer would market and liberal ideologies have to hide
beneath the transmission of tangential, superfluous high culture but would merely
transform the market itself into culture. The market narrative has now become the
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absolute master narrative, the story in which everything must play a part according to its
rules and scripts.
Neoliberalism is a broad term that generally ties together a new strain of capitalist
ideology that justifies the current capitalist state. "Neo" refers to the modification of
classical liberal ideology, a philosophical worldview that privileges the position of the
individual to an analytical dominance: "[t]he neo or new aspect of this liberalism comes
from the ways in which neoliberalism alters the liberal economic theory to correspond to
new material conditions," (Saunders, 45). In liberal analysis, the individual is of
paramount concern, each person being the primary unit of rights and actions. For many,
this seems like a common sense idea, which, before we even decide whether it is correct
or not, means it has become a congealed ideological framework that we have a priori
assumed. This takes on the perspective of conservatism as "neoliberal ideology wraps
itself in what appears to be unassailable common sense," (Giroux, 251). Even before we
consider other ideologies, we must do our best to hold our current one at a special
distance of examination. As Gramsci said, common sense is always conservative because
it holds to the sense of the time. If we want to progress forward, we need to be able to get
enough distance to critically think about the state of things.
As always with these broad historical movements, it is difficult to nail down a
specific time. Saunders, as well as other thinkers, would pin neoliberalism down to
emerging into dominance sometime over the past thirty years. "During this time, the
classical liberalism that defined United States economic and social policy during the
nineteenth and early twentieth century has been revitalized, intensified, and its scope has
been extended," (Saunders, 42). Neoliberalism, however, did not invent the primacy of
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the individual out of thin air but rather appropriated it from a bygone era, using nostalgia
very similarly to the traditional humanities scholars to adapt people to believing that there
was a fall from a grace that we need to reclaim.
Neoliberals use the language of the past as lessons for the future, quoting the
founding fathers as divine prophets, who molded a philosophy themselves primarily from
John Locke, and using iconography, imagery, and myths from the 1920s and 30s as
fodder to recast the icon of the 21st century as the industrial titan: "[c]reated in the
mid 1970s as a response to economic stagflation in which a steep recession is combined
with a rise in prices, neoliberalism is a return to and extension of the laissez faire
economic theory that reigned until the 1930s but adapted to a new economic and social
world," (Saunders, 45). Neoliberal ideology casts everyone back into the narrative of the
factory line, except without the factory line itself, meaning that we must become
essentially economic actors.
The neoliberal assumes human nature and on top of that assumes the marketplace
as the primary instance of that nature in action, thus extending an "economic rationality
to cultural, social, and political spheres" and redefining the "individual from a citizen to
an autonomous economic actor," (Saunders, 42). One of the key assumptions here is that
of "autonomy," the idea being that individuals are isolated units of human nature, and that
any relation therein must fit into marketplace ideology, assuming that "free-market
relationships are the expression of a truly free society," (Saunders, 46). Individuals are
ideologically preconfigured as being absolutely isolated from one another, their
relationships always being mediated by capital exchange.
Further, "[neoliberals] have complete faith in free trade and believe that
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competition will naturally lead to economic growth, global prosperity, and will
necessarily benefit all individuals. If such growth and prosperity does not occur, they
contend it is due to outside interference in the market’s operations, which are naturally
and internally regulated," (Saunders, 46). We can see this ideology emerge linguistically
in terms such as "intrusion" and "regulation" that are applied when the government does
something to the market, whether that is a bailout or a review. It is assumed that the
natural state of human beings is one of market exchange so that any interference in this
natural relationship must be an external unnatural one. If the marketplace is the natural
instance of humanity at work, then any "forceful" external act must be an intrusion, an
infection.
This ideology is an inherently ahistorical analysis because it assumes a particular
vision of human nature and human relationships that supposedly persists throughout
history (or at least since the founding fathers) and further, is assumed natural enough to
justify propagating it throughout the world as recent imperialist efforts at "democracy
spreading" prove. As usual in imperialist narratives, there is a specific vision of human
nature that one must comply with and rather than accept a different kind of human, one
must delegitimize them as inhuman because they do not comply to what is "natural."
Achieving Dominance
The primacy of market relationships as "true" or "real" relationships has become
materially dominant. Even as its ahistorical nature is proved with a look back at other
periods of human relationships, it can even be disproven in our time, with studies of
bonds between people as family members, friends, and lovers. Still, neoliberalism foists
the market relationship as the primary one by giving it material power. One may be
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deeply unhappy without these non-market relationships but one can only starve and die
without the persistence of one's market relationship. All relationships can then be ground
down to this "bottom line" depending on the circumstances. The market is the ultimate
standard, but, further, it is held up as the natural, objective, and inevitable standard for
humanity vis-á-vis a particular vision of human nature. Here, we see where some of the
conservative traditionalist humanities scholars find some grip, because arguments in
favor of human nature can always be fitted to justify the current state of things. Any
narrative based in human nature can be retrofitted to conservatism.
Narratives such as these are necessary because on the face of it, neoliberalism
does not seem natural in a material sense. Wealth inequality has increased at staggering
rates on a global scale, and, even within the proud United States, the disparity between
the richest and the poorest has widened dramatically, in a sense completing Marx's
analysis of capital's destiny: "[a]ccumulation, where private property prevails, is the
concentration of capital in the hands of a few, it is in general an inevitable consequence if
capitals are left to follow their natural course, and it is precisely through competition that
the way is cleared for this natural destination of capital," (41). Neoliberalism however,
can always justify this because they believe in the natural efficieny of the market,
especially in its ability to generate the maximum amount of wealth: "[t[his is not to say
that the market will eliminate economic inequality (quite the opposite is true in that a
certain level of unemployment is required in any capitalist system), but rather that the
free market will allegedly ensure that such inequality is based on the amount of effort or
‘hard work’ one exerts and the level of natural ability with which one is born"
(Saunders, 46). By strictly individualizing people into isolated units, neoliberalism
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ensures that "there are no social problems, only individual challenges, and there cannot
be a social solution to an individual challenge without restricting the individual’s
freedom," (Saunders, 48).
People are then simultaneously blamed for what they can accomplish in society
and are told that any collective effort to change such a situation would then somehow
restrict individual rights. People are allowed to do whatever they want except for
gathering together. Despite being social beings inherently constituted and limited by their
historical cultures, humans are instead restricted to themselves, cut off from the world
that created them as they are blamed for what it does to them. This both limits people to
seeing themselves as market commodities and fractures their abilities to collect together
and change the system. Despite the ideology of marketplace relationships as natural and
inevitable, the history of humanity proves differently. There have been different systems,
and different systems can be created. Further, if we make the radical assumption that
humanity's natural state is one of happiness and satisfaction, then capitalism does not at
all fit; in fact, it relies on people feeling their positions are inherently unstable. This
comes across clearest in their economic roles with jobs.
Even as politicians argue back and forth about unemployment rates and who will
create jobs or rather, let the market create jobs, none can acknowledge the fact that
capitalism is predetermined to have a great amount of unemployment. The advance of
industry has in effect produced the advance of poverty, a symptom that Max Horkheimer
and Theodor Adorno analyzed in Dialectic of Enlightenment in 1944 but has only
worsened since then: "[n]ow that the livelihood of those still needed to operate the
machines can be provided with a minimal part of the working time which the masters of
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society have at their disposal, the superfluous remainder, the overwhelming mass of the
population are trained as additional guards of the system, so that they can be used today
and tomorrow as material for its grand designs. They are kept alive as an army of
unemployed," (Horkheimer, 30). As Marx pointed out long ago when capitalism was still
ascending, the very laws of supply and demand that capitalism founds itself on also
require there to be a pool of workers without work: "[w]hen political economy claims
that demand and supply always balance each other, it immediately forgets that according
to its own claim (theory of population) the supply of people always exceeds the demand,
and that, therefore, in the essential result of the whole production process–the existence
of man–the disparity between demand and supply gets its most striking expression,"
(100). Unemployment is not an isolated problem to be solved but is a necessary
consequence of the capitalistic system. More than that, it is a necessary part of the
dynamic functioning of capitalist production. Even in times of fantastic production
produced by such dynamism, poverty must always exist: "[p]overty as the antithesis
between power and impotence is growing beyond measure, together with the capacity
permanently to abolish poverty," (Horkheimer, 30).
With exploitation constantly rampant, workers also simply won't do many of the
jobs capitalists would require of them if the threat of poverty did not exist. If there was
more supply than there was demand, then businesses would be unable to function at peak
efficiencies, and, while the businesses are in control of the market, it must be tilted in
their favor. To function at their maximums, they must rather keep supply lower than the
amount of demand so that there are always enough hands to work and there is pressure in
case any one of those hands doesn't work hard enough.
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Neoliberalism, thanks to its ideological ossification, gets to have its cake and eat
it too. It simultaneously claims that capitalism is best for everyone as a collective and
blames people individually for not being satisfied. At all points, the individual must be
cut off from the social world and act in their natural state; for capitalism, it is that of the
rational economic actor. If the natural state of human beings is that of collective profit
making, then any human that does not contribute to this would be unnatural and wrong.
Further, if a human tries to participate in this marketplace but is denied for such social
reasons as gender, race, upbringing, or past historically determined inequalities, then this
social disqualification is localized to the individual, refitting the fault to be theirs. In
typical rhetoric, we see the blame being defined as laziness, unwillingness to the play the
game that is assumed we must all play. After denying socially determined problems,
neoliberals can then let them slip in through the backdoor, allowing implicitly racist or
sexist people to further justify an impoverished person's place by a multiplicity
intersecting power relations, all functioning but all denied.
Neoliberal Ideology
To understand this as an ideology, we must let go of ideology being a mere
repressive false consciousness, a brainwashing propaganda tool used by the big wigs in
charge. Though there are certainly people that benefit from this system and reinforce it
with their power, that power enters into society in a number of more sophisticated ways
than mere repression. First of all, it ties directly into the myth of the self-made man, the
rags to riches narrative that America has founded itself on. Denying the market is then
akin to denying our nation's origin, a cultural contradiction that is practically heretical.
Despite neoliberalism denying our social beings, it benefits from it because the language
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we use to articulate ourselves is largely determined by the system in place. Rather than
individuating ourselves as social beings, we are encouraged to individuate ourselves as
mere individuals, in essence collapsing the social dialectic into one side so that we grow
up stunted in isolation. As John Russon shows in his analysis of human experience, and I
hopefully amplify, the social is necessary for individual development. Dialectically,
conflict is necessary for movement and growth, so a human in stability is a human
unchanged, stagnant, degraded.
In effect, this stunting by neoliberal ideology reinforces it because people are less
able to recognize what Jameson's calls a "utopian desire" to see something better. That
said, we must also recognize, as Marx did, that while humans are socially and historically
determined, they also take an active role in that determination. Historically, Daniel
Saunders notes that:
"[s]uccessful ideologies are grounded in our general individual experiences and
attempt to reconstitute and represent them in a way that extracts consent to certain
policies, institutions, and ideas. Specifically, neoliberalism was allegedly born out
of necessity from the severe economic stagflation of the 1970s. Given the difficult
economic times and the bleak projections for the future, people were ready to
reject policies that they were repeatedly told led to the economic downturn. When
provided with an alternative that appeared to solve both the larger economic woes
as well as personal financial issues they welcomed change. The
economic recovery that partially occurred in the 1980s and to a greater extent in
the 1990s seemingly provided evidence of neoliberalism’s suitability and
reinforced the original claims of the inherent benefits of a neoliberal world," (50).
Neoliberalism, with the help of an economic crisis, then became its owns self fulfilling
prophecy, as a renewed cultural narrative profited by way of a correlation, not necessarily
a causation: "Provided with this seemingly compelling evidence, the acceptance of
neoliberalism is understandable; it is reasonable for people to desire change when the
current economic system is failing them, just as it is reasonable for them to believe the

114
new system works when they appear to benefit from it," (Saunders, 50). Once this wider
cultural narrative takes hold, the general ideology ossifies into a system as people find
their identities within it.
People see themselves as economic actors and find their niche roles in society by
way of the marketplace. When the wider cultural narrative situates one's nation as an
economic powerhouse and the individual narratives situate oneself always as part of this
production, there is little room for resistance. This is easy to see when someone is asked
to describe who they are, the terms emerging from the mouths usually starting with their
job: "engineer," "mechanic," "writer," "student." The marketplace then becomes the
natural state of humans at work with each other because it currently is.
It's important to note here how this narrative is overdetermined with other power
relations, especially of masculine domination. Masculinity has long been defined less as a
positive set of traits and more as the absence of femininity, the negated opposite of what
is defined as weak. The gender hierarchy then situates people based not on who they are
but who they appear to be, socializing them into certain gendered roles of strength and
weakness, retroactively claiming these roles as natural. Masculinity can then graft onto
and intersect with neoliberalism as people see their strength as being defined as the
absence or devaluing of extra-market relationships. Those devoted to their jobs are well
respected, rewarded for market obsession with market rewards. Men are then most
susceptible to this ideology as one can prove one's manliness with career earning, and
women are both expected to stay at home and are devalued for doing so. Feminism, the
historical movement for the liberation of women from patriarchy, can then even be
partially commodified by defining freedom in a phallocentric manner as career obsession.
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Many modern feminists ask women to “lean in” and prove the value of their femininity
by becoming more masculine; in a capitalist context this means earning more money on
their own. In this way, patriarchy too can be overdetermined by neoliberalism as
ideologies intersect and different frameworks remain unquestioned. Power sustains itself
by its netlike tightening of different power relations, intersecting and pulling more taut in
certain lines even as other ones are cut.
As neoliberalism denies social historical determinism, it depends on it by
determining people to think of themselves as isolated units while "the market- driven
juggernaut continues to mobilize desires in the interest of producing market identities and
market relationships that ultimately sever the link between education and social change
while reducing agency to the obligations of consumerism," (Giroux, 251). Humanity gets
reduced to commodity consumption. Further, it denies people the ability to value other
social worlds and, in a sense, forces addiction to the market rewards it does value.
Getting a promotion at work or getting the latest technology can both become obsessive
compulsions toward consumption. When the individual is cut off from its wider sociality,
it will thirst for that satisfaction, and the market is more than ready to take advantage of
that.
This ideology is especially dangerous because it fractures the human being on an
individual and social level, impairing their growth, limiting their abilities, and denying
them the capability of social resistance. Those in power always benefit from it, because it
situates those on the bottom as deserving their suffering and those at the top as deserving
their joy. The hierarchy justifies itself by its own system of individualization, fracturing
everybody into their respective places and justifying their placement by the very fact of
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them being there.
Human behavior then begins to be ruled by an insatiable desire for money, this
"quest for an income" being, for Jameson, a "pre-desire, a precondition for desiring which
has been systematically devalued in advance," (205). Financial stability is configured as
something that should be pre-achieved, something that should merely be a foundation on
which to launch real desires. For the multitudes of people in poverty, this means that their
very desire to achieve stability is devalued and treated as petty. Commodity fetishism is
lorded as the highest means of desire, but the platform on which to make these demands
is denigrated.
We see this as people deride systems like welfare for helping people just scraping
by, due to the very fact that they are just scraping by. If the means of being human
necessitate a certain financial means, then those in poverty do not quite qualify as human.
They are merely humans in waiting, potential humans; until they can become their natural
forms as economic actors to take their natural place in the human marketplace of relations
then they have not established the precondition for desire. Until they have earned "the
indispensable prerequisite to a self-realization that never comes," (Jameson, 205), they do
not even qualify for the capitalist game.
As Jameson points out, even as those stricken by poverty are denied entry, those
that do qualify are still resigned to desiring something they will never quite realize.
Financial stability is always the ultimate goal but it never quite comes. Capitalism, as a
dynamic engine of production, rests on human discontent. It needs people to be
uncomfortable, needs them to desire more than stability so that production can keep
humming. Even the richest CEOs in the world still invest, still need to multiply their
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profits, still need to desire and consume. The precondition for being human is the
precondition for desiring, the economic base upon which one has enough tenuous safety
to want more.
The Appropriation of Ascension
Always, always, there is this ascending desire for the accrual of wealth and with it
the accrual of humanity. As Marx said: "[t]hat which is for me through the medium of
money – that for which I can pay (i.e., which money can buy) – that am I myself, the
possessor of the money. The extent of the power of money is the extent of my power.
Money’s properties are my – the possessor’s – properties and essential powers," (Marx,
102). Individual and social humanity is increased by way of capital. Capital then leaks in
between every social relation, market logic structuring how they conduit information.
With capital mediating and isolating humanity from itself, the development of humanity
then becomes ruled by money. One becomes more of a human, more capable of what
humanity has collectively developed in history once one has earned enough money to buy
it. “Men, then, only desire money, and money is an abstraction, a form of reflection…
Men do not envy the gifts of others, their skill, or the love of their women; they only envy
each others’ money… These men would die with nothing to repent of, believing that if
only they had the money, they might have truly lived and truly achieved something,"
(Kierkegaard, 2). Competition, capitalism's golden calf, is reduced not to a dynamic
innovation but to the mere greed for another's money and the desire to divine a way to
match their wealth. Capitalists will brag about capitalism's vast engine of production, but
this massive luxury of civilization is only available to a precious few, a privilege that is
defined by one's earning potential.

118
Through neoliberalism, capitalism has become more powerful than ever by
grafting itself onto culture. The ascending motion I described as belonging to culture
belongs more and more to capital. Before neoliberalism, culture and economics existed
alongside each other, often justifying each other but still remaining tensely adjacent.
Culture survived the same way capital did, by creating a hierarchy and treating it as an
instance of human nature. As classical Marxist terminology has always pointed out
though, economics have constituted the base of the culture's superstructure, and despite
this highly mediated and dialectical exchange, culture has always been subsumed within
capitalism. Over time, capitalism and neoliberal ideology have corroded culture from the
inside out, eventually breaking through it, metamorphosing and leaving culture behind
like a cocoon.
The university is just an instance of this transformation, but it serves. The
university as a cultural apparatus justified itself by the cultural hierarchy, complicity
repressing others by vaunting some as having earned more high culture.
It is my inclination that this corrosion is not entirely a process of gradual and
regular eating away but functions more like Thomas Kuhn's paradigm shifts, but
admittedly less revolutionary. Capitalism naturally contains what its proponents refer to
as a "boom and bust cycle," capitalism's productive dynamism being based on its ability
to reach far and occasionally fall from its height, only to pick itself back up again and
reach farther. With the neoliberal ideology the marketplace as the de facto instance of
natural humanity, any problem in the market is then localized to "intrusions" or
"alterations" assumed to come from an unnatural outside. The busts are then blamed on
some sort of interference with the natural market flow of life. This is usually configured
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as something tangential from real life. Through these busts, capitalism then "recovers" by
purifying its markets from outside interests, processes by which we are secularized,
modernized, and isolated. Interests besides profit interests and humanity besides
economic action are delegitimized, scapegoated for capitalism's own busts. Every failure
of capitalism becomes a reason to double down on the natural material reality of capital
exchange.
Capitalism as Crisis
Neoliberalism has become so ideological that seeing past it is nearly impossible;
as said, it conditions the ability to see in this historical moment. We cannot question the
supposed natural cyclicality of a system that inherently exploits people alternately
exploiting them deeply or more deeply. Capitalism has recently internalized this ideology
into its system, as ideological apparatuses reinforce it by institutionalizing a culture of
permanent crisis. At a near constant bleat, the media and the culture at large wallow in
economic misery, pining for an Eden of profit whilst trying to rid itself of whatever
caused this seemingly permanent downturn. Education, now being the central mediator
for market accrual rather than culture accrual, is usually situated as one of the prime
causes of this constant economic crisis. This is made drastic when tied to America's
global status: "the crisis in education has been tied to the crisis of the economic position
of the United States in the world," (Weiler, 215).
In capitalism, people are situated in a precarious position of earning or not earning
enough to live. “Americans are taught to believe the economy is in a permanent crisis - a
position seemingly validated by their own experience," (Kendzior). This constant culture
of crisis petrifies this precariousness through capitalism's necessary consequences: either
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commit to the market or face poverty. People are then materially restrained from
questioning the system because it is simultaneously what gives them life and what
threatens them with death.
We have moved into what some writers call the "post employment economy"
(Kendzior) wherein the constant crises of market employability force people to cling to
any temporary or contingent job available. Aronowitz too worries that "American
capitalism has entered the era–one hesitates to call it an epoch–of the normalization of
temporary, part-time, and contingent employment," (121). While unemployment rates are
bad, they are supported by a fluctuating rate of underemployed people, workers that must
constantly live within the tight boom and bust cycles of their lives, getting hired only to
be laid off, getting temporary work knowing they must eventually lose it, and living with
awful wages and working conditions because any job fulfills the basic need for money.
Students are then taught to learn the same set of basic "employable" skills, thus
reducing difference and making each of them replaceable with another. Precariousness
fuels precariousness. Despite supposedly suffering from these crises, corporations greatly
benefit from them. Students learn they must work for free in internships, work jobs lower
than their degrees, and stunt their education to learn vocational skills just so that they can
get a job. Corporations win because of the desperation of their applicants and the
outsourced need to train them.
Within this always-imminent crisis, capitalism must always desperately fight for
its own survival, conscripting students in this struggle. All life activity can then become
alienated to the goal of preservation, which inherently helps whosever benefits from the
current system: "[b]y subordinating life in its entirety to the requirements of its
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preservation, the controlling minority guarantees, with its own security, the continuation
of the whole," (Horkheimer, 24).
At all points, the evils inherent to capitalism are redefined as being due to an
intrusion. This supposed infection then justifies the continual attempt to purify the system
from interference. Neoliberals across the aisle are constantly trying to return to a
supposed place of purity by shedding some disease they've managed to contract. For
some, it means the shirking of government regulations, for others it means the dodging of
collective and social concerns, and for many it involves isolating themselves still further
as mere carriers of capital. Within crisis culture, anything can be justified as an intrusion
into the market, including culture itself. For capitalism to fully eliminate intrusion, it
would have to eliminate the very possibility by subsuming such extra-market externalities
into its marketized internality.
Living Post-Culture
With the marketplace assumed as the natural system of human interrelationships,
the culture of crisis can then justify the consumption of everything around it as not being
"natural" or "real," in a word, not marketized. It is my argument then that we have
entered an age of post culture or commodity culture, wherein the base has eaten the
superstructure from the inside out until shedding it like tangential waste.
The ascending motion of culture has been replaced by the ascending motion of
capital accumulation. No longer are the high cultural peaks dominated by those who pick
up the historically defined signifiers of high culture but by the sheer volume of their
wealth. People are motivated less to become cultured and more to become rich. Culture
has been replaced by capital, with the remains of college being a mere ideological

122
shadow of what it used to be. In Bill Readings' analysis:
"[c]ulture is not a citadel to be occupied. In fact, no one sits in the center any
longer. The center was once occupied by the institution of the nation-state, which
embodied capital and expressed it as a culture that radiated across the field of the
social. But the decline of the nation-state means that this center is actually a lure.
Capital no longer flows outward from the center, rather it circulates around the
circumference behind the backs of those who keep their eyes firmly fixed on the
center: Around the circumference, the global transfer of capital takes place in the
hands of multi or transnational corporations. The so-called center, the nation state,
is now merely a virtual point that organizes peripheral subjectivities within the
global flow of capital; it is not a site to be occupied. Hence everyone seems to be
culturally excluded, while at the same time almost everyone is included within the
global flow of capital," (111).
Culture itself has become commodified, and now both conservative and leftist groups
suffer from focusing on this empty center as if it were still filled with the bounty of high
culture. Through vast marketization, such a core has been hollowed out through
commodity ideology. The ascending motion and exclusionary structure has been
maintained but, as Readings says, power flows around and permeates through rather than
represses down. Deeper ideological lines have been created through the fissures of
neoliberal ideology, wherein capital flows and accumulates along these faults as the
casting of the market to frame what life can be.
To completely purify itself from "interference," capital had to colonize and
commodify everything external to it, naturalizing everything outside of it to becoming
internally marketized. Though the university is this study's prime example, we can see
this process trailing down into the very language people use as they describe anything
worthwhile as "profitable," any decision as being "worth the investment," and referring to
the ultimate reality of any act as the "bottom line" (this line being the profit margin).
Human actions and relationships are increasingly defined by market logic that values
profit and exploitation, values as being purely for use and consumption.
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In the language of economists, any person can be broken down into monetary
value to be used for the economy. Most dangerously, "the very viability of politics itself
is at stake, as formal and informal public spaces for educational exchange and debate
atrophy or disappear altogether," (Giroux, 251). The political field itself, in whatever
stunted state it currently exists, "produces an effect of censorship by limiting the universe
of political discourse, and thereby the universe of what is politically thinkable, to the
finite space of discourses capable of being produced or reproduced within the limits of
the political problematic, understood as a space of stances effectively adopted within the
field,” (Bourdieu, 172). The most overt example of this is in American politics is the
limitation of people to two political parties, both of which are dominantly neoliberal with
only slight differences between them. This binary reduces the universe of political
thinkable stances to two that oppose each other with ineffectual and ultimately petty
disagreements. As the vehemence of this disagreement absorbs all public attention, the
marketization of politics slips through unnoticed as neoliberal ideology solidifies
humanity from its most intimate identity to its farthest reaches in culture. Humanity
becomes little more than a multitude of economic agents.
As politics itself becomes neutralized, commodified, and marketized, the very
possibility of envisioning and enacting change becomes ideologically precluded. This
possibility is essential because, as Henry Giroux and other progressives continually
remind us: "[c]orporate culture, in large measure, lacks a vision beyond its own
pragmatic interests in profit and growth, seldom providing a self-critical inventory about
its own ideology and its effects on public health, the environment, or the stability and
gainful employment of citizens. It is difficult to imagine such concerns arising within
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corporations where questions of consequence begin and end with the bottom line," (261).
Without a politics that can’t envision difference, marketization will corrupt humanity
from its acceptance of a certain human nature that the market is natural and paramount.
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The Long March of Marketization

The university in the guillotine
The university is one of many targets in a long line of marketization as "public
spheres are replaced by commercial spheres, as the substance of critical democracy is
emptied out and replaced by a democracy of markets, goods, services, and the increasing
expansion of the cultural and political power of corporations throughout the world,"
(Giroux, 252). The university though, is not an arbitrary example of marketization but is
a chilling model of neoliberalism's power. As said before, the university has maintained
power by way of it being a cultural apparatus, the peak of ascending culture. In this
sense, the university was one of if not the most powerful cultural apparatuses of its time.
While fashions and tastes changed, the university remained as the arbiter and legitimator
of those changes. For the university to be defeated would be a great failure.
The university has always been on the ideological chopping block, but the
traditional humanities programs were never engaged enough to realize it or mount a
resistance. We can see this in the historical American distrust of newly graduated college
students, wherein high culture is both revered and despised. The ascending motion of
culture never quite gelled with the ascending motion of capital because the hierarchies
had subtly different modes of operation. The cultural hierarchy was based on the accrual
of culture signifiers, arbitrarily legitimated through history, and cultural institutions that
defined which signifiers denoted high, which low, and which sub. The capital hierarchy is
in a sense a democratization of this process that flattens this playing field into one game
of capital accrual but retains the hierarchy. In a capitalist context, culture can only endure
a process of meaning less and less, especially when neoliberal ideology explicitly argues
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that the market is the true relationship of human beings, not literature, not theater, not
high society. Though ascending culture has complimented capitalism in the past, it can
never be quite as efficient as capital simply taking its place.
The university, as a bearer of culture, has then been continually backing itself into
a corner that would eventually disappear. Rather than reimagine what the university can
be, traditionalists have used this corner as a platform to prove their victimization. As Bill
Readings shows,
"the holders of cultural power need to portray themselves as unorthodox rebels. It
seems to me that the conservative jeremiads are motivated by the fact that their
authors feel the emptiness of the cultural power they hold. That is to say, they
recognize the powerlessness of the cultural power they hold, and they blame leftwing academics for usurping it. They hold the center, but they know that it is
merely a virtual point. The cultural right is not rebelling against its exclusion from
the center but against the exclusion of the center, its reduction. The ‘culture wars’
thus arise between those who hold cultural power but fear that it no longer matters
and those whose exclusion from that cultural power allows them to believe that
such power would matter if only they held it," (114).
By centering itself as a cultural power, the university has sown the seeds of its own
destruction at the hands of marketization. Even as this corruption is recognized, it is
ideologically maintained by traditional resistors who try to reestablish the prominence of
a cultural center and progressives that try to stake their own claim to that cultural center,
neither realizing that "[i]n lending primacy to the cultural, critics miss the fact that culture
no longer matters to the powers that be in advanced capitalism-whether those powers are
transnational corporations or depoliticized, unipolar nation-states," (Readings, 105).
Culture, while still important, is no longer the center, the meta-frame of the struggle, but
is one of many peripheral tools used to maintain domination.
Though the universalization of the marketplace is hard to see as artificial now,
this is when Marx's perspective comes in most handy because he studied capitalism when
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it was ascending. Capital is inherently hungry for its own accumulation, driving it into
imperialism and colonialism, both outside of the nation and within it. "The need of a
constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the entire
surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connexions
everywhere," (Marx, 212). Just as capital spread across the globe, constantly empowering
itself by its imperialism in order to implant a "cosmopolitan character to production and
consumption in every country," (Marx, 212) so does it empower itself by its internal
imperialism, colonizing and propagating itself within its own borders. The very
dynamism of capitalism demands that capital be restless in its consumption, in what Marx
called its "profanation" of life.
Capitalism has eaten away at the university for much of its history, demanding it
be both academic and pre-professional, that it both teach the best that has been thought
and said and prepare students for particular careers. The culture of ascension model
proved a compliment to this, justifying every intrusion as human nature reasserting itself
and every failure as both a mistake of the person and a mistake of being uncultured. If
they read the classics as they were meant to, as their meanings were transcendentally
divined, they would see the liberal ideological core stowed as the truth in all canonized
and neutralized texts. But even that had to fall, as capital's obsession with efficiency
could never allow for even a jaunt in the unprofitable classics to endure forever. The
university survived by maintaining the remnants of high culture, its foundation ever
shaking beneath it as commodification infected everything.
The Commodification of the University
The transition in the university has been a gradual but revolutionary change.
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Much of the surface level has remained intact, but the foundation of the university has
transformed, and, with that, change is spreading throughout its every branch. The cultural
justification has been hollowed out and the market rationalization has spread from both
the inside and the outside. The new wave of neoliberalism exists both to incite this
change and to be the model by which this change is justified. "Proponents of
neoliberalism view the market as the natural and inevitable organizing and evaluative
force in all social, cultural, and economic matters" (Saunder, 46), so the university too
should naturally be evaluated by the ultimate force that is the market.
The market has achieved a sort of perfect ideological framework, ossifying to the
point where it seems to be the ultimate frame of human nature, not being a historical
occurrence but the end of history, the inevitable point at which humanity must find itself.
With this kind of ideological framing, the traditional university and humanities
proponents cannot mount a solid critique. Any push on the behalf of culture seems
tangential to the market's primacy.
This view of its peripheral nature has been solidified over years of traditional
humanities education not being engaged in the conflicting political realities of the world
outside of the university. Based on the culture of ascension model, the humanities holed
itself up in what transformed from being a peak of culture to an ivory tower, something
the "democratization" efforts of the market could easily justify chopping down. Though
the culture of ascension model was already ideologically firm, its market replacement
faded even more neatly into the assumed background, emptying the culture model of all
of its content but retaining its ascending model, merely replacing those complexes of
signifiers with the accrual of wealth. Those signifiers still float on with some meaning but
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they are not grounded in the way the market is. The market framework simplifies,
streamlines, and makes efficient the understanding of ascendence in neoliberal society.
The ideal man has been hewn and streamlined as a vision of a white, male,
heteronormative everyman tinged with some nostalgic workingman work ethic, imbued
with some conservative but not too conservative values, charged with faith in humanity
and the market, common-sensical rather than intellectual, and absolutely loaded with
wealth. Ascendence to become this man is no longer based on the development of one's
being; after all, one should just rely on common sense. Rather, one grows through a
natural progression of maturity wherein one broaches the social world on occasion but
ultimately disciplines oneself as an individual with the world and nature set over against
one as something to be conquered through market acquisition and exploitation.
Cultural studies merely quickened a process that was inevitable, as shown by the
humanities’ refusal to politically engage with the world outside its culture of ascension
model. Cultural studies revealed that this model was in fact arbitrary and unfair,
oppressive and hierarchal. This truth required a vast reimagining of the university, and
even as it settled into an all too familiar shape, the illusion of culture as all-important had
been shattered.
Capital has the advantage of establishing itself as material reality, as the naturally
objective foundation upon which culture is founded. It eventually would have completed
its journey up, but cultural studies inadvertently helped it by fracturing culture, though
the fault lies largely with the university for not taking this challenge up and
revolutionizing itself around it. Neoliberalism is then not an ahistorical disaster brought
upon by an singular event but has been a development long fermented and inadequately
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resisted:
"the changes that have occurred due to neoliberalism are not fundamental
transformations of the roles and purposes of the university, but instead are
substantial accentuations of its previous functions. To say that the development of
the neoliberal university and the changes that define it are unique is to both
misunderstand the history of higher education in the United States as well as to
misplace the source of many functions of higher education. What is new to the
neoliberal university is the scope and extent of these profit-driven, corporate ends,
as well as how many students, faculty, administrators, and policy makers
explicitly support and embrace these capitalistic goals and priorities," (Saunders,
55).
Despite being figuratively and consciously unprecedented, the material historical
precedents have long been there for neoliberalism to achieve its dominance.
Neoliberalism is not so much a new event as an extension into new territories.
Streamlining the University
Starting with the very subjects that were tacked on to the university, marketization
denigrated and derided subjects such as women's studies and African American studies,
spreading from there to the rest of the humanities and eventually any subject that didn't
directly lead to profit: "[n]eoliberalism, fueled by its unwavering belief in market values
and the unyielding logic of corporate profit-making, has little patience with
noncommodified knowledge or with the more lofty ideals that have defined higher
education as a public service," (Giroux, 265). Culture could no longer be the master
narrative because capitalism assumed material reality and ideological reality.
The liberalization of culture that the humanities was complicit with packaged it up
into an easily consumable, easily commodifiable form. Withering without political
engagement, the humanities could only be commodified by capital. The humanities, with
an undeniably powerful push from the rest of the university and market ideology at large,
turned a revolutionary potential in cultural studies into its own defeat, allowing its
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conception of culture to be fractured and remained broken. It moved and continues to
move with the ascending model of culture but few can pretend this cultural inheritance
has any universal bearing or material/market relevance.
Student alienation shows that the lessons of the past no longer seem to apply
because there is no culture in which to apply them, because the real reality is the
marketplace. The Sputnik moment of massive cultural and collegiate federal support was
a last gasp of cultural belief, but the humanities did not recognize it as such. The 60s
radicalism of cultural reimagining was an opportunity for revolution, for the saving of the
humanities from the maw of capital but it was wasted on those that could not bear to lose
grip on their ideological inertia. The introduction of a repressed unconscious sub culture
into a conscious high culture forced a resolution of this contradiction, but the explosive
potential of this realization was instead brought to a bland contiguity, a resolution
through cohabitation rather than a revolutionary restructuring.
The high cultural model was merely repeated, persisted only through a stubborn
inertia. As with all hierarchies, it could only subsist with the subjugation of the
oppressed. With the oppressed in the house, the humanities settled for a compromise
rather than a change. It kept all of the fracturing of revolution with none of the creation,
enduring the 60s critique and only reacting as absolutely needed. Disguised in neoliberal
ideology, the marketplace became situated as the ultimate sociality of mankind, and, with
this, all institutions and all life had to fold into its dominance. We were all but individuals
unable to fight a systematic strength.
The Continual Crisis In Higher Education
Though little has been done to radically change this situation, there are multitudes
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of studies continuously released that evidence the "crisis" in education. For instance, one
cites that "[a]bout 1.5 million, or 53.6 percent, of bachelor's degree-holders under the age
of 25 last year were jobless or underemployed, the highest share in at least 11 years,"
(Associated Press). The university must be justified in a neoliberal market situation by its
baseline ability (as all things in life) to ensure a job with financial stability and eventual
wealth accrual. As it continually and evidently fails to do so, we continually experience
the wider capitalistic crisis in a tightened mode around the college passage. In
neoliberalism, the crisis, even in a state of panic, is accepted as normal insofar as the
system itself cannot be deeply changed. People can accept that society is on the brink of
falling apart, but this can only be seen as a reason to dig deeper into the market. The
precariousness of the market necessitates that people go to college despite the escalating
prices because desperation has become the nature of the worker, a price that has "surged
1,120 percent since records began in 1978," (Jamrisko). To deal with these escalating
prices, students must take out massive loans, another perennial issue that is continually
recognized but hardly reformed, certainly not changed.
One study revealed that "[s]tudent loan debt is bigger with total outstanding loans
exceeded $1 trillion for the first time in 2011 compared to credit card debt in the U.S.
which stands at about $798 billion," while the average size of that debt has "jumped since
2005 when the average debt was $17,233. By 2012 the average U.S. student loan debt
climbed to $27,253–a 58% increase in just seven years," (Touryalai). This debt breaks
students of their freedom at the very moment they are supposed to realize it: "Americans
are being conditioned to accept their own exploitation as normal. Ridden with debt from
the minute they graduate college, they compete for the privilege of working without pay.
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They no longer earn money - they earn the prospect of making money," (Kendzior).
Students compete with each other to achieve this slim prospect, all because of the
alienated goal of surviving in a capitalist society. The very idea of the American Dream is
dying for students, the fuel for this ideological narrative relying on the correlation of new
generations improving on their predecessors. At this point, students quite clearly face a
future that is bleaker than the ones their parents encountered. Their society and their
culture is not flourishing, so neither will they.
The humanity that is represented to them in maturity and adulthood is not a
politically engaged social being but is rather a stunted, economic agent capable only of
competition and alienated loneliness as "[c]itizenship is portrayed as an utterly solitary
affair whose aim is to produce competitive, self-interested individuals vying for their own
material and ideological gain," (Giroux, 252). Self worth itself is reduced to what one can
produce. To have self worth is to have market worth.
College becomes the eye of a natural storm, the responsibility to survive from it
being placed on the students and the schools. The cultural ascension form that
neoliberalism appropriated was replaced with the university's new mission of economic
rather than cultural initiation. Students were not to be educated but to be trained, not to
live but to survive, not to flourish in the future but languish in the present and recover
from a debt-ridden past. Even in market reality this is harmful, because students prepare
not for the unseen jobs of the future but for the ever changing, ever disappearing jobs of
the present. They train for positions that disappear, and the United States becomes an
economic follower rather than leader. Without a vision to appropriate, capitalism's own
dynamism devours itself.
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The Denial of History
Again, despite draining traditional culture of its content signifiers, market
capitalism still retained its ideological model, including the ascending motion and the
interpellation into a power hierarchy. Though this crisis constriction damages most
people, it especially damages those of sub cultures. People are never evenly interpellated
into society because there is a structural history always perpetuating itself from the past
into the present, a historical power relation that market ideology denies. In a neoliberal
worldview, the idea that society at large could control or limit what was supposed to be
the ultimate power of the individual must be illusory, must be denied and erased. Further,
the idea that structural conditions could persist after their overt reformation is absolutely
inconceivable. Even a modern democratic society based on equal participation in the
market cannot produce equality because it applies equal standards to unequal conditions,
conditions that it ignores.
There are different kinds and forms of hierarchy throughout the world and
throughout time, but, in America in particular, there is a specifically powerful
discrimination history against black people and other people of color. I wouldn't be
breaking any historical ground by claiming that slavery was a horrific institution that still
has lasting effects, but even this seemingly elementary realization can still break
ideological ground. It's an idea that at a distance makes sense, but once brought into close
reality comes into conflict with neoliberal ideology, and the latter usually overcomes it.
Most will accept that slavery would have a devastating effect on someone and
their family, but to extend that to understanding how this might still be affecting a
modern black family in poverty becomes dubitable. This is assisted by the neoliberal

135
conception of the individual that delimits strict boundaries for memory, dictating that the
individual's is the only significant item. With this in mind, the Civil Rights movements,
only taking place decades ago, are relegated to history textbooks despite there being
people currently alive to remember it. Slavery too has become a distant memory despite it
having only been abolished a few lifetimes ago (assuming something like 70 years a
piece). Further, it eliminates the possibility of seeing modern day slavery in the forms of
sex trafficking, outsourced labor, and wage slavery. Neoliberal history commodifies the
conception of slavery and absorbs it into the past, isolating it as something only to be
remembered. The neoliberal conception of history brackets off any conception of
collective history, limiting and restricting history to individual events.
History can only be seen as a series of discrete events rather than as something
that can accumulate and solidify not through people as individuals but through groups as
systems. Something like slavery then merely becomes a terrible event as people ignore
the fact that "[t]he subsequent institutionalization of these relationships for the continued
acquisition of material wealth serves to reproduce the current impoverishment of large
segments of communities of color," (Zamudio, 17-18). Slavery becomes something of a
historical event rather than a historical institution, the latter of which being understood as
having lasting and systematic effects.
Instead, people of all histories are expected to rise to equal standards despite
unequal historical conditions. Dominant conservatives and proponents of neoliberalism
point to individual reforms as signs that institutional problems have been solved, unable
to conceptualize history in a relational sense. The very way neoliberal ideology
configures the conceptualization of history fragments it into a series of discrete events
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that can be solved and forgotten in a linear fashion: "[u]ltimately, the liberal perspective
fails to consider the multiple power relationships that give some individuals much greater
advantage over others, and that allow some people to be freer than others," (Zamudio,
16). Without a more complex understanding of the relational workings of humanity and
the way history is both generated by these relations and determines its people by those
relations, history becomes oversimplified. Without a relational understanding, we are left
with an individualistic understanding, one that is generated by neoliberal ideology,
reinforced by it, and made to support it. "Liberal societies use the slogans of equality to
benefit an exclusive, privileged group. And while over the years liberal societies have
extended legal and political rights to a greater number of people, they have never
addressed the fundamental material inequality passed down through generations of
modern capitalist development. From the very beginning, then, the ideal of equality in the
abstract has been celebrated within a broader context of concrete inequality," (Zamudio,
16). The liberal rhetoric of equality is then little more than an ideological disguise
masking a material, social, and cultural inequality.
Further, as critical race theorists and feminist theorists continually uncover, even
the individual reforms that are made in favor of oppressed groups generally do not come
from a radically empathetic society. Instead, the dominant vision of the present society
becomes primary over the past reality. Specifically, the dominant group still has primary
control and regard in what reforms occur. For instance, many of the civil rights reforms
finally succeeded because dominant white society wanted to appear more democratic in
the face of the Soviets: "the landmark ruling in Brown was made possible through the
convergence of foreign policy interests with the interests of people of color in securing
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civil rights," (Zamudio, 35). Of course, this does not at all devalue the work of civil rights
leaders but does show that even when the dominant group works with an oppressed one,
they must find a way it benefits them to be able to justify it.
An analogous situation occurred in education with the institution of such policies
as affirmative action and other diversity-based reforms. They are justified by the
dominant group not based on genuine care but by how it benefits them: "the affirmation
of diversity was held to be of value but only with the convergence of white interests and
only when students of color had to bear the responsibility for creating that diversity,"
(Zamudio, 36). For diversity, this is usually done through the idea that a more diverse
student population will make a better environment for students already there by bringing
in new perspectives.
Behind the scenes, diversity is also justified by some supposed need for political
correctness, as if the inclusion of an oppressed group in higher education were simply
some toll one had to pay to be considered polite and well mannered. This is confirmed as
people now pressure such reforms to be excised before they even came terribly close to
healing a much deeper problem. Dominant groups now get upset as if it is unfair for
oppressed students to be given a favorable glance; they do not even begin to
conceptualize the very idea of structural consequences.
Fairness, at least on a historical level, is not something people in such dominant
and privileged positions are equipped to fully understand (the author included). They do
not realize that "Civil rights policy removed the most blatant legal institutional barriers to
equal schooling, but failed to address the multitude of other existing social inequalities
created after almost 500 years of racialized exploitation. Students of color are allowed to
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enter the classroom but never on an equal footing," (Zamudio, 18). This inequality is not
only perpetuated by the school; institutions throughout force oppressed student to
articulate themselves through language of oppression. Individuals within these
institutions, however, deny conscious racism and believe this means racism itself has
ended. Neoiberals only understand things in terms of intentionality, but racism persists
through institutions, through past intentions sedimented into collective human inertia.
Because of this linear ideology and lack of structural understand, there are now
efforts to eliminate these reforms before they even get deep enough to make a substantive
change. From an entrenched neoliberal perspective, the problems have been solved, and
any further issues must be the fault of the students themselves: "[t]he failure of students
to achieve given these extra opportunities must then be rooted in the deficiencies of the
students, their families and culture(s) rather than in the educational institutions. In reality,
much of the major educational reforms have worked to open access to schools but have
not focused on the quality of education once minority students pass through the
schoolhouse door," (Zamudio, 17). Now that changes have been made, neoliberal
ideology is comfortable blaming these oppressed groups, because they see the conditions
as having been equalized when they are far from actually being so. They only see the
theory of equality rather than the reality, the practice: "[p]olitical equality, such as voting
rights, in the abstract does not translate into equality in the concrete social world,"
(Zamudio, 19).
We can see this from such traditional conservatives as Allan Bloom, who claims
“kids just do not have prejudices against anyone. Whether this is because man has been
reduced to a naked animal without any of the trappings of civilization that differentiate
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him, or because we have recognized our essential humankindness, is a matter of
interpretation. But the fact is that everyone is an individual—if not very individual —in
our major universities. They are all just persons. Being human is enough for what is
important. It does not occur to students to think that any of the things that classically
divided people, even in egalitarian America, should keep them away from anyone else,"
(89). This is a classic neoliberal perspective and one that many hold, especially as
neoliberal ideology solidifies. If one sees humanity as merely a series of persons and fails
to see interpersonal prejudice, it is easy to assume racism and sexism no longer exist. If
the only available way to relate to another person is between an isolated individual and
another isolated individual, racism can all but disappear after such overt policies as
segregation and Jim Crow laws are destroyed. This fragmentation aids an order that is
maintained by the ignorance of its own consequences: "[t]he very notion that race no
longer matters is part of an ideology that justifies and legitimates racial inequality in
society. Subtle beliefs about racial superiority and inferiority serve to elevate the
traditions, art, languages, literature, and ways of being and knowing of some groups
while disparaging the contributions of others. We learn to value the Western literary
canon and a Eurocentric curriculum as superior to the traditions developed by oppressed
groups," (Zamudio, 3).
In modern society, racism and other systems of oppression have become both
highly visible and completely invisible. They are continually argued about, and anyone
would step back from implicating themselves in their perpetuation, but the structures still
persist through less visible, more sophisticated means. People of color are now jailed not
for the color of their skin but because they “looked suspicious.” Feminists are denounced
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not for being women but for being “emotional.” And always, it is “people” that commit
violent and hate based crimes, with the recurrent white male identity now being
submerged in neutral wordings. Language itself is depoliticized, with obscurity
subsuming people in neoliberal ideology as structures of oppression continue in the
background.
Racism in terms of interpersonal prejudice has been ousted from the unconscious,
brought into the daylight and rightfully denounced. Bill Readings points out that as this
simplified version is critiqued, "[l]iberal academics denounce the ideology of race and
gender from a position in which it becomes possible to see such representations as
ideological, without pausing to think that if the ideological has become visible, it is
because the high-stakes game has moved to another table," (104). If the interpersonal
ideologies within racism have moved into a place of being visible and mendable, then
they are not truly ideologies anymore. That said, they can still be incredibly pernicious,
and the progress already done to see them and fix them has been worthwhile. Still, if
radical progress is to be achieved, one must continue to question ideology, and, as
Readings suggests, this framework has shifted back another step into the background,
ever seeming natural and objective.
Structural Oppression
Pierre Bourdieu analyzes the topic of ritualistic progression in a way that can
show one of the most important structural ideologies of racism, sexism, and other
oppressions. It is worthwhile to quote him at length:
“To speak of rites of institution is to suggest that all rites tend to consecrate or
legitimate an arbitrary boundary, by fostering a misrecognition of the arbitrary
nature of the limit and encouraging a recognition of it as legitimate [...] By
solemnly marking the passage over a line which establishes a fundamental
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division in the social order, rites draw the attention of the observer to the passage
[...] whereas the important thing is the line. What, in effect, does this line
separate? Obviously, it separates a before and an after [...] In fact, the most
important division, and one which passes unnoticed, is the vision it creates
between those who are not subject to it... There is thus a hidden set of individuals
in relation to which the instituted group is defined,” (118).
The ritual around the college graduation itself focuses attention on the dividing line
between those who graduate and those who don't, those who get in to college and those
who don't, and for him specifically, those who pass the ritual and those who don't. The
more sacred the ritual, in terms of diploma transference or embossed acceptance letters,
the more attention becomes localized to this dividing line between successes and failures
(and always in neoliberal ideology, the failures are blamed entirely for what is seen as
their own mistakes). The sanctity of this ritual passage serves to distract from the
marginalized and silenced groups of people that are quietly disqualified from the ritual
entirely.
In higher education, this includes students who through luck of geography end up
in poorly run and poorly funded high schools that don't support them enough to make
them college eligible, students without stable family structures to support their
academics, students who must work most of their lives to support their families, students
who have been informed from birth by cultural and personal narratives that they cannot
go to college or cannot pursue certain subjects because of their race or gender, and, in
general, students that have been interpellated into oppressive hierarchal systems that
structurally eliminate their ability to pursue higher education. Neoliberals cleverly focus
on the rare students that transcend these massive odds, but they are always exceptions to
the rule. In the ideological mode of ascendance, the ritual of ascendance becomes the
center of public attention while the structural elimination is marginalized.
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The disqualified group is made invisible by only acknowledging those who have
"failed" to pass the line. In this way, graduates are always defined against people who do
not graduate and good students are always defined against bad students, both oppressive
situations that serve to mask the still more oppressed people that are disqualified from
this process entirely. The rites and ceremony around this passage are especially important
because they create a process wherein “[t]o institute, in this case, is to consecrate, that is,
to sanction and sanctify a particular state of things, an established order [which] consists
of sanctioning and sanctifying a different (pre-existent or not) by making it known and
recognized; it consists of making it exist as a social difference, known and recognized as
such by the agent invested and everyone else,”(Bourdieu, 199). The rite of graduation and
the structure of education create the social conditions for the reception of certain
unequally treated peoples and subsequently makes certain people within its systems cast
in a role that makes them socially recognizable as having passed. The structure of
education itself has become permeated with the institutions of oppressions that have long
defined society so that even if we include liberal reforms, they merely change the surface
rather than radically change the root.
Unequal Educational Policies
Such reforms are revealed to be especially weak when we consider what some
writers worry will become a deeper educational inequality wherein the best schools
become entirely for a higher class of people and worse schools are left to rot in
underfunding for the rest. Just as wealth distribution has deeply diverged in the wider
economic situation, so has wealth diverged in higher education, with the best schools
hoarding wealth and maintaining their exclusivity through high tuitions, while worse
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schools are given less funding to support the students that need it the most. Education in
general, from college down to primary school, has been infected with the structural
funding ideology of achievement.
No Child Left Behind, instituted during the Bush administration, may be the most
well known initiation, all bearing the common and most dangerous mark of achievement
based funding wherein “good schools” are rewarded with funding and “bad schools” are
punished with defunding. This creates a widening disparity wherein poor schools, already
underfunded with their revenue being based on the property taxes of their districts,
which, to no fault of the students, may be poor: "so once again the advantaged would be
competing with the disadvantaged, with almost certainly predictable results. Such mass
testing would not alleviate the real crisis in US education, but the results could be used to
justify differences in achievement of both children and schools, by imposing ideals of
competition and hierarchy while accepting and exacerbating a divided and unequal
society," (Weiler, 217).
Even institutions like colleges are neoliberalized as individuals, as
personifications that fail based entirely on their own effort. The system gathers inertia as
people fail to adequately challenge it because the "high achieving schools have little
reason to challenge a system that benefits them, and the low achieving schools have few
resources to change a system that does not benefit them," (Zamudio, 34). Structural
inequality, disguised as achievement and measured through illusorily objective
standardized tests, then produces more structural inequality. As Zamudio further points
out, the “emphasis on standardized tests above all other types of learning damages the
intellectual potential of all students. By privileging and accepting only one way of
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knowing, it devalues the funds of knowledge that students of color bring with them to
their educational experience," (40). Continually, a certain type of knowledge is tested and
rewarded with the distribution of teaching capable of handling this testing unevenly
placed.
For instance, the SATs have long been representative of a gender bias that
rectified a supposed error in gender difference to support males:
“[F]or the first several years the SAT was offered, males scored higher than
females on the Math section but females achieved higher scores on the Verbal
section. ETS policy-makers determined that the Verbal test needed to be
‘balanced’ more in favor of males, and added questions pertaining to politics,
business and sports to the Verbal portion. Since that time, males have outscored
females on both the Math and Verbal sections. Dwyer notes that no similar effort
has been made to ‘balance’ the Math section, and concludes that, 'It could be
done, but it has not been, and I believe that probably an unconscious form of
sexism underlies this pattern. When females show the superior performance,
‘balancing’ is required; when males show the superior performance, no
adjustments are necessary,'” (fairtest).
Even as tests are supposedly standardized, certain societal norms, in this case gender, are
taken into consideration. A certain vision of society, always seen as being the true, right,
and natural one, is to be supported.
With the outer economic crisis and the significantly worse educational one, tight
funds mean that even schools opposed to such testing must shift all of their teaching to
the test in order to get enough money to even have a chance at succeeding. At all points,
this hurts already structurally disadvantaged people, so even as acts like affirmative
action become devalued in neoliberal culture, an accurate material perspective is not
taken. Though enrollment is up, this enrollment has become stratified to different types
and qualities of schooling. As Henry Giroux says
"when business concerns about efficiency and cost-effectiveness replace the
imperatives of critical learning, a division based on social class begins to appear.
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Poor and marginalized students will get low-cost, low-skilled knowledge and
second-rate degrees from online sources, while those students being educated for
leadership positions in the elite schools will get personalized instruction and
socially interactive pedagogies in which high-powered knowledge, critical
thinking, and problem-solving will be a priority (coupled with a high-status
degree). Under such circumstances, traditional modes of class and racial tracking
will be reinforced and updated," (268).
New divisions emerge among old fault lines with neoliberal ideology ready to blame the
individual rather than itself as a structure. Poor and marginalized students from minority
races and genders are then re-segregated in disguised form, as they are filtered into
poorly funded schools with overworked staff. They become what Gayatri Spivak has
legendarily termed, the “subaltern,” “those removed from lines of social mobility," (531).
Rather than opening up these disadvantaged situations to well-meaning professors
however, efficiency minded administrators further cement this divide by focusing on the
hiring of temporary staff, namely adjunct professors. Aronowitz explains: "[a] college
can hire five to eight adjuncts for every junior faculty position and typically does not pay
them benefits unless they have some form of union rights," (74). These professors are
paid poorly, are deeply overworked, and their own precarious position reflects those of
the students they teach, making the relationship between them a treacherous one to
maintain.
Of course, administrators cannot be dealt all of the blame because they are being
handed a financial situation unequally unfair in the history of the university. In this era of
neoliberalism, all public institutions are viewed with a suspicion and all have been
receiving massive cuts. “Financial support for universities has veered dramatically from
public to private contributions, consistent with the general pressure to diminish
government funding for a wide range of public programs and to predicate support for
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most any social program—any social good, more broadly—on private preferences,
whether individual or corporate. [...] All universities, public and private, have become
major fundraisers, dependent increasingly on private giving, non-state revenue streams
(including steady fee increases), and the interests of private and privatizing
determination,” (Goldberg). The university does not become increasingly corporatized
purely by the conspiracy of internal agents but by material encouragement from outside
market forces. When it comes down to it, the university has lost a vast amount of funding
and in this desperate context; more and more administrators are brought on in an effort to
more quickly bail the water out of this sinking ship. The effort is certainly
counterproductive to some degree, but it at least makes more market sense than hiring
more tenure track humanities professors. The market is not merely an ideology but is also
a reality, a reality that universities must increasingly respond to with deference.
Marketization, like other damaging historical political changes, moves upward, so
traditionally cheaper institutions have generally been corroded first with the changes
racing up to the more elite universities. It is worth noting that the issue has also risen in
public attention only when it has begun to touch these more prestigious institutions,
perhaps implying that a loss of the "lower" schools would have been sustainable and
worthy of ignorance. Changes such as these can always be justified on the marginalized
first, allowing the establishment of a new norm that can then take over the “higher”
planes. Giroux warns that this now totalizing effort for marketization will especially harm
such schools already in precarious positions: "corporatizing the university will take its
biggest toll on those second- and third-tier institutions that are increasingly defined as
serving no other function than to train semi-skilled and obedient workers for the new
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postindustrial order. The role slotted for these institutions is driven less by the
imperatives of the new digital technologies than by the need to reproduce a gender, racial,
and class division of labor that supports the neoliberal global market revolution and its
relentless search for bigger profits," (268). Though culture may have already been
devoured to a great extent in this vast marketization, it can still be used as a tool to divide
people against each other. It can still be an already well-worn channel, a repeated
narrative along which changes can be slid in more easily.
Transcendence Through STEM
In the face of wide economic turmoil however, these silenced groups can
suddenly gain some purchase in neoliberal ideology as they are offered a savior in the
form of economic work. While scholarships in the arts, humanities, and other "useless"
degrees will be hard to come by, oppressed groups will be homogeneously encouraged to
take up careers in subjects that will boost the economy. Again in neoliberal ideology,
people are not recognized as people until they are first economic actors.
A new series of reforms has recently occurred as schools rush to get women and
other minority groups involved in STEM (Science Technology Engineering
Mathematics) fields. Though past reforms have always suffered from the above problems
of shallowness as well, these new ones are sharpened by the edge of a new focus on
STEM education. STEM has become the new focal point of educational development,
and through it, neoliberals can justify and claim it as the savior of so many
underrepresented groups.
There are constantly myths circulated of inner city kids finding transcendence
through engineering, of women defying their gender roles through coding, but these
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myths barely even cover the fact that these fields within and without education still have
not been changed to welcome such minority groups, despite the supposed focus on
STEM. It is implicitly assumed that such groups have not joined these economies because
of their own faults and that they merely require encouragement to do so. It is
ideologically ignored that the very structure of these economies and groups have
systematically disallowed and disqualified such groups from participating in these
economies despite interest. Further, as we discussed in the section on sub culture, sub
cultural groups cannot merely be included within a dominant group without the radical
restructuring of that group and their very definition of what constitutes that group.
Dominant people within such groups then become highly resistant to such "intrusions,"
often insulating themselves by poisoning their own environment with vitriolic discourses
and practices that make participating in such a group painful to the point of being
impossible.
Opposite to this, oppressed groups often try to coalesce into collections of
solidarity in subjects such as Women's Studies and African American Studies, but these
subjects are denigrated. These students are seen as congregating to isolate themselves
within their own studies, while white male students never receive this judgment because
their congregation in white centered studies is treated as normal. In all manners of racism,
sexism, and heteronormativity, the prototypical person is treated as white, male, and
heterosexual. Any deviations from that produce a socially recognizable difference.
Racism and sexism are subsumed into states of normalcy and any resistance, even
passively, is seen as tangential specialization, as isolationism, as self-centeredness. We
can see this in an example accusation from Allan Bloom: "[t]he way was opened for
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black students to live and study the black experience, to be comfortable, rather than be
constrained by the learning accessible to man as man," (95). The system sets things up to
benefit a certain kind of people and either breaks people into those roles or fails people
who don't. A particular standard is treated as transcendentally universal and any
deviations from the norm are treated as insubstantial.
For neoliberalism, such issues are ignored because STEM does not take its worth
from its use value but from its exchange value. It is often disguised as being a set of more
useful disciplines, but the definition of use is socially defined and in a capitalist context,
"use" means how much surplus value it can produce. STEM is then valued so highly
because it is one in a line of educational subjects that are treated as profitable. In
marketized education, knowledge becomes merely a commodity, and with this,
knowledge becomes subject primarily to exchange value. That knowledge which can be
exchanged into the market, invested for surplus and eventual profit is legitimated as the
best knowledge, as valuable knowledge. "Knowledge with a high market value is what
counts, while those fields, such as the fine arts and humanities, that cannot be quantified
in such terms will either be downsized or allowed to become largely irrelevant in the
hierarchy of academic knowledge," (Giroux, 264). With the ascendance of profit
replacing the ascendance of culture, the humanities is seen as tangential and ripe for
elimination.
Appropriating Positivism
STEM has some extra power because it commodifies a bygone cultural power
from the philosophical worldview of positivism. This vision of the world limited value to
what it saw as scientific, i.e. things that could be rigorously and meticulously studied
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with constant reference to supposedly material, objective, and physical facts. A classic
diagram from positivism is one that makes a hierarchy of knowledge based on a
foundation of math, which is seen as the cell of purest objectivity. True facts can only be
built upon that in linear form from math to physics to chemistry to biology to psychology.
Each step up gets shakier and is viewed with more skepticism, especially if it cannot trace
clear reference down the ladder to an origin in mathematics. Interestingly, this is
sustained even as mathematicians such as Gödel prove that even a basic mathematical
system like arithmetic cannot be upheld axiomatically, in other words, cannot be
autonomous. The base treated as absolute still needs some assumptions, which are of
course socially constrained and constituted.
Though it is not admitted, this hierarchy is sustained by the ideological view that
delimits positivism, essentially the view that reason is the ultimate tool and standard of
life. This receives some inheritance from Cartesian dualism and other dualistic views that
treated the mind (as rational) and the body (as physical and emotional) as two
fundamentally different and separate things. This division is usually upheld in order to
privilege the powers of mind over the tangential distractions of bodily desires and
emotional distractions. This in itself can do quite a bit of damage to the humanities,
which largely deals with the emotional and the bodily through such lenses as literature
and theater, but it is amplified by positivism which then extends this discourse by
privileging such subjects as science above others, not only by valuing it more highly but
by treating it as legitimate.
This edge is sharpest when it comes into contact with certain minority groups who
don't have the privilege of denying their bodies. bell hooks shows this as she reflects on
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how multicultural education has disquieted this positivist dualistic habit: "I think that one
of the unspoken discomforts surrounding the way a discourse of race and gender, class
and sexual practice has disrupted the academy is precisely the challenge to that
mind/body split. Once we start talking in the classroom about the body and about how
·we live in our bodies, we're automatically challenging the way power has orchestrated
itself in that particular institutionalized space. The person who is most powerful has the
privilege of denying their body," (136-7). For women accustomed to being harassed or
abused based on the gendering of their bodies or persons-of-color being systemically
disadvantaged based on the color of their skin, the body is not something capable of
being denied.
Bodies have an important place in the constitution of the social hierarchy, but
only those at the top have the privilege of pretending they don't. "The erasure of the body
encourages us to think that we are listening to neutral, objective facts, facts that are not
particular to who is sharing the information. We are invited to teach information as
though it does not emerge from bodies," (hooks, 139). The erasure of the body is then an
essential part of pretending knowledge to be neutral and objective. "To call attention to
the body is to betray the legacy of repression and denial that has been handed down to us
by our professorial elders, who have been usually white and male," (hooks, 191) a
betrayal that is feared, blocked by the delegitimizing efforts of positivism, dualism, and
enlightenment. These groups are further denigrated as reason is prioritized so that it
essentially defines humanity: "[s]ince reason is the essential faculty that distinguishes
humans from animals, it is also identified [...] as the higher, superior property of humans,
as a life distinguished by activities of reason is a superior life," (Ferguson, 61). White
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men are esteemed as the most rational, so the emotional women and the angry people of
color are delegitimized.
Positivism is not just some philosophy snapped up by convenience either. It has
its origins in the fountain of enlightenment thought, the place where liberalism itself was
largely conceived and perpetuated. Enlightenment, even before positivism, sought to use
rigorous reason to dissect reality and through that, understand it. "Enlightenment,
understood in the widest sense as the advance of thought, has always aimed at liberating
human beings from fear and installing them as masters. Yet the wholly enlightened earth
is radiant with triumphant calamity. Enlightenment's program was the disenchantment of
the world. It wanted to dispel myths, to overthrow fantasy with knowledge,"
(Horkheimer, 1). Already, we can see how such a movement would be ripe for
ideological entrapment by thinking that it can clear a scientific path straight through an
inevitable interpellation. In education, we can see how the attempt to dispel fantasy could
be used to dispel anything that was seen as dealing with fantasy, such as education in the
humanities. After all, "[f]or enlightenment, anything which docs not conform to the
standard of calculability and utility must be viewed with suspicion," (Horkheimer, 3).
Again, it's clear how such a movement could align perfectly with the neoliberal
marketization of society.
Ultimately, positivism does exactly what it says it doesn't: it makes an aesthetic
value paramount. What is important for positivism and other fundamentalist adherents to
reason is less the strict system they seem to maintain than the cold, slick, seemingly
objective appearance of reason. This appearance is maintained by a cleansing of
subjectivity through the body and the emotions, thus flushing anything out that uses those
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domains. Positivism continually defines itself by the negation of humanity, seeing
subjectivity merely as a source of bias. With objectivity inherently being something that
cannot be achieved by the very nature of social historical interpellation, positivists seek
exactly what they profess to avoid, the aesthetic feeling of something being rational.
Disguised within this supposedly objective judgment is the fact that the “notion of
objectivity in any field reflects the values and assumptions of the scholars working in that
field. In the name of objectivity these values and assumptions are hidden. It is impossible
to separate values from facts and inquiry from ethics," (Kincheloe, 12). Far from being
neutral and objective, positivism is tied up in a particular vision and any subjects taking
part in this vision are far from being neutral as well.
As positivist enlightenment is subsumed into neoliberal marketization, that faith
in mathematics is culturally transmuted into a faith in equivalence: "[b]ourgeois society is
ruled by equivalence. It makes dissimilar things comparable by reducing them to abstract
quantities. For the Enlightenment, anything which cannot be resolved into numbers, and
ultimately into one, is illusion; modern positivism consigns it to poetry. Unity remains
the watchword from Parmenides to Russell. All gods and qualities must be destroyed,"
(Horkheimer, 4). In Capital, Marx showed how capitalism inherently exploits labor to
produce not in terms of use value but in terms of equivalent value so that one product can
be transformed through the exploitation of labor power into a different product of greater
equivalent value, thus making surplus and profit. Horkheimer echoes this by extending
this vast equivalence from the economy into culture and into all of life. Enlightenment
positivism and marketized capital then meet in a space where they both reduce all reality
into abstract numbers. Marketization commodifies for the purpose of surplus value
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production, while positivism justifies on this path of destruction while delegitimizing
anything that cannot be thus subsumed.
In this context, STEM inherits this ideological structure and benefits from its
institutionalization. Continually, STEM outreach programs are made to capture students
as young as primary school with a fascination for engineering, while, on the other side,
humanities programs that have little authentic critical presence before college are getting
cuts across the board, often being eliminated entirely. Of course, this is nothing against
engineering and the STEM fields themselves. Their content is actually incredibly
important and absolutely worthwhile for human development. What is ideological and
thus damaging about STEM is not science nor technology nor engineering nor math but
the acronym, i.e. the idea that these must be grouped together and lorded as the
objectively most valuable part of education. It is not valuable because of what it is but
because of what it can be made to do. Engineering can absolutely be progressive, but it is
one of the easiest fields, thanks to positivism and industrial work narratives, to neutralize
and commodify. Its falling in the "scientific" category versus the "artistic" category is
arbitrary; the motivation to make it the most valuable is ideological. By being closer to
the market in proximity, it is easier for it to be swallowed into the hole of marketization
entirely.
As said before, oppressed people who would normally get ignored actually get
attention because of this focus on STEM. When STEM is marketized and valued this
highly, we create a new crisis by arguing there are not enough students to fill these roles
and thus not enough workers to hold up the economy. We only reach down to help the
oppressed when we can offer them a role that benefits the dominant group. They are not
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acknowledged as people but as potential economic actors. We do not reach for them as
humans but as a labor pool in waiting. What initially seems progressive is then deeply
regressive, commodifying potentially radical sub cultures into market compliant
workers.
We see this reflected upwards by some feminists who, rather than critique
masculinity and patriarchal dominance, actually blame women for not being masculine
enough (which is coded as "assertive" or “competitive"). Similarly, movements of sex
positivity have lost control of responsible positivity and have degenerated into
performing the male gaze with pride rather than learning independent self-love. In both
case, feminism, which is certainly a historically radical movement, has strains wherein
what is outwardly progressive becomes implicitly regressive. Both strains fight for
ultimately affirmative stances, one for women staking their claims in the world of
dominant CEOs and the other choosing to join abusive sexuality rather than fight it.
Progressive movements can then be commodified by the grafting of conservative
ideologies that seem to putatively change culture but materially affirm society. This is
prime evidence that the struggle has moved beyond culture. Cultural arguments can
always be commodified because capital now permeates everything. Though we want
young girls to be able to think of themselves as engineers for sure, we need to be critical
of the fact that the dominant order is only allowing this small act of progressivism
because it can be commodified for the market order by way of positivism and similar
ideologies.
In this way, capitalism then gets the advantage of a well-chosen, historically
entrenched narrative that can assist it as it delegitimizes and destroys any institution with
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even the potential of questioning capitalism. This is not to say that positivism and the
Enlightenment are purely evil, but, when neutralized into capitalism, it provided a
seemingly cultural justification for capitalism's brutality. Positivism, by way of its
methodologies of masculine purification in which it tries to cleanse itself of bias and
emotion, fits perfectly with similar narratives of the ideal liberal individual. Positivism is
already quite close to marketization because it already sets itself up as masculine (by
negating emotion) and individualist (by denying determination as bias). Yet as capitalism
develops, even as positivism paves this way for marketization, it becomes less and less
necessary as capitalism founds its own self-justificatory common sense. Market ideology
always demands a continual improvement and streamlining in efficiency, so, even as it
gains dominance, it must cut out extraneous justification until reality is replaced with the
market, until reality can justify itself.
A Market Language
Marketized universities, with the inevitable decay of positivism, have invented
their own language to replace it. Bill Readings has a particular bone to pick with the term
"excellence," a popular meme turned metric that is used to measure the quality of
anything in the university. Many have picked it up in their mottos and many more have
propagated it throughout their curriculums, grants, and reforms. The problem with such a
term though, is that it is an “integrating principle, excellence has the singular advantage
of being entirely meaningless, or to put it more precisely, non-referential," (Readings,
22). Without getting into the details of language philosophy and reference, we can at least
stake the claim that the term is at best highly malleable and at worst, completely
meaningless. Either way, it becomes something to manipulate. Without reference,
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excellence cannot demand a strict meaning so its meaning is then up to market forces. It
is not used objectively, as is claimed, but changes with the market: "[e]xcellence is
clearly a purely internal unit of value that effectively brackets all questions of reference
or function, thus creating an internal market. Henceforth, the question of the University is
only the question of relative value-for-money, the question posed to a student who is
situated entirely as a consumer, rather than as someone who wants to think," (Readings,
27). In a market context, “excellence” can only refer to exchange value and surplus
profit, but the word as an internal market brackets questions that would obstruct such a
marketization. Excellence is then another term in the process neutralizing language into
pure market ideology, only a small step from reducing everything to absolute market
terms.
“Excellence” then functions with a great deal of subjectivity disguised as
objectivity, as if people and institutions can be adequately judged based on how
"excellent" they are. But "to say that excellence is a criterion is to say absolutely nothing
other than that the committee will not reveal the criteria used to judge applications,"
(Readings, 24). Excellence disguises the dominance of market concerns and more
nefariously obscures any other concerns that may be in the administrator's mind. Despite
being pushed through on the glint of positivism, such a system is ripe for misuse and bias
but it still retains a cloak of objectivity. "In this context, excellence responds very well to
the needs of technological capitalism in the production and processing of information, in
that it allows for the increasing integration of all activities into a generalized market,"
(Readings, 32). By way of excellence as ideological structure, anything and everything
can be subsumed into the market.
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Most damningly, Readings claims that "[e]xcellence draws only one boundary:
the boundary that protects the unrestricted power of the bureaucracy. And if a particular
department's kind of excellence fails to conform, then that department can be eliminated
without apparent risk to the system," (Readings, 33). With excellence as a tool and the
general need for efficiency and the infection of market values, bureaucracy has gained
power over the university. Administrators have always been a need, but formerly
educational institutions have become administrative ones if one is to look at who is hired,
what kind of position is cut least, and who gets the biggest pay check (the ultimate value
signifier in capitalism). "I would be inclined to argue that the University of Excellence is
one in which a general principle of administration replaces the dialectic of teaching and
research, so that teaching and research, as aspects of professional life, are subsumed
under administration," (Readings, 125). The administrator then becomes the ideological
resolution of a necessary dialectic, smoothing over the contradiction in order to
subordinate it to a market hierarchy.
Administrators have taken a position akin to the managers of factories, using
scientific management and assembly line logic to encourage and induce efficiency,
ultimately justifying themselves with the need for excellence. When a university needs
something, another administrator needs to be hired and when the university is doing well,
another administrator needs to be hired to handle the extra money. Continually,
excellence only draws a distinct line in favor of bureaucratic progress. According to
Debra Scott, in 2012, “administrators [outnumbered] faculty on every campus across the
country.”
For humanities education, this becomes especially dangerous because this influx
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of administrators can only see the humanities as a waste of money. They do not produce
money but only suck it away. They are only a liability. The university, as a newly
consecrated corporate business, only invests in what makes surplus value. This is why
sports arenas are continually remodeled and campus roads can fall into disrepair. The
pecking order is dominantly decided by return on investment so adjunct salaries, roads,
and humanities education all go underfunded if they're lucky. Most likely, they will be
outright cut or starved of funds until they necessarily fail. As per usual, it's the failure's
fault, not anyone else's. As Readings goes on to say: "[s]ince this process is designed to
introduce a competitive market into the academic world, investment follows success, so
the government intervenes to accentuate differentials in perceived quality rather than to
reduce them. Thus more money is given to the high-scoring university departments, while
the poor ones, rather than being developed, are starved of cash (under the Thatcher
regime, this was of course understood as an encouragement to such departments to pull
themselves up by their bootstraps). The long-term trend is to permit the concentration of
resources in centers of high performance and to encourage the disappearance of
departments, and even perhaps of universities, perceived as ‘weaker,’" (36). Of course,
the non-referential item of "excellence" is the ultimate and final metric for funding and
survival. Use value is entirely ignored in favor of exchange value.
The University as Global Commodity
Readings then spells a future that is already upon us, one wherein such notions of
excellence help the university link up to a globalized corporate structure, the final step
the university needs to achieve complete corporatization. "The University will produce
excellence in knowledges, and as such will link into the circuits of global capital and
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transnational politics without difficulty. This is because there is no cultural content to the
notion of excellence, nothing specifically "French," for example, except insofar as
"Frenchness" is a commodity on the global market," (Readings, 38). Without assuming
national culture is inherently valuable, it would be a blockade to leveling such ancient
cultural institutions to the level of global businesses, but as discussed before, this process
is already largely completed. Further, the very capability of universities to engage in such
a wide market is proof that such cultural foundations have already been dismantled.
We can see this process occurring alongside the spreading of Internet-based
education, wherein anything specific to professor and community is eliminated. Online
education is justified by its cheap price tag, a material encouragement that most do not
have the privilege to ignore. As always, capitalism creates the grounds that determine its
success and with such empty metrics in tow, "the only criterion of excellence is
performativity in an expanded market," (Readings, 38). Importantly, though such an
ideology certainly affects content, it is not content in itself. Its very nature as a structure
for transmitting content is what crafts it as an ideology. By nature, this structure cannot
be neutral: "[k]nowledge is a system in which the 'contents' cannot be conceived outside
their forms of appropriation (acquisition, transmission, control, utilization). The system is
that of the ideological dominance of a class," (Ranciére, 6). The narrative, the structure,
and the ideology of marketization dictates knowledge as objective, disguising the fact
that it cannot be appropriated without the indelible mark of its transmission, control, and
utilization, all ossified as market ideology.
One thing we must continually resist in such analyses is the temptation to over
personify institutions such as capitalism; such vapidity results in little more than
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conspiracy theories. This extended discussion of marketization is then in fact not a
superstructural implementation from nefarious illuminati but is generated by (and
generates) material conditions. This marketized education is not a new invention but is a
revitalized inheritance from industrial era education. As capitalism and the industrial
revolution first started their ascendent profanation of society, education was fitted to new
circumstances. When life was secularized and profaned by the profusion of capital,
education had to be modified to fit these new circumstances.
Althusser discusses how educational institutions are retrofitted to become
ideological apparatuses because the state of production necessarily requires a continuous
state of reproduction. Similarly, we cannot merely teach students the market but must
marketize students: "the reproduction of labor-power requires not only a reproduction of
its skills, but also, at the same time, a reproduction of its submission to the rules of the
established order" (Althusser, 103). As Benjamin says, "[m]ass reproduction is aided
especially by the reproduction of masses," (251). In industrial era education and our
inheritance of it, this means that scientific management on the industrial line is translated
into discipline in the classroom. Students are regimented into strict course loads with
exact timings and ruler snapping order. The dominant form of knowledge is one of "know
how" rather than "know why" (Althusser, 103). Specifically, the students must know how
to be workers because this is the objective natural world they are about to enter. In order
to compete in a globalized economy, students must not enter the market but enter the
market prepared to be the best workers they can be for "just as the corporation replaces
the factory, perpetual training tends to replace the school, and continuous control to
replace the examination. Which is the surest way of delivering the school over to the
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corporation," (Deleuze).
Once the material world becomes dominated by the market, the superstructural
world had to react. Though this correspondence is never exact, as Althusser said, it is
always economics "in the last instance." By this, I take it he means that the material base
crafts the edge on which all other arguments must be cut. Perhaps there is some
resistance, but, ultimately, the market will cut through and the necessity created by the
market as status quo means that it will a priori establish itself as the reality against which
all fantasy must be measured. As Ranciere reminds us: "since Marx, we know that the
'real' needs of society always serve to mask the interests of a class" (5). What is objective
is always actually partisan.
Resurgence of Vocational Education
By way of neoliberalism and marketization, by way of positivism, by way of
STEM, we see the resurgence of an already powerful strain of education come to absolute
dominance in the form of vocationalization. The siren call of the supposedly newest,
freshest, most modern form of education is that of job training. Even STEM will soon be
phased out because it accidentally contains things such as theoretical physics and abstract
mathematics, which, while having a positivist glow, do not contribute to the market.
Positivism will have its use and it will eventually be ditched as the market achieves
absolute dominance. The cries we hear for making education vocational however do not
just come from cultural conservatives and capitalist ideologues. This is an idea that has
been manufactured as common sense, and it has done this partially through the American
narrative of democratization.
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John Dewey, with great profundity, located the university's fundamental identity,
which shows how, in my analysis, it was destined to fall and disintegrate with culture.
Though he wrote in the early 1900s, his brilliant analysis still holds weight today. He
locates the beginning of higher education in the Greek age, an age that is explicitly
remembered with nostalgia and reverence. He, however, is conscious enough to know
that despite the outer trappings of such a society, it could not have historically existed
without the institution of slavery. From the very beginning of society, there is a hierarchal
division of labor between the doers and the thinkers. The thinkers could only exist by
way of enslaved doers that did everything that needed to be done so that the thinkers
could have the privilege to think (Dewey, 144). For most of history, such practical,
vocational doers have retained the disgrace of originating in this lower class form. They
didn't work with their hands as much as had to work with their hands. Higher-class
people were above such necessity. Dewey points out that the “class that enjoyed the
privileges of freedom and a liberal education was based upon precisely those
considerations that modern liberation has steadily striven to get rid of," (145). On the
surface, we have indeed tried to make a more democratic society through a modern
liberation but it persists within and behind our ideological structures. Culture itself
"originates in the radical separation of mental and physical work. It is from this
separation, the original sin as it were, that culture draws its strength," (Adorno, 203).
In this way too, we can see that the hierarchal view of culture is inherently based
on such subjugation, but, as this subjugation historically dissipates, so too must this
cultural structure dissipate. There emerges a discrepancy when everyone becomes "free"
to work and must work, but some are still more cultured than others. The ascending form
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of culture was inherently hierarchal and was destined to fail from the beginning with the
historical development of consciousness. Traditionalists are then inherently regressive;
implicitly taking on all the baggage such a regressive stance gives them.
With this cultural format inherently set against capitalism, because it valued
things tangential to wealth and only somewhat tied up in it and its limited perspective on
which to exploit, it had to be dismantled. Again, marketization disguises itself as
rebellious rather than dominant, as a marginal voice rather than the author. Vocational
education is seen as a democratization of ivory tower intellectual education, a narrative
that corresponds perfectly with narratives about the founding fathers rebelling from the
ruling British because it has the essential cell of resistance. We can see this again and
again as proud conservatives take on the perspectives of victims because "in order to
speak in today's academy one is constrained to assume a position of marginality. So even
conservatives have to tell the story of their own marginalization from culture in order to
speak for themselves," (Readings, 111). They speak as oppressed people who must fight
for their downtrodden causes of Christian morality and market politics in the face of the
supposed dominance of such bogeymen as politically correct discourse, multiculturalism,
and "progressives" (always in scare quotes). As Readings says, in a purely marketized
society, the power has moved from the top to the center to permeating the structure itself;
the center of power has become invisible. In this context, the only thing that can have
voice is the marginal, or what is disguised as marginal.
High culture is then democratized in the name of the people, breaking down the
ivory towers not to bring intellectualism to the people but to hang the intellectuals and
declare the guillotine a utopia. I must repeat this and say that intellectuals set themselves
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up for this by perpetuating the high culture mythic structure inherently based on
oppression, but everything else that is lost in this destruction does have value.
Marketizing Thought
Marketization is seeking to eliminate, in the name of the populous proletarian
workers, for their supposed advantage, the very idea of critical thought. If the market is
paramount, any thought not dedicated to getting a job, making money, and working hard
is tangential. It can be tangential in emergent, residual, or alternative terms but its state
never quite matters because its status is that of being extraneous. We can see this as high
schoolers, before they are even adults, contemplate their educational paths in terms of
their future careers. They are taught not in terms of exploration but in terms of limitation
and narrowing in order to prepare themselves for marketability. Students are being asked
to pick their major and with that, their career future before they can even vote or drink
alcohol. Self-actualization is cut as tangential to a market reality that demands a child
know itself fully so that it can reduce itself to a commodity. We must keep in mind this is
not merely a false idea but a reaction to a material reality, namely, the price of college.
College is a necessity for many jobs, but its supposedly priceless education is priced very
highly. In a cutthroat market world, students will have to do whatever they can to lower
that price, including reducing their humanities to a form of settling rather than curiosity.
This is all justified by the idea that the market is reality, and a market good is really a
common good. If this is conceptualized as sacrifice at all, it is seen as a sacrifice for a
greater good.
As Henry Giroux says:
"[i]n the corporate model, knowledge is privileged as a form of investment in the
economy, but appears to have little value in terms of self-definition, social
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responsibility, or the capacities of individuals to expand the scope of freedom,
justice, and democracy. Stripped of ethical and political considerations,
knowledge offers limited (if any) insights into how schools should educate
students to push against the oppressive boundaries of gender, class, race, and age
domination. Nor does such a corporate language provide the pedagogical
conditions for students to think critically, take risks politically, or imagine a world
governed by civic values rather than corporate interests. Education is a moral and
political practice and always embodies particular views of social life, a particular
rendering of what community is, and an idea of what the future might hold,"
(263).
Despite the narratives being espoused generally, the supposedly objective marketization
and vocationalization of education is not done naturally or apolitically but is done
because it embodies a certain vision of social life, especially of the community and its
future. The marketization vision sees workers and commodities, not people. We can see
this, as Giroux says, through how marketization dictates how knowledge's value is
defined.
Knowledge is merely an investment, a means to an economic end, not a use value
but an exchange value, something to be circulated in order to bring profit. Essentially,
this is being shaped not as a certain kind of knowledge or even the best kind of
knowledge but simply as the knowledge. Everything else is not merely tangential but is
unreal, hogwash, and pretentious drivel. Further, as Elizabeth Povinelli points out:
"Within a neoliberal state, any social investment that does not have a clear end— a
projected moment when input value (money, services, care) can be replaced by output
value—is not merely economically suspect but morally suspect, no matter the lifeenhancing nature of the investment," (Povinelli).
Humanities education is either eliminated or neutralized, fragmented, and
commodified as the "older, inherited ways of doing things are broken into their
component parts and reorganized with a view to greater efficiency according to the
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instrumental dialectic of means and ends, a process that amounts to a virtual bracketing
or suspension of the ends themselves and thus opens up the unlimited perspective of a
complete instrumentalization of the world: cultural institutions could scarcely hope to
resist this universal process, which sunders subject from object and structurally colonizes
each separately, producing hierarchies of functions according to their technical use,"
(Jameson, 220). Of course, with Marx, we know this is not some random chance but is
motivated by the dominant class because, after all, "The ideas of the ruling class are in
every epoch the ruling ideas," (Marx, 229) and, as Giroux points out and neoliberalism
encourages and marketization ensures, corporate business is currently the ruling class.
Anything tangential to them is tangential to reality.
This achieves its full force in what Giroux calls an "audit culture" wherein money
must constantly be traced and controlled down to its last dime. Though the educational
boom during the Cold War also focused on STEM and increased market and cultural
viability, money was free to flow in a market that had at least some of the dynamism
capitalist purports to have. In late capitalism, dominance has been handed to
administrators that track every dollar, and, through this magnified clarity, through this
exact calculus, absolutely nothing can be justified that cannot be proven to have an
immediate return on investment. Money has gone from being central to absorbing that
which was situated around it.
The humanities is being gradually expunged of anything with the potential for
emergent radicalism by way of this ideology. Subjects like women's studies and African
American studies, which inherently focus on oppression, become the icon of wasted time.
Literature, philosophy, and history are little more than additional context to what the
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world really is. Social science and abstract STEM are simply wasted potential. The
ultimate marketization is the marketization of life, and as students and human beings
have their humanities reduced to their natures as workers, everything else can be
eliminated as intrusive, unnatural, inefficient, and wasteful. The most fundamental thing
to get rid of, to disintegrate, is students' humanities and this is what we will cover next.
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Student Alienation

A priori cynicism
For the everyday work of the humanities teacher, the problem most likely to
overtly occur is not these manifold issues of marketization but the pedagogical struggle
of working with and trying to work through student cynicism. The symptoms of cynicism
are easy for even a relatively unpracticed teacher to notice. Bodily and behavioral
symptoms include glazed eyes, sighs, furrowed brows, hands obscuring the face or eyes,
fidgeting, etc. Often, it's not even this subtle as students defiantly turn in subpar work,
exhibit their distraction and boredom, dismiss both the content and form of teaching out
of hand, and more. Students are rarely as creative as when trying to invent new ways to
display their lack of engagement both in the material in front of them and in school and
society as a whole.
The struggle to teach has become a struggle to capture engagement. In this age of
teaching, teachers cannot even count on attention but must contend with the fact that
most students already dismiss them. As Martin Haberman sympathetically
describes: "[t]he classroom […] seethes with passive resentment that sometimes bubbles
up into overt resistance. Teachers burn out because of the emotional and physical energy
that they must expend to maintain their authority every hour of every day," (291). A site
of student alienation is also a site for teacher alienation.
With our study of culture, identity, and ideology in mind, especially Russon's
therapeutic focusing of these ideas, we can begin our analysis of this behavior with the
idea that students are not as neurotic as they may seem, but are, in fact, responding
rationally to a contradictory world. Their responses usually do produce neurotic behavior
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and mental patterns, but the responses themselves do not issue from a damaged mind but
come from responses to environmental stimuli that they may or may not be entirely
picking up on themselves. As always, in order to read these texts, we must engage in the
contexts and how they mesh together and rewrite the texts.
Market Infection
As detailed in this project so far, marketization and neoliberal ideology have
become dominant forces in modern society. Especially noxious in this institution is,
which Marx pointed out in Capital, the market's necessary function as an accumulating,
growing, hungry cycle of exploitation. For the dynamic potential of capitalist production
to be tapped, for capitalism to realize itself, it must constitute itself as an always-growing
entity. Capital cannot rest but must grow, spread, establish itself, replace what used to be
there, and assert its dominance. If a CEO leads a meeting with his stockholders by saying
that high profits have merely been sustained, that is not good news. Profit must be
continually growing or else it risks being in decline, something capitalism cannot allow.
The market, already dominant in life and ideology, is still expanding, but not only
in an outward and external sense but in an internal mode. As previously discussed,
individuals are constituted by their articulation of the social language as run through
intersecting social narratives either pliant or firm depending on the degree of structural
ideological calcification. In a marketized context, all of these items are subsumed within
a market discourse, the only articulation deemed suitable for them being a marketized
one. Reality is homogenized within the market, commodified into merely being an
instance of the market.
This can be seen quite clearly if we translate this metaphor literally to see how
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students articulate themselves and are referred to as “customers,” “workers,” and
“investments” within the university. This is not simply a repressive language impelled on
them, as students often use the discourse of consumer rights to demand certain
improvements to their education. This does not make it a radical or recommended form
of change, but it shows that marketization has already defined the grounds on which
educational struggles may be waged. Within a marketized context, we are always already
struggling with the conception of the individual as merely a thing. Within the neoliberal
university in particular: "the economic exchange between the student and the institution
becomes the defining relationship between the two," (Saunders, 62). Through this market
relation, both are reduced to commodities.
As marketization replaces culture and identity with the market, an ultimately
dialectical contradiction is ideologically resolved so that a dynamic humanity is reduced
to a metaphysical commodity. This change, to be analyzed in detail, is again, not
implanted through a repressive regime but is continually imported by way of
rationalization, justification, and crisis care. With capitalism consecrating the market as
reality, all changes are measured by their correspondence to this objectivity. As
capitalism entrenches itself in a culture of crisis, wherein everyday life is constituted by
an overwhelming concern over one's precarious position in the market, marketization can
then be continually justified in order to ensure protection against the dangers of the very
acceptance of the market.
Internalizing Precariousness
For young students entering into the neoliberal state of constant market
precariousness, stability is hardly even distantly available. Especially in particularly deep
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market downturns, when older adults must lower their standards to take jobs
undergraduate students and high schoolers would normally take, students enter college
already accustomed to the feeling of unemployment and underemployment. Of course,
this especially damages already impoverished students, but it affects a majority of
students whose parents still expect them to work a side job to school or work through
college to pay for it. Students are distinctly aware that this possibility no longer works, no
matter how much they sacrifice their time and sweat for minimum wage jobs over their
schoolwork.
From high school to graduate school, students are intimately familiar with their
precarious positions in society. It is from this fear, institutionalized through constant
economic crises, that students internalize both their alienation from the market and the
desperate need to attach themselves to it. Students survive college but "internalize the
economy’s failure, as a media chorus excoriates them over what they should have done
differently. They jump to meet shifting goalposts; they express gratitude for their own
mistreatment: their unpaid labour, their debt-backed devotion, their investment in a future
that never arrives," (Kendzior). In the constant crush of market crises, students become
initiated not into cultural leadership but into an abusively laborious relationship under
capitalism. Crisis capitalism then "thrives on a culture of cynicism, insecurity, and
despair," (Giroux, 249). It is no wonder that students enter the university cynical when
the worldwide system of capitalism profits from them by forcing them to only be
conscious of their market value and repress other values as tangential.
This system is transmitted through fear:
"today, the point of education is not education. It’s accreditation. The more
accreditation you have, the more money you make. That’s the instrumental logic
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of neoliberalism. And this instrumental logic comes wrapped in an envelope of
fear. And my Ivy League, my MIT students are the same. All I feel coming off of
my students is fear. That if you slip up in school, if you get one bad grade, if you
make one fucking mistake, the great train of wealth will leave you behind. And
that’s the logic of accreditation. If you’re at Yale, you’re in the smartest 1% in the
world. […] And the brightest students in the world are learning in fear. I feel it
rolling off of you in waves. But you can’t learn when you’re afraid. You cannot
be transformed when you are afraid," (Diaz).
Fear insulates the student from the world, from confronting themselves in such a way that
would impel transformation.
Before the university will even accept them after all, students must mold
themselves into the kind they would want to accept, which is usually a marketized
version of themselves. Crisis culture further makes it impossible to resist such a need
because economic needs always assert their primacy in terms of survival. Students then
frame their education as the shaping of applications, participating in clubs and sports,
getting good grades and studying; all is under the sway of the application. The student is
already enmeshed in a process of retrofitting their past in objectified terms and directing
their future in accordance with market potential.
This is further cemented as students' desperation drive them to apply to as many
scholarships as possible in order to pay for the immense price of college. Within
neoliberal ideology, most scholarship owners still see themselves as being charitable
rather than providing a now necessary service, so these funds typically sort themselves to
students who have "earned it." In large part, this money goes to students who need it the
least, students that have been given the structural advantages for getting good grades,
transportation to community service, and connection-based leadership opportunities.
Disadvantaged students are largely locked out of this funding unless they can find
scholarships that require essays and other work that gives them the chance to prove
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themselves in other ways. For these students, already overworked by their conditions, this
amounts to slaving over arbitrarily difficult projects in order to stake a claim to survival.
Scholarship work often constitutes a job in it of itself but it is typically added on to
another job the student is working.
The Remnants of Ascension
Students enter the university under the assumption that for the most part, the
university is still an outdated cultural institution. Though the decay of culture may be a
heart-rending idea for many academics, it is common sense to students. Culture is
something that has been made distant and untouchable to them, but in this distance, it has
only proved its own pretentiousness, with market values being both within reach and
affirmed as more valuable. Though teachers continue to teach on the behalf of culture in
the forms of literature, history, philosophy, etc.: "[t]he school represents a culture distinct
from these students and their families, no matter how the school tries to represent itself.
School literature is distinct from many people's culture, no matter how hard it tries to
present the heritage of the people in glossy courses whether separatist or integrationist.
The texts presented represent a canon of ‘high’ culture, not one of ‘mass’ culture,"
(Purves, 8). The structure that once demanded students ascend is now being severed from
the bottom by marketization. High culture is less being destroyed by direct dismantling
and more by the cutting of a balloon by its cord, letting it float overhead without any
attention being paid to it.
The culture students are enmeshed in, the one with which they are familiar, is not
one of ascending but one of market defined democracy. Despite material facts to the
contrary, it is largely accepted that anyone can partake in this popular mass culture in
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equal amounts, this market form of democracy being credited to capitalism and
media: "[m]edia culture has brought with it the merging of ethnic and cultural strands in
food, dance, music, drama, and dress. Advertisers and producers change the color or the
language of their commercials, but they do not change the content. Such a broad culture
is the culture of the students," (Purves, 8). This wide student culture is not truly diverse
but is simply a larger assortment of appropriated items for sale. Still, students are
immersed in this seemingly infinite popular culture that extends through, past, and
beyond them.
Even when not explicitly done, the implementation of high culture still associates
itself with the ascending model and links itself with pretentiousness. From birth, students
are already familiar with a form of culture that demands little from them but their basic
participation, even seemingly leaving it up to them to choose among the many
commodities on display. The school however, takes these cultural objects and makes
them a "matter of study and testing. The commercial culture makes no such demands on
the students; they can become part of it, learn it, and even become experts in it without
taking any tests, seeing coercion, or feeling the threat of failure behind the invitation to
partake in it," (Purves, 8). The old form of ascending culture can now be cut as if it were
the only coercive and alienated structure. In the name of the market, culture is destroyed
and students enter the university suspicious of any cultural education that does not
directly tie itself to the market.
Historically and materially, the cultural framework has not been entirely excised
because such a sudden change would still be too shocking, even to the cynical student.
We still work within a mixed context of market dominance, cultural tangents, humanities
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waste, and intellectual diversions. For the administrator dominant university, the “easiest
and most administratively satisfying solution is to make use of what is already there in
the autonomous departments and simply force the students to cover the fields, i.e., take
one or more courses in each of the general divisions of the university: natural science,
social science and the humanities. The reigning ideology here is breadth, as was openness
in the age of laxity. The courses are almost always the already existing introductory
courses, which are of least interest to the major professors and merely assume the worth
and reality of that which is to be studied," (Bloom, 342). The modern liberal arts
university then focuses the methodology of its form on the widest absorption of content
possible to it. Students are thinly stretched to cover as much as possible in order to
belatedly justify the aging narrative that they emerge from the university as more highly
cultured people. Because marketization has greatly limited and continues to limit such
efforts however, this breadth is limited to a sampling of other courses, usually
introductory ones.
For science students, they may have to take an introductory English class which
English majors would never have to see, a class fitted to align not with introducing them
to literature but with introducing literature to them. Reading and writing are reduced to
mechanical activities, usually in an effort to improve rhetoric and communication. On the
other hand, humanities students are often introduced to science courses through
introductory courses that are usually required by those departments. This means that they
are often massively difficult in an effort to "weed out" students that are not dedicated
enough to those respective majors.
This fits in with a pattern of alienated failure they are likely already experienced
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with: "[w]hen you ask a sample of individuals what are the main factors of achievement
at school, the further you go down the social scale the more they believe in natural talent
or gifts–the more they believe that those who are successful are naturally endowed with
intellectual capacities. And the more they accept their own exclusion, the more they
believe they are stupid, the more they say, 'Yes, I was no good at English, I was no good
at French, I was no good at mathematics,'" (Bourdieu, 269). Bourdieu shows here how
the liberal arts model can be infected by neoliberal ideology, so that exploration is not
encouraged. Students are taught not to be curious but to exclude themselves, to assume
that if they have failed, it must be their fault. Rather than constantly accepting all of this
blame, they rationalize it by chalking it up to one's natural set of skills. While this
alleviates the pain and pressure for a time, it further seals them within an ideology that
does not believe them capable of anything. This breadth then usually results in a lot of
failures, a lot of stress, and most often, the swarming of science departments that happen
not to fit into this model, usually Geology and Astronomy. This feels especially unfair as
students are increasingly hyperconscious of the cost for each of these classes. When they
aren’t seen as worthwhile, their high price tag seems like another slap in the face. In this
material market ideology, they cannot be blamed for becoming cynical about the liberal
arts model that seems to suck wealth away from them without any return on this alienated
investment.
Either way, this liberal coverage model merely becomes a path to extraordinary
easiness or difficulty, with neither being fitted to the needs or wants of the students.
Students are introduced to the university by being forced to either (and often both) suffer
the stress of the university immediately trying to eliminate them or to suffer extreme
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levels of boredom. The university as a whole and the liberal arts form in particular
weathers waves of cynicism upon this introduction, as students are overtly not engaged
with their education. From the very start, education is not about them but suits some other
purpose, with them being merely extraneous factors.
The university then explicitly establishes itself as an institution that will not
engage them. Students have most likely already endured deep alienation throughout
middle and high school, largely due to batteries of standardized tests and classes fitted to
teaching to those tests. Students enter the university with their cynicism not budding but
in bloom, encouraged by a previous system. Developmentally, students are also in a
period of life most vulnerable to alienation, past the innocence of youth and before the
acceptance of humility in full adulthood, a twilight period wherein students must learn
their tiny place in the world without being equipped to healthily accept such a realization.
This is a time ripe for young people to reject any concern that attempts to deal with the
supposed reality of nihilism.
Commodifying Students
Though students may and will attempt to reject anything and everything that
doesn't matter to them, most will accept something, even grudgingly, in order to give
their lives some shape and direction. For young people, this involves the engagement in
social reality in the forms of friends, passions seen as divergent from societal desires, and
as previously discussed, immersion in popular culture. This context persists well into
high school but upon applying to college, there is a dominant social narrative that this is
the time to grow up, to mature, and leave childhood behind. Though youth survives well
into adulthood, the university is there to welcome students into adulthood in a marketized
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context; this adulthood is a market one. If the university engages them in anything, and
this is impelled by the wider culture as well, it is in their need to become commodities.
As Marx analyzed, capitalism dialectically interpellates people within a double
determination as workers and as commodities: "[l]abor produces not only commodities; it
produces itself and the worker as a commodity," (71). Historically, for traditional
assembly line capitalism, the dominant aspect of this contradiction would have been the
worker. Through wage slavery and scientific management, the person is fitted into a
worker, their humanity reduced to their earning potential. Subordinately, they are also
shaped into commodities, as objects to invest in so that surplus value can be produced.
The university presents a unique historical context wherein this contradiction is flipped.
Students cannot quite be workers because the nature of the university places them as
recipients of knowledge, necessarily inexperienced, so the value they are capable of
producing is hardly worthy of profit. That being said, the corporatization of the university
has produced a number of business tie-ins wherein students do directly work with
corporations, implicitly helping their profit margins in the guise of earning experience.
Similarly, students are expected to get themselves internships where they must work for
nothing but the value of experience, an overt scam that is justified by the student's
precarious economic placing forcing them to take anything available in order to ensure
marketability.
But in this modern context, the aspects of this contradiciton have flipped, and the
students are taught to be commodities more than they are taught to be workers. Especially
in crisis capitalism, "[t]hese labourers, who must sell themselves piecemeal, are a
commodity, like every other article of commerce, and are consequently exposed to all the
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vicissitudes of competition, to all the fluctuations of the market," (Marx, 216). The
student is dominantly engaged in the process of being turned into a commodity, so they
must be exposed to the market and all its forces. Students only engage in the worker
aspects in order to improve their marketability as commodities, and in this sense, the
student worker is tied to the externality of the market: "the external character of labor for
the worker appears in the fact that it is not his own, but someone else’s, that it does not
belong to him, that in it he belongs, not to himself, but to another," (Marx, 74). Students
are then ideologically tied to an external force that does not react to them but alienates
them.
The objectification of humanity becomes not a consequence of marketization but
a direct goal. As Marx said: "[t]he product of labor is labor which has been embodied in
an object, which has become material: it is the objectification of labor. Labor’s
realization is its objectification," (Marx, 71) so for the student laborer to realize itself as a
product, it must become objectified. "As individuals express their life, so they are. What
they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with
how they produce," (Marx, 150). With this organizing principle in mind, with the student
as the locus of analysis and education around them localized as efforts at
commodification, we can see past and upcoming analysis center on this goal. If students
are meant to become commodities, the entirety of marketization can be justified by
aligning with this goal. If students are to objectify themselves, anything human (coded as
tangential or wasteful) must be eliminated for the sake of efficiency.
In this way, the destruction of the humanities in the institution mirrors the
destruction of the humanity of students. Institutionally, the humanities should function as
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the conscience, as the critical creative theoretical mind of the institutional body, but it is
eliminated in favor of the hands of engineering and the reasoning of math. Students are to
have their humanity diminished until it is eliminated, so that they are merely left with
hands as tools to work over the material in front of them. Supposedly ultimate freedom
has provided us with the freedom to be trapped in a profound unfreedom.
Students are not mere ideologues in this process of marketization. In fact, their
cynicism often results from a self-consciousness of this process. Students know what they
must become, and many often resist it and try to dismiss it. However, as Raymond
Williams explains, the reality students posit in reaction to this dominance rarely exists at
all, and if it does, it is a residual alternative, not actually oppositional and utterly unlikely
to become emergent. Cynicism traps students not in a process of resistance but in a
continuous act of dismissal that works as an escape valve for resistant tendencies,
allowing any rebellious energy to merely flush out in the form of non-oppositional
disengagement. Further, this usually allows for the idea that once students have exhausted
themselves of this negative outpouring, they will have then grown up by accepting
market reality. Never is the student actively engaged in authentically resistant,
oppositional, revolutionary thought. Rather, as Jameson expounds, the students' "utopian
desire" for things to be different and possibly better than they currently are, is both
denigrated and ignored, forcing it to wilt without any cultivation. Students slip into
cynicism as the only resistance open to them and slip back into marketization once this
paltry utopian desire is exhausted.
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Dehumanizing students
Under the mantle of marketization, humanity as student is then directed to
develop with accordance of becoming a commodity. With the calculus of exchange value,
this means that difference cannot be valued: "[t]he blessing that the market does not ask
about birth is paid for in the exchange society by the fact that the possibilities conferred
by birth are molded to fit the production of goods that can be bought on the market. Each
human being has been endowed with a self of his or her own, different from all others, so
that it could all the more surely be made the same," (Horkheimer, 9). Sameness is valued
so that student-commodities can be more efficiently invested in and circulated throughout
the market as workers. To become the best commodities, students must objectify and
reduce themselves as much as possible to a base line similarity, differentiated only by
their chosen profession.
This is exemplified in class discussions wherein different sides tend to trend
toward two extreme poles, those of cynical relativism and absolute intentionality. When
discussing a text, the first analysis to be broached and the hardest to overcome is the
surface level of sameness. Either meaning is universally singular to be transmitted from
the author to the reader in a passive process, which makes difference illusory and
sameness absolute, or meaning is universally multiple to be entirely interpreted by
readers in their own individual ways, which makes difference negligible and sameness
defunct. They are merely two different directions to proliferating a set of meanings as
object products rather than mutable, social, co-creations. Meaning is reduced to a mere
choice, though market ideology exalts choice and through that consumption as the
highest instance of humanity at work. Students may not disagree directly, but in their
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unarticulated structure of feeling, there is an alienation from the text that amazingly lets
meaning, something that should by definition mean, mean nothing. The text is not
engaged with relationally but is consumed as an object, implicitly objectifying readers
through their methodology.
To accomplish this, market ideology does not teach this still horrifying concept as
concept but filters it through structure. Within the university, the very substance of
knowledge, the very units of human theory and action are ossified into units of
ideological constitution: "[t]hought is reified as an autonomous, automatic process, aping
the machine it has itself produced, so that it can finally be replaced by the machine,"
(Horkheimer, 19). Thought, which should at the very least have the powers of reflection,
study, criticality, and creativity is reduced to an automatic process that the student is
expected to complete. We can see this reflected in standardized tests, which, while
directly impacting the format of education, also show the ideal skills it is supposed to be
implanting, only asking students to absorb and regurgitate information. Even the meager
requests of the SAT's writing portion have been eliminated in favor of the more
mathematically precise natures of the reading and math sections. This is the expectation
of a machine and this expectation raises machines.
Paulo Freire, in his inception of critical pedagogy, spends a great deal of time
critiquing what he calls the "banking system” of education. In this conception of the
marketized school, students are only seen as sites of investment. Education becomes a
process of shaping the available knowledge by neutralization, censorship, and
delimitation to only make available knowledge that is neutered to be a mere market
value. Knowledge is merely something to be circulated into the students so that such an
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investment can return on investment in profit in the economy. Most importantly, the
students are treated as passive receptacles in which to place knowledge, not as active
agents in their own rights.
"The more students work at storing the deposits entrusted to them, the less they
develop the critical consciousness which would result from their intervention in the world
as transformers of that world. The more completely they accept the passive role imposed
on them, the more they tend simply to adapt to the world as it is and to the fragmented
view of reality deposited in them," (Freire, 73). Students are taught that being successful,
that being knowledgeable and intelligent is thus defined by their ability to adapt to market
circumstances, and this identity is practiced through the continual absorption and
regurgitation of knowledge-as-commodity so that the student too can become a
commodity. This "leads the students to memorize mechanically the narrated content.
Worse yet, it turns them into 'containers,' into 'receptacles' to be 'filled' by the teacher.
The more completely she fills the receptacles, the better a teacher she is. The more
meekly the receptacles permit themselves to be filled, the better students they are,"
(Freire, 71). The student is treated as a passive container only so that marketization can
complete the process of sealing it up within itself so that it can be entirely objectified.
Students become ever more vulnerable to ideology as they are trained into
passivity and objectification, as something to be filtered through the market structure than
acting with it. At all points, the students are in the world rather than with it (Freire, 75),
subjects only in that they are commodities within the marketplace. The world is
something entirely determined a priori, with their interactions suited only to adaptation
and function within it. "The reduction of thought to a mathematical apparatus condemns
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the world to be its own measure. What appears as the triumph of subjectivity. the
subjection of all existing things to logical formalism, is bought with the obedient
subordination of reason to what is immediately at hand," (Horkheimer, 20). With the
objectification of thought comes the objectification of humanity and this reduction
disables students from living with the world, ensuring that they can only deal with what is
at hand rather than engaging in either critique or creativity to envision a world beyond it
or different to it: "[o]ur quest becomes not to figure out what ethically and politically is
desirable but what is technically possible," (Kincheloe, 13). Our visions are restrained to
what is in front of us and we become destined to affirm and repeat it.
Further, any knowledge gained comes from a space is sanitized of
humanity: "[t]he subject matter is ready-made in the sense that it is presented as an end
in itself. It does not have to be connected to any other experience; it has only to
be committed to memory. Not only does the knowledge come ready made, but it
is second hand as well. It is second hand in the sense that it is the result of other people’s
exploration and discovery. Where the knowledge came from or how it was arrived upon
is not important. Devoid of context, like other reflections of the culture of positivism, the
second-hand knowledge is learned in isolation from lived experience," (Kincheloe, 14).
Knowledge is an object to be passed along, to be consumed in turn. The humanity that
constitutes it is purified from consciousness and the history that generated it is ignored as
tangential. What remains is an objectified form of knowledge that serves to objectify the
learner. Humanity is always second to the market.
The market becomes the only reality and the “actual is validated, knowledge
confines itself to repeating it, thought makes itself mere tautology. The more completely
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the machinery of thought subjugates existence, the more blindly it is satisfied with
reproducing it," (Horkheimer, 20). Within a discourse that only allows for market
knowledge and marketized forms of apprehending knowledge, this actuality can only be
validated and reproduced along an assembly line of blind inspectors approving the only
thing they've been taught to feel. As Horkheimer goes on to say, the “regression of the
masses today lies in their inability to hear with their own ears what has not already been
heard, to touch with their hands what has not previously been grasped; it is the new form
of blindness which supersedes that of vanquished myth," (28). This form of blindness is
not a natural occurrence of this age but an artificial situation crafted by a dominant
market order for the purposes of sustaining and reproducing itself. Historical
consciousness has regressed in a neoliberal ideology that cannot apprehend it. With the
decay of consciousness goes the decay of humanity, rotting in a seemingly endless cycle
of repetition as its most distinctly human feature is consigned to passive affirmation. The
world is entirely over and against the student, something to be initiated into rather than
changed.
An Initiation in Alienation
This is then a prime site of alienation, justified because the rest of society is
alienated, and students needing to be initiated into it. Marketized education is an
initiation into disengagement, into passivity, objectification, dehumanization, and
limitation. This is encouraged and justified by way of the myth of maturity, which
situates the market as the ultimate height of development. Keeping positivism in mind,
we can see how such things as emotion and subjects like the humanities that are linked to
emotion can be situated as immature and childish. They are at best unreal diversions,

187
fantasies that delay one's development into adulthood, worthwhile only as momentary
distractions or escapisms. Anything that interests the student outside of marketability,
especially anything that generates excitement, is bracketed as a waste of time. Students
are meant to grow up by severing these ties, achieving adulthood once they have
developed into their true selves as economic actors. With everything else being
tangential, maturity becomes a process of stripping down to the essentials, to the
streamlined and efficient core of human action. Cynicism is then a necessary step along
this road to maturity as students learn they must relinquish the innocence and naiveté of
youth for the realistic concerns of market adulthood. Cynicism is merely a frustrated
bump on the way to learning to accept reality as it is.
Higher education has become a crash course in alienation. One need only study
the behavioral patterns of students trying to live up to the expectations most colleges set
to see that education does not place one's life activity as paramount. Students often push
themselves to the brink of exhaustion, often over it, by refueling their energy with sugary
sodas and energy drinks. Studying can extend into the early morning hours, to the point
where "all nighter" has become a universally recognizable term. Students habitually skip
meals and disrupt their sleep cycles in order to fit in all the studying they need to do. This
often leads to bad health habits and sickness, calamities further punished by often
infantilizing systems that demand students get a doctor's note despite being ill in order to
get a pass from demanding attendance regimes. As feminist theorists have known for a
long time now, it needs to be recognized that infantilization is an important step on the
way to dehumanization. Once you treat someone as being so young and underdeveloped
to have no mature faculties, it is a quick turn to considering them as not having a
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distinctly human presence. Students then often study through sickness, going to class and
spreading illnesses so as not to be perceived as weak, childish, and ultimately lesser.
Of course, the studiers have it lucky because more and more students are asked to
pile on hours of work at a job on top of their schoolwork. This vast amount of work is
then unequally and unfairly structured based on who has the privilege of having
transportation, parents that can assist you when needed, connections to local jobs, etc.
Even beyond schools themselves, grades become the metric of a student's healthiness. A
student could very well be suffering from depression, anxiety, and suicidal ideation, but
without poor grades, mental illness will often not be diagnosed by the school or the
parent. On the flip side, bad grades universally indicate that something is wrong with the
student and whatever it may be is her fault. On campus counseling centers take a half turn
into becoming tutors, trying to help students recover from the grades that not only
indicate depression but may also take part in causing it. Above all things, a student must
be "excellent", so such conversations always go in the direction of what the student can
eliminate from their life, what they must sacrifice in order to be excellent enough.
As Kinecheloe states: "[m]en and women are students before they are workers.
Workers who give up their control of the planning and direction of the activities which
comprise their jobs, first surrender their autonomy to a teacher," (Kincheloe, 4). Through
the labor of education and all of the alienated work that entails, students ideologically
learn through this structure to surrender their autonomy, first to the teacher and
eventually to market society itself. This process requires all of the above to break them
down and ultimately eliminate or at least sideline most of the activities that make them
human. "The more 'dehumanized' a bureaucracy becomes the more 'success' it attains,"
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(Kincheloe, 4). Education trains students to assume the roles of machines. As Marx long
ago analyzed, capitalism would ideally replace the whole of humanity with machines but
must make do with humans so long as the technology is not yet there. In the meantime,
people are bent and broken until they are as machinelike as possible.
Students come into college conceiving of school as a coercive act done upon
them. When class is over they are “free” and when the weekend comes, they get the
chance to feel alive and “real.” What Marx said about alienated labor applies equally to
students: the more human aspects of their productive minds become sites of alienation
and the more animalistic aspects of their consumption begin to seem more human.
Students get some of their greatest joys from consumption, in the forms of drinking,
eating, and, now, the over consumption of digital media. Consumption, though is it not a
place for active humanity, actually seems more human in comparison to alienated labor.
Traditionalists of all kinds then denigrate students for being unable to work hard
enough to overcome these difficulties. Again, without a structural understanding of
history, older adults can only remember when they were able to work through college and
assume such conditions have not significantly changed. People are continually raised to
assume that history has not changed, and individuals must overcome circumstances or be
assumed weak, immature, and disappointing. Conservatives see this and prescribe an
extra dose of discipline to force students through, their reforms only involving a back to
basics approach, a purification of "liberal" intrusions to the "natural" market of
conservative Christian values. Haberman describes the conservative as enduring this as a
"source of continual frustration. The clear-cut need to 'make' students learn is so
obviously vital to the common good and to the students themselves that surely (it is
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believed) there must be a way to force students to work hard enough to vindicate the
methodology," (292). The vision is not questioned; only the students’ alliance to it.
Progressives rarely do much better, allowing bureaucracy to mire vision as they
overload curriculums with petty reforms that only serve to justify the conservatives'
complaints. An example of the latter would be current pre college math reforms such as
Everday Mathematics and Common Core that demand students learn a multiplicity of
new methods of doing old math. Students from as young as grade school becoming
cynical with the frustration of being unable to understand math, their parents (if they're
available to help) soon follow when they are unable to complete the teaching that falls to
them. This creates a feeling of over complication that only serves to fuel the conservative
call for a traditional return.
Working the system
The thing to consider here is not students' ideological subservience to their
treatment but the clear self-consciousness they have of it being impossible to change. By
the time students enter college, they are intimately familiar with the idea that education
will ask things of them that are simply impossible. Each student, no matter the grade
level or apparent level of dedication, is at least familiar with and often a master of the
double skills of cheating and faking. Cheating has been a perennial problem of education
but it has become a necessary skill in marketized education. Sneaking a peak at
someone's test however has evolved into an elaborate system of faking, strategies that
construct the appearance of being a good student. Within a system that values exchange
value as paramount, use value becomes tangential to appearing marketable. Students use
the Internet to both outright plagiarize and use ideas that can impress a naive teacher.
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Students become masters at rewording and rewriting other people's ideas until they
appear as their own. Most students recognize the immorality of this act but with a shrug
and a cynical laugh, they recognize the necessity.
Students become expert manipulators in order to measure up to an impossibly
demanding standard. The classroom is tarnished as something inherently valued to be
experienced but becomes a contested space between the students and teacher, something
to be struggled over to impose one's vision of oneself. The classroom replicates the
market as students compete amongst themselves to market themselves to the teacher
for "students in the neoliberal university become less like members of a community of
learners and more like individuals focused on enhancing their human capital and who are
solely responsible and accountable to themselves," (Saunders, 63).
The quickest and most efficient way to construct a marketable appearance is
through manipulation. This means taking easier classes to inflate grades, refusing
challenges to sustain GPA, joining and creating empty clubs to stack transcripts,
researching what teachers like and playing to their satisfaction, and if it comes down to it,
bringing in parents to demand the grades they rightfully deserve. Though critiques of
these behaviors abound, we must recognize that this is what the system demands students
do in order to compete. If a student engages in "too many" challenges, their grades will
appear lower and they will be less marketable. Students are conditioned to view
challenges as tangential and/or impossible. They must be dismissed or manipulated.
Student relations are reduced to either cynically gaming the system or cynically
disengaging from it.
This emerges out of classroom activity into competitive relations between
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educational subjects. Students are immediately enmeshed in a competition to choose
which educational major will lead them on a path to success and happiness, a path usually
conflated with one leading to wealth and renown. They are encouraged to choose among
a variety of subjects that will dictate the rest of their educational choices, with some small
space for a subservient minor path and maybe a couple of electives. The pressure
immediately sets in to pick one's final choice, because as each semester passes, the less
likely one is to complete it. Curriculums have become so dense that a change in major
often necessitates at least an extra year in college, an extra year that many scholarships
don't fund.
Even colleges that are supposedly proponents of liberal arts structurally
discourage exploration because exploration always costs money and almost always
damages marketability. Students are accustomed to this pressure however, because they
have been long been demanded before college to shape their education, their learning,
their passions, and their personas to what can eventually make them the most money.
Higher education is another step, the strongest step, in a process of professional
specialization that narrows the range of knowledge and the reach of the students to a
smaller and smaller grasp. For a dynamic market however, this isn't necessarily
good: "[i]ronically, the more specialized the knowledge, the more vulnerable the bearer
to the vicissitudes of the job market," (Aronowitz, 112). Still, capitalism drives toward its
own destruction as competition necessitates focus, and focus necessitates safety and
hedged bets. Despite claims to the contrary, college educates consciousness to be
narrowed and lengthened, rather than widened and deepened.
Within these narrow ranges of focus, students and departments compete amongst
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each other for legitimacy, so that they can ensure funding from administration. From the
first day, students begin to take on the identity of whichever major and thus whichever
profession they've chosen, often using it as an ice breaker to define and introduce
themselves. Arguments constantly erupt about which major is "best" and which is the
most worthwhile to pursue: "[t]he college major debate - in which ‘skill’ is increasingly
redefined as a specific corporate contribution - extends this inequity to the undergraduate
level, defining as worthless, both the student’s field of study and the person teaching it,"
(Kendzior). Market language is usually the ultimate trump card, defeating arguments for
happiness, satisfaction, and social necessity, always ignoring largely due to fear, that
"[c]hanging your major will not change a broken economy,"
(Kendzior). Interdisciplinarity is dismissed in favor of narrow competition and
professionalization.
Though these arguments seem petty, they are reflections of departmental
arguments that are waged in somewhat more implicit languages. Funding is always
needed, and in order to get it, departments must engage in the market to sell themselves
and to appeal to money-minded administrators; selling oneself is always key. In this way,
even detractors are pulled into reducing themselves to market terms in order to get
enough funding to sustain themselves. Humanities departments know they are
ideologically precluded from being as marketable as STEM fields, but they are still
forced to engage in this losing discourse, often claiming that such things as
communication, critical thinking, and rhetoric are essential job skills that can be gained
by studying literature and philosophy.
This discourse is not a neutral manipulation however, for the more it is used the
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more the department must actually shift to supplying such skills and supplying them in
such a way as to satisfy the administrator-inspectors. These educations, which are
formally, explicitly, logistically, and fundamentally not set up for this work must be
reduced in order to take it on. The continuous but understandable thought process is that a
compromised education is still better than none at all. When it comes down to keeping a
colleague or keeping a course, most educators will side with such compromised language
in order to secure some sort of future. As always, capitalism makes the future bleak and
forces alliance with it in order to stave off this very bleakness.
Within this context of competition, identification becomes strict with whichever
major the student has chosen. They are not with their form of education but are in it,
determined by it. We can see this as students, despite being in what is supposed to be a
site of education, fiercely defend themselves from learning. This is overt, as students
overtly dismiss the idea of liberal arts education because such general education courses
are "wastes of time." Learning is not inherently valuable but is a means to an end, an end
that is increasingly marketized. Even within their own educative spaces, students
continually choose the most well trod courses, constantly funneling into what is easiest,
what is closest to a core of already known knowledge. The only learning that can be
justified is what is marketable, and even this is usually resisted. Students are taught to
fear ignorance and find value in objectified knowledge as status.
As students shape themselves into commodities, the form of knowledge with
which they are invested is one of passive objectification. They are told that knowledge is
of great value but taught that ignorance is a liability, a contradiction that is repressed
rather than resolved. They then want to take on the form of that knowledge and be fully
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knowledgeable. Colleges then raise a generation of people that pretend their genius but
run from any sign of their ignorance, egoists that find value in the aesthetic appearance of
their knowledge rather than its use.
Even when professors try to work around this, students can be resistant. As
Freire's work with peasants reveals, oppression can so deeply implant itself within a
student's consciousness that it can be difficult to raise something different. He discusses a
particular but common occurrence when trying to sustain a discussion: "They call
themselves ignorant and say the 'professor' is the one who has knowledge and to whom
they should listen. The criteria of knowledge imposed upon them are the conventional
ones. 'Why don't you,' said a peasant participating in a culture circle, 'explain the pictures
first? That way it'll take less time and won't give us a headache," (Freire, 63). This
situation occurs not only with impoverished peasants but in upper class universities, a
wide-ranging symptom of how market culture views knowledge.
Neutralizing Education
Students define themselves in ignorance as they define the professor in
knowledge, conceiving of their relationship as a market trade off with themselves as
customers. For the professor to ask any more than consumption from them is illogical and
is often met with resistance. For one, it asks the student to move beyond their comfort
zone: "students will not readily abandon all their know-how to take on willy-nilly some
new and uncertain system that they may not be able to control," (Haberman, 292). After
years of learning how to navigate and manipulate the system, students will not
immediately be happy with change, even if it's for their own good or eventual happiness.
Cynicism is deeply implanted long before students reach college.
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We must not place all responsibility or blame on the teachers because the students
themselves will defend the system that abuses them: "[t]he students' stake in maintaining
[this system] is of the strongest possible kind: it absolves them of responsibility for
learning and puts the burden on the teachers, who must be accountable for making them
learn," (Haberman, 292). For young people consecrated as students within a culture of
passivity, objectification, and marketization, their stake is in ensuring that their narrative
roles are maintained because "[f]or an alienated person, conditioned by a culture of
achievement and personal success, to recognize his situation as objectively unfavorable
seems to hinder his own possibilities of success," (Freire, 157). Different pedagogical
approaches that try to resist this system are then fundamentally seen as tangential, as
superfluously difficult in a context that demands much less of them. Though students are
cynical to their passivity and their abusive contexts, capitalism encourages they cling to
this cycle for fear of their lives. Rather than attempt change, safety is found in
conforming.
They are also raised in a situation where even such supposedly progressive
concepts as critical thinking, creativity, and radicalism are commodified objects.
Standardized tests all purport to test critical thinking skills, but these barely result in
being able to ask a student to read a few paragraphs to point out logical inconsistencies.
Critical thinking becomes a puzzle for a student to discover the one solution: "[t]he
critical thinking exercises are presented with only minimal information and are calculated
to elicit a pre-determined outcome. The form of sequential logic required is also predetermined, and the narrow range of outcomes acceptable does not challenge prevailing
wisdom," (Kincheloe, 15). Commodified critical thinking does not engage in any deep

197
criticism but merely confirms common sense, turning criticality into a rote repetition.
Creativity too is often valued only superficially, treated as a tangent that must be
engaged off to the side of "real" work. The only creativity valued is one that can innovate
to find a new way to make profit. As the glow of the 60s counterculture softens into
nostalgia, even radicalism can become commodified. With Readings' hated “excellence”
framework: "the discourse of excellence can incorporate campus radicalism as proof of
the excellence of campus life or of student commitment" (Readings, 150). Student
protests and demonstrations, which used to be violently shut down, are now destroyed in
a more sophisticated way by absorbing them into the dominant order. An "excellent"
student is now "involved" in campus activities and social change, of course, not in any
way that is truly radical but in a way that contributes to their marketable persona, their
excellence. "To put it bluntly, the shock value of punk is not lasting in a cultural sense,
since it soon becomes possible to be 'excellently punk,'" (Readings, 121). Rebellion and
resistance itself is commodified, re-situated as a phase of youth to be welcomed, endured,
and passed.
Market Dominance
At all points, the educational hierarchy maintains its dominance. The struggles
with resistance and with cynicism are merely a working out of the kinks that prepares
students for a lifetime of passive labor. The educative system then reflects the outer
system of alienated market labor. For instance, the “hierarchy in the workplace keeps
those workers at the lowest rung of the ladder ignorant of the way the production process
works as a whole. The low level workers see only a minute part of the process and they
see it in isolation from the logic of the process. This ignorance requires that these workers
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accept the fact that decisions regarding their work be made by higher-ups," (Kincheloe,
5). Similarly, students are insulted from educative conflict (as Graff detests) so that their
authority can be delegated up to the teachers and administrators. This trains students to
feel comfortable in their passive, subordinate role in the social hierarchy. When teachers
try to push for more active learning "students who have had a more conventional
education [will] be threatened by and even resist teaching practices which insist that
students participate in education and not be passive consumers," (hooks, 143-4).
This aligns with how education severs knowledge from life and lived experience,
sanitizing it as something isolated and objectified to be learnt mechanically. Without
social context, students are left "[u]nable to understand the larger social, political, and
economic picture, [and] the student has difficulty gaining control of his own life. He or
she is left in a permanently subordinate position," (Kincheloe, 17). By being educated in
their formative years to be passive and isolated beings, students are trained to assume
subordinate roles and are stunted from even growing the capabilities of envisioning or
enacting anything but subordination outside of school.
In large part, the system seems overtly set against the students, and their cynicism
is a sign that they understand this. Education does not provide them with a "language of
possibility" (Giroux) to create a vision of change or even of escape. Students are
alienated from their life activity and alienated from any possibility of political
engagement that can deeply change such a situation. Bourdieu shows that: “[p]olitical
alienation results from the fact that isolated agents – and this is all the more true the more
they are symbolically impoverished – cannot constitute themselves as a group, as a force
capable of making itself heard in the political field, unless they dispossess themselves and
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hand over their power to a political apparatus: they must always risk political
dispossession in order to escape from political dispossession,” (Bourdieu, 249). Students
are always subservient economic agents before they are political agents so they are rarely
capable of constituting themselves as a political body capable of change. The only slight
power they can have is through dispossessing themselves into an apparatus, by allowing
an almost entirely disempowered student president to lead them or by complaining up a
ladder of authority to someone who, on a whim, may or may not help them. The first
system is largely only capable of mollifying desire for change and the latter is set up to
exhaust rebellion as students are continually blockaded up a chain of power.
Neoliberalism is highly capable of propagating power through disempowerment,
constituting each holder of authority as someone who does not have the authority to stop
the power they channel. Neoliberalism does not so much institute a system of overt
repression as institute a superficially weak chain of authorities that cannot help but let the
inertia of their own oppression carry on. Even the authorities are subordinate to the
ultimate market authority with anyone capable of substantive change distantly away from
being contacted. The bureaucracy spontaneously becomes autonomous on contact with
resistance, so that by-laws, regulations, and rules that were previously in the background
become an absolute impediment to any change being done. Capital so permeates the
administrative system that it saturates it with inhumanity, with the inertia of machine
force that cannot be countered.
Within this inevitable calculus of the machine, students perceive something of the
inhumanity of life. Capitalism actually benefits from the horrors it introduces. Cynicism
is a defense reaction against the inertia of the market. Its momentum is so vast, so
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massive that it is often easier to become disenchanted with the very idea of changing it. It
is a passive resistance that will ultimately lead to more alienation, but it must be
understood as a role to be played within the machine. There is some comfort to this
narrative because it gives students some separate individuality from that which
subjectively alienates them. Life as it is seems impossible to avoid so one must accept it
happily or cynically. Ultimately, the market doesn't care about the subjectivity of one's
alienation but only cares about the material acceptance. It is this ultimate cynicism that
nearly all students learn to accept: the market doesn't care about them beyond their
exchange value and no matter how much they care about the market, it will not react.
This relationship is essentially dead, characterized not by a dynamic dialogue but by a
droning monologue, the societal mirror of the professor at the lectern heedlessly
repeating his decades old lecture at the revolving rows of eyes seated before him.
Drudgery is to be adapted to in education just as in life. Students are conscious of
unfairness but see it as natural and unchangeable, as something to be dismissed or
manipulated. Students' overwhelmingly widespread subjective alienation reflects a
structural alienation that removes education from being thinkable as an aspect of one's
life activity. Education is not a part of life but an impediment to be suffered before life
can be lived. School is a time of alienated work, when their humanity is repressed rather
than cultivated. As Freire says, "[a]n act is oppressive only when it prevents people from
being more fully human," (Freire, 56) and marketized education would then certainly
qualify as an oppressive act.
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Renewing the Humanities

The Position of the Critic
In "Cultural Criticism and Society," Theodor Adorno presents the accurate
admonition that if one wants to be a cultural critic, one must become self-conscious of
one's determination. In his estimation, one I agree with, too many would-be critics take
on a position of transcendence wherein their criticism formally places them above
culture, as something that has ascended beyond it and critiques it from above. In his
words, "[t]he cultural critic is not happy with civilization, to which alone he owes his
discontent. He speaks as if he represented either unadulterated nature or a higher
historical stage. Yet he is necessarily of the same essence as that to which he fancies
himself superior," (196). This position demands that the world rise to the critic's level.
Even progressive critics often engage in this kind of discourse, simultaneously
recognizing the structural determinations of society but implicitly denying them as they
sublimate their own attempts to maintain the illusion they have somehow risen above it.
What Adorno instead recommends is the position of the self consciously
immanent critic. In his terms, the truth of cultural criticism "consists in bringing untruth
to consciousness of itself," (205). Rather than boring into society from an illusory
without, the immanent critic bores from within. Though my position is just as liable to
the same mistakes, I hope my perspective as a student situates me at a deeper center than
most to have an especially productive boring. I have used readings as handholds to pull
myself through, to get my analysis beyond myself despite it being rooted within me.
In the reflections that follow, it must be emphasized that these recommendations
do not come from a place of transcendence. I do not view the goal of renewing the
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humanities as a divinely projected mission but as a collective project that we must all
work toward developing. I have not achieved some level of transcendence that allows me
to see above the heights of everyone else, rather, higher education has, in some
compromised and contradictory manner, achieved for me what I want it to achieve for
everyone: engagement. These recommendations are then not me showing what education
should be, but finding the elements of education within my own experience that need to
be further emphasized, made more accessible, and spread more widely. In Raymond
Williams’ terms, the progressive elements that are there immanently need to be made
emergent and oppositional. The humanities must be renewed from within, not without.
Illusory Emancipation
Many pedagogic theories however, fall exactly into the trap of transcendent
critique. Such theoretical frameworks are not harmless academic abstractions but trickle
down into pedagogical straggles that bind themselves to failure. As professors conceive
of themselves as being above society, so do they try to elevate students to such a level.
This has been discussed previously as traditionalist educators use discipline and
individualist introspection strategies to elevate students to a higher cultural sense of
being, but these teachers and these perspectives are dying out. Part of this is because of
the death of the meta-cultural model of education and part of this is the death of the high
culture dream. Students are now alienated more than ever by this model that must
implicitly convince them they are low before they can attain a higher status. For students
immersed in popular culture, this is alienating, and with a market reality framing their
educational experience, the claim that it is worthwhile is not convincing.
This traditional form of education can be translated into a seemingly progressive
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pedagogy that many teachers unfortunately find alluring. This is what I will call
emancipatory education. This term generally encompasses certain sets of ideas that
involve elevating the students to a state of transcendence wherein the students can
accompany the professor in becoming free from society. The goal of this kind of
education is the "achievement of a certain mimetic identity by the student: either as
replication of the professor or as replication of a place in the system. And with this
identity comes autonomy, or to put it more clearly, independence–the end of dependence,
the end of obligated relations to others, (Readings, 157). Though this often disguised as
the attaining of emancipation, since true emancipation is impossible, it must mutate into
the repetition of a role that is accepted and treated as independent.
Within pedagogy, this takes the shape of inspiring students but not connecting
such inspiration to practical reality. This often takes the forms of sharing great literature
that exposes societal problems, engaging in discussions that circulate relevant and
relatable issues, and immersing in general frustration. This often results in
disenchantment from market reality but with only a critical theory, they are left
floundering. Most often, this eventually results in cynicism that forces them to slip back
into market reality reluctantly, either by giving up on their ideals or "realizing" their
ideals were never realistic to begin with, the next step merely being a step in maturity.
They try to enact what they see as true independence, truly emancipated freedom but it is
impossible to realize and must eventually be left behind as an illusory dream: "[t]here is
no emancipation from our bonds to other people, since an exhaustive knowledge of the
nature of those bonds is simply not available to us," (Readings, 189). As Jameson says,
"[t]he only effective liberation from such constraint begins with the recognition that there
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is nothing that is not social and historical—indeed, that everything is 'in the last analysis'
political," (20).
Other students, feeling emancipated from alienated society, either do not have the
courage or the means to engage in its compromised nature. Instead, they swallow
themselves in escapism that gives them the illusion of supporting norms. This is often
done through counter normative art projects and utopian living circumstances. In the
latter, students become completely alternative rather than oppositional, separating
themselves from society, sometimes entirely and sometimes partially. A few deeply
disillusioned ones will develop their own communes but most will try to leave as "ethical
consumerists," which often involves eating different food, buying products at different
places, and donating to charity. Other students try to transform their lives into artistic
efforts as a means of living alongside but separate from society in a subversive way. Art,
having been transformed into a vague almost non-referential category in postmodernism,
can be a rock under which one can hide from society. By being counter normative, these
artists fancy themselves as radicals, but they do not reach to the root of any problem,
much less actually pull anything up. Perhaps one could claim Duchamp and the Dadaists
were doing subversive political work, but historical consciousness has long passed them
by. Art has a place in radical politics, but merely pushing against supposed artistic norms
does not constitute much of a practice. As artistic theorists like Hegel and Adorno have
studied, art is capable of doing a lot but merely wallowing in worrying about what art can
be cannot hope to change things. We must ask what art should do.
Both methods, and they intersect often and diverge in different ways, are clearly,
in Raymond Williams' terms, merely alternative. They do not constitute an actual
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oppositional threat to the established order but merely live alongside it, merely
pretending they are above. As Williams worries, these people actually function as a
benefit to the system, by becoming parodies or escape valves. As parodies, they seem
silly, delusional, and examples of what a non-market person is like to dissuade people
from rebelling. As escape valves, they serve as outlets for society's resistant energy.
Without a source to put in adequate radical resistance, such energy is merely sloughed off
to the side of political reality. This is an example of being subjectively engaged but
structurally alienated. Though they often feel like they are making a difference, they are
not, and their energy is often still not going to personal and social development.
Despite some of these more extreme sounding examples, the probable result of
emancipation is a continuation of cynicism. As said before, cynicism tends to trail the
student upon entering college, but the university can often seem like an intellectual oasis,
beckoning the student into wishful thinking about changing the world merely through
academic analysis. Professors and students alike tend to think that the university is the
world’s last utopia. Their dependence on the university exactly mirrors their frustration
with society.
Their dependence soon turns to cynicism as the utopia cannot be extended.
"Student frustration is directed against the inability of methodology, analysis, and
abstract writing (usually blamed on the material and often justifiably so) to make the
work connect to their efforts to live more fully, to transform society," (hooks, 88). Upon
entering the world, especially with a humanities degree that doesn't prepare them to
engage in the world as either a political or an economic agent, they are often left stranded
without direction. With the immense weight of the world on their shoulders, they are
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likely to turn away from their radical past and embrace cynicism knowing that optimism
was merely a youthful phase.
All of these various failures result from an educational methodology that
privileges the educator and the student as being above society, as having the possibly to
transcend it. If education is perceived as something powerful enough to impossibly
emancipate people from society, it can only lead to them disengaging from it. Their
critiques will lose their relevance and their practical engagement will be next to
nonexistent. They are still fundamentally alienated from society because it is not
something within their reach as mutable and their energies still do not go toward their life
activities.
Working in a compromised system
Much of emancipatory styled education comes from a well-meaning place,
usually from leftist professors who are trying to make a mark on their world through their
pedagogy. Often, the desire is to progress past traditionalist humanities education that is
seen as being too locked into authoritarian pedagogies and impractical texts. This actually
replicates what is merely a mutation of liberal enlightenment ideology, a transcendent
perspective that Adorno heavily critiques in his work as well as in his work with Max
Horkheimer in Dialectic of Enlightenment. In an effort to transcend such failed efforts,
progressive educators run the risk of abandoning immanently progressive reforms already
instituted within education. As discussed before, the radical reforms of cultural studies
and other minority studies contained a radical power to restructure the cultural foundation
of education. No matter how much this change was commodified and instituted by the
base power of market ideology, what has been incorporated has valuable potential.
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Similarly, the humanities will not be able to emancipate itself from current
collegiate structure nor be able to institute even more radical reforms, especially now the
culture war has already been waged. Though struggle certainly needs to be waged on the
behalf of sub cultures and oppressed groups, the battle to include them in college cannot
alone constitute a radical politics. That said, any foundation to such a radical change
would begin by supporting and elevating the status of the liberal arts college. This system
has been compromised in numerous ways, but it is still the humanities’ best source of
support.
With the culture wars in the past and the fragmentation of meta-cultural theory
already completed, liberal arts rhetoric must relent on the narrative of ascending culture.
Such ascension means little to nothing to any students, and administrators have already
proved willing to cut such programs on their behalf. A new strain of conservatism has
swamped over the old one, so that even supposed traditionalists are arguing for cutting
the humanities in favor of vocational education. Liberals construed as leftists are usually
attacked as high intellectuals supporting such useless academic ventures, so they too have
denounced much of liberal arts, again preferring the reality of the marketplace.
The difference between the two camps is not so much a difference of vision but a
difference in compassion. Both envision society on the basis of the market, but the
conservatives now want students to do it purely on their own as impossibly isolated
individuals. Liberals put as much faith in the market but try to place some safety nets that
can catch people when/if they fall. As Paulo Freire points out, this is merely a false
generosity. This is the oppressor handing pocket change to the oppressed and pretending
themselves heroes. “False charity constrains the fearful and subdued, the ‘rejects of life,’
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to extend their trembling hands. True generosity lies in striving so that these hands–
whether of individuals or entire peoples–need be extended less and less in supplication,
so that more and more they become human hands which work and, working, transform
the world,” (45). True generosity comes not from giving to the outstretched hand but
restructuring the system so that the hand no longer needs to reach out. Of course, neither
side nor very few in the undecided, middle, or periphery are interested in this radical
change.
Without a material market reality or either side of a political reality that can come
close to supporting a radical humanities, we will have to work from within the vestiges of
the liberal arts system. The rhetoric however must be changed so that, rather than taking
the tempting defense strategy, liberal arts can situate itself as an oppositional entity. Of
course, this does not mean a declaration of Marxism but that the common cultural
narrative of liberal arts as a method of initiation into a higher or better culture is reversed
into an oppositional democratic culturation.
As of now, despite efforts to the contrary, humanities programs are still seen as
partaking in the pretentious act of elevating their students to something higher than
others. The problem here is less the content of elevation (all though this certainly has its
limits in exaggerated pretentiousness) but the structure of picking and choosing only
certain people to receive this elevation. As far as the modern student sees it, vocational
education is available for all and cultural education is stowed away for a few. These few
are painted as pretentious, useless, impractical, and doomed to failure. This justifies the
democratic narrative to bring these people down to the vocational level.
Liberal arts needs to appropriate and reverse this narrative to argue that the
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mission of the liberals arts college is to bring everyone forward rather than drag the few
down. As Dewey said, "[t]he problem of going ahead instead of going back is then a
problem of liberalizing our technical and vocational education," (Dewey, 146) and not
the other way around. Though this narrative is residual in places, it needs to be made
emergent and directly oppositional to the rhetoric of vocational education. We need to
make it overtly recognizable that "[b]y limiting the school curriculum to only the
practical problems of daily life, such schools left access to the skills of critical reasoning
only to those who were already in dominance," (Apple, 103). We not only need to create
critical thinking but take it back.
Remaking liberal arts through conflict
To make this work however, humanities education will have to let go of the
vestiges of the content of meta-cultural education and ascending culture. Liberal arts is
often touted as being such a democratic effort but it cannot be believed when it still
retains much of the inner ideological structure that envisages it as a place of initiation.
One of the major ways to do this is, as Gerald Graff recommends, is to institute conflict
into the curriculum of the school. According to Graff, "controversial issues are not
tangential to academic knowledge, but part of that knowledge. That is, controversy is
internal to the subject matter of subjects or disciplines-it is the object of knowledge or is
inseparable from it," (xv). Instead, "[t]he tacit assumption has been that students should
be exposed only to the results of professional controversies, not to the controversies
themselves, which would presumably confuse or demoralize them," (8), a model that
inherently assumes the student as a passive and even weak entity.
As has been analyzed, the man behind the curtain has been revealed and meta-
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cultural theory cannot be assumed on the behalf of anyone. Students come in skeptical
and cynical, often getting both of those presumptions fulfilled by an alienated and distant
humanities that has made slight reforms but refuses to outwardly acknowledge the fact
that its historical context has changed. Professors, of course, are for the most part not in
denial of this but are continuing a long pattern of keeping such problems hidden from the
students. Curriculum arguments, text inclusion, cultural visions, and more are discussed
and debated behind closed doors and out of the student's eyes. Even as the university is
fractured and gasping on its last cultural legs, it still tries to present a calm and unworried
face to the student. This is undoubtedly done with good intentions, but it only serves to
confirm the suspicions the student has that the humanities is an out of touch discipline
because they do not appear concerned about their own construction. Even as they have
consciously changed in vast ways, the appearance they put forth suggests they are still
riding high on their remaining inertia. Though things may have internally changed, "[a]n
institution is not merely a few walls or some outer structures surrounding, protecting,
guaranteeing, or restricting the freedom of our work; it is also and already the structure of
our interpretation," (Derrida, 102) so as long as this institutional facade is maintained, so
will our interpretations of what it can do be compromised.
Instead of repressing such conflict, the liberal arts college needs to be open with
it. Students will almost always attest that honesty is a refreshing and sympathetic quality
to find in an authority figure. After all, students are accustomed to feeling lied to
throughout most of their lives so far, especially in high school education. If college can
present to them an honest front that does not hide conflict but exhibits it, students will be
more likely to believe in visions of change and improvement, possibly even engaging
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with the school to make it happen. After all, "individual pedagogy alone can have only
limited effects when it conflicts with institutional structure," (Graff, 10). As said in my
introduction, the small reforms I did at my Honors College resulted from a year of
frustrated discussion among fellow students wherein we assumed the professors were too
distant to realize any of our complaints when they were in fact dealing with the same
issues almost every day. Once I discovered this reality through honesty, it became an
opportunity for me and several other students to finally channel our repressed critical
energies into an institution that actually reacted to us. If even seemingly progressive
educators continue the pattern of "maintain[ing] order at all costs" then "[b]ourgeois
values in the classroom [will] create a barrier, blocking the possibility of confrontation
and conflict, warding off dissent," (hooks, 179).
As hooks reports, this opening of conflict is not always easy to accomplish. This
breach in silence is often seen as a breach of safety: "[m]any professors have conveyed to
me their feeling that the classroom should be a 'safe' place; that usually translates to mean
that the professor lectures to a group of quiet students who respond only when they are
called on. The experience of professors who educate for critical consciousness indicates
that many students, especially students of color, may not feel at all 'safe' in what appears
to be a neutral setting. It is the absence of a feeling of safety that often promotes
prolonged silence or lack of student engagement," (hooks, 39). hooks reveals here that as
dominant classes, especially white ones, assume politically neutral stances and what they
presume to be "safe" ones, they are not often safe for oppressed students. Any idea of
safety, just as ideas of tradition and peace and conservative unity, is an ideological
foreclosure that assumes a blinded past is a universal present. What seems safe to a
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dominant class is almost always unsafe to an oppressed class. As always, "no education is
politically neutral," (hooks, 37) and every decision must be confronted as a politically
active choice. This is of course, not a comfortable stance but in the theme of honesty, this
too can be revealed: "that there can be, and usually is, some degree of pain involved in
giving up old ways of thinking and knowing and learning new approaches. I respect that
pain. And I include recognition of it now when I teach, that is to say, I teach about
shifting paradigms and talk about the discomfort it can cause," (hooks, 43). Sharing
conflict with students invites them into an intersubjective communal engagement with the
project of learning.
Conflict is then a primary way to engage students not as passive objects of
learning but as active subject learners. Though an active pedagogy as far as content is
certainly necessarily, instituting a reactive institution is essential to making this activity
stick. Otherwise, the student will rightly perceive that supposedly student centered
discussions are merely tangential to an institution that does not care for them. Ron Scapp
says further (in a dialogue with bell hooks) that the "traditional notion of being in the
classroom is a teacher behind a desk or standing at the front, immobilized. In a weird way
that recalls the firm, immobilized body of knowledge as part of the immutability of truth
itself," (hooks, 137). For knowledge to be seen as mutable, the teacher and the structure
must be seen that way as well. The classroom will merely be a superfluous game relative
to the institutional structure, further enhancing the prospects that cynical students will
disengage and passionate students will find an unreactive classroom that may swallow
them too in cynicism.
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Humanizing the Institution
It is an understandable temptation to rest on conservative and traditional rhetoric
for the power it once had: "many teachers who do not have difficulty releasing old ideas,
embracing new ways of thinking, may still be as resolutely attached to old ways of
practicing teaching as their more conservative colleagues," (hooks, 142). We have to
come to grips with the fact however, that the humanities will always be tangential to a
market reality. Even the vast counter cultural movement in the 60s only resulted in
reforms rather than radical change, so unless we can somehow surpass that power, we
will remain superfluous. In this uncertain and precarious state, we have to take risks. We
have to take leaps of faith and trust in students.
What this institutional development should do is begin the process of engaging
the student in a humanized social dialectic. If society in the form of this institution can
reveal itself to be an artificial, malleable, human entity through its willingness to respond,
converse, react, and change, the students should respond with growing humanities of
their own. This is hampered however, by a history of marketized neoliberal education
that prefers to treat them as products, a process that subsumes such things as critical
thinking: "[c]ritical thinking is an interactive process, one that demands participation on
the part of teacher and students alike. In fact, most students resist the critical thinking
process; they are more comfortable with learning that allows them to remain passive.
Critical thinking requires all participants in the classroom process to be engaged,”
(hooks, 9). Without interactivity, critical thinking dies as a one sided process, as
something distant and unengaged. Engagement is then a precondition of criticality, which
itself needs some form of excitement and passion.
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I still believe that with diligence, these walls of cynicism and detachment can be
broken down. Though students are accustomed to being treated like products, they are
still enmeshed in an education system that has been shuffling them around in ways that
force them to adapt and change. They have changed schools numerous times, taken a
variety of courses, dealt with multiple authority figures, and continually deal with
change. Though they are not the most well equipped critical thinkers, they are still much
more developmentally open than an adult that has already been reduced to drudgery.
Higher education is a unique space in which to consecrate the student into
adulthood by exposing them to an institution that should finally treat them as fully
capable human adults that are worth something to them, not merely as passive
investments but as active co-creators. "Rather than focusing on issues of safety, I think
that a feeling of community creates a sense that there is shared commitment and a
common good that binds us. What we all ideally share is the desire to learn-to receive
actively knowledge that enhances our intellectual development and our capacity to live
more fully in the world," (hooks, 40). Though conflict becomes a site of engagement, the
source of energy for this co-creation is from the community. Safety can then be attained
through the communal effort to tie people not to the institution but to each other. Conflict
can then become a source of community and commonality. The institution can become
more human too as it opens up in the surrounding geographical community, ensuring the
walls of the institutions open up into doors that engage the students in the outside world
and others with the institution.
By humanizing the student in this way, the institution will itself be humanized;
humanization itself a dialectic process, so both sides must be continually engaged. One of
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the structural ideologies passed through the background of history is that of pretending
the educational institution to be a united authoritarian edifice rather than a human,
conflicted, and social site of discursive educational practices. Even as students struggle
with other things, their alienation will be lessened if they feel capable of changing the
institution.
Hypothetically, as students from other departments engage in such an
environment, they will bring home to their departments a desire to see this replicated.
Students have a constant desire to be treated with respect, and, especially considering
their youth, they want to be treated like adults. If humanities education is willing to treat
them in a mature fashion that other departments don't, students will become more likely
to demand it as they are exposed to it. As said before, students are accustomed to abuse
and alienation, but if a liberal arts program exposes them to departments that do not
engage in such tactics, that show them the possibility of a different kind of education,
they will demand it. For students, there is a radical potential in reversed alienation. The
further you stretch someone from their humanity, the stronger they will snap back once
they realize what they're missing out on. As hooks says: "it is crucial that critical thinkers
who want to change our teaching practices talk to one another, collaborate in a discussion
that crosses boundaries and creates a space for intervention," (hooks, 129).
Interdisciplinary discussion is necessary for changing the university as a whole. To
humanize the institution and the students, both sets need to realize that narrow
specialization can only stunt their growths. Everyone will benefit from a communal
perspective of co-development. No subject should be expected to take on knowledge
itself, but must understand that it and the students taking it are pieces of a communal,
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intersubjective labor.
Solidarity in content
By dismantling this structure, the content within will be similarly humanized, but
this still needs its own radical revision, because students must engage in the content
before they are willing to engage in the structure. Before we even arrive at pedagogy, we
must continue the work of diversifying all content among intersectional lines of
oppression. The efforts to then diversify literature programs with other kinds of writers
and widen the scope of historical studies to give silenced voices time to speak are
certainly not wasted efforts. Representation is always an important fight to be had.
In the analysis of culture, we discussed how individuals articulate themselves
from a social language so even and especially as we are immersed in popular media
culture, if such minority groups do not see themselves in their culture, they do not have
adequate spaces to articulate themselves: “[w]hen those who have the power to name and
to socially construct reality choose not to see you or hear you…when someone with the
authority of a teacher, say, describes the world and you are not in it, there is a moment of
psychic disequilibrium, as if you looked in the mirror and saw nothing. It takes some
strength of soul—and not just individual strength but collective understanding—to resist
this void, this non-being, into which you are thrust, and to stand up, demanding to be seen
and heard," (Rich). Higher education, if it wants to be progressive, must at the very least
fulfill this effort to diversify their education. Such efforts should be supported, and
similar external efforts to actually maintain and improve minority students entering
college should just as well be supported.
As Junot Diaz describes,
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"You guys know about vampires? You know, vampires have no reflections in a
mirror? There's this idea that monsters don't have reflections in a mirror. And
what I've always thought isn't that monsters don't have reflections in a mirror. It's
that if you want to make a human being into a monster, deny them, at the cultural
level, any reflection of themselves. And growing up, I felt like a monster in some
ways. I didn't see myself reflected at all. I was like, ‘Yo, is something wrong with
me? That the whole society seems to think that people like me don't exist?’ And
part of what inspired me, was this deep desire that before I died, I would make a
couple of mirrors. That I would make some mirrors so that kids like me might
seem themselves reflected back and might not feel so monstrous for it,” (Diaz).
It is the oppressed student that is most likely to feel dehumanized so it is they that most
need to feel represented and worthy of inclusion. They most need to feel a sense of
solidarity with what they engage in.
Further, it is the oppressed that will have the most radical potential to reverse
oppression if consciousness of it can be adequately raised. bell hooks instructs how the
specific inclusion of black vernacular can be a transgressive force, a reflection that can
apply to the general inclusion and empowering of sub cultures: "[t]he power of this
speech is not simply that it enables resistance to white supremacy, but that it also forges a
space for alternative cultural production and alternative epistemologies–different ways of
thinking and knowing that were crucial to creating a counter-hegemonic worldview,"
(171). With consciousness raised and capabilities taught, it is the oppressed that will best
be able to constitute a revolutionary perspective. They already live within marginalized
spaces, so if this is brought to the fore, they will best be able to make new and counterhegemonic spaces in society.
But we must, as Paulo Freire reminds us, treat these students as people before we
treat them as teachable entities. They are not unique tools to be fetishized but people that
we must treat as such as we raise their consciousnesses. They are not oppressed to being
animals or machines, requiring animal or machine teaching to humanize them; students
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must always be treated as humans because that is the only way to humanize them, to raise
them to the point of demanding a context that allows for their further development. These
students will also constitute the most radical critiques because they are at a deeper level
of immanent interpellation. The boring out in immanent critique will necessarily be from
a deeper core, making it more productive at reaching the root.
Of course, it is not only the most oppressed that need consciousness raising, but if
we are to reverse the trend of merely applying equal standards to unequal conditions, then
we must put effort into equalizing those conditions by focusing on the students that need
it the most. And as said before, this consciousness raising is not to be envisioned as an
elevation of the student to a transcendent or emancipatory level. This consciousness
raising is less an ascension and more a widening and deepening, a process of examining
one's connections to social reality, becoming more open minded, caring, empathetic, and
aware of one's context and social determination. Raising consciousness is not
compromised just of external learning but internal, by not just becoming conscious but
self-conscious.
In this way, the humanities will take charge of the mission in its name, that of
humanizing students. The mission of this education will not be transporting students to a
higher plane but developing them in a way that widens and deepens their consciousness
and self-consciousness. This education will not sever connections as they ascend but
make them aware of ones that they have used all their lives and develop their ability to
create more connections as they grow not just as individuals but as citizens, community
members, and instances of a collective humanity. Though the most difficult process of
this might be the first step of making students conscious of themselves not as isolated
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individuals but as social articulations, the most ambitious vision of the process would be
to engage them in an ever widening discourse that subsumes not only the campus, their
community, their nation, the world, but all of history. Ideally, students would begin the
process of learning to see themselves as an instance of the grand uncaused history, as an
instance of a totality. Of course, this cannot be engaged in a purely or even majorly
content way; there is simply too much, and the sheer amount of information would
overwhelm them into cynical detachment. Students must instead use ideology against
itself and engage in the history that survives by way of structure. The first major step of
this will be done by engaging them in institutional co-creation, revealing structure and
their engagement in it to be something malleable and human, as something that is socially
constituted. The next will be to constitute the ability to structurally allow all kinds of
content into this education in a flexible manner, in a way that will keep the material
modern and challenging.
Engagement as precondition
The beginning of this kind of engagement will necessarily begin immanently with
the teaching at hand. As always, further progressive and radical education must work
from within society, as immanent critics maintaining and reforming progressive acts that
have already been made. Perhaps it is my innocence and lack of vision as a student, but
with a focus on subversion and practicality, I still see potential within what would seem
to be a fairly traditional humanities classroom. What would be retained is the general
format of the class with the professor as head and the students as members of a discussion
with the text at the center. This has formal potential, but the vision needs to be radically
changed in order to constitute the seeds of something radical.

220
As implied before, the shift should be to engaging the student as an active cocreator of knowledge, not just in terms of curriculum but in terms of learning as well.
Professors must learn to define themselves not as the knowledgeable one opposing the
students’ ignorance, but as the more experienced co-creator. This is a welcoming, almost
familiar process of enfolding students into the co- creation of meaning. To do this,
professors will have to learn how to absolutely respect their students' voice in all senses,
along gender, race, and class lines as well as in a general human sense. We must
remember that even when dealing with the silent, “[t]here is really no such thing as the
‘voiceless’, there is only the deliberately silenced, or the preferably unheard” (Roy),
silence thus signaling marginalization and oppression. It is then a transgressive act to help
these students come to voice, to learn to articulate themselves, not only in a culture that
oppresses them but in a classroom environment that encourages, welcomes, and
cultivates them. Similarly, students in general have been smothered into passivity, so
voice itself, as long as it opens up into other voices as well, is inherently worthwhile.
Students must also be engaged in an environment that cultivates and encourages
them, one that deals heavily in terms of excitement rather than detachment. It is too often
assumed, with latent positivist tendencies, that true learning is only occurring with quiet,
stone faced students, and cold discussions. Passion, happiness, laughing, sadness, fury,
and emotions in general are invalidated. They are not treated as signs of engagement but
as illegitimate, inappropriate behaviors, as things to be corrected. As bell hooks shows,
excitement actually contains elements of transgressive radicalism:
"Excitement in higher education was viewed as potentially disruptive of the
atmosphere of seriousness assumed to he essential to the learning process. To
enter classroom settings in colleges and universities with the will to share the
desire to encourage excitement was to transgress. Not only did it require
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movement beyond accepted boundaries, but excitement could not be generated
without a full recognition of the fact that there could never be an absolute set
agenda governing teaching practices. Agendas had to be flexible, had to allow for
spontaneous shifts in direction," (7).
If we are to humanize students, we must engage them holistically and wholly as human
beings in the forms of intellectual, emotional, and bodily engagement. As Dewey long
ago said, we must educate the whole student or we risk, as Marx said, fracturing them to
be sold piecemeal into the market as alienated laborers. This is necessarily transgressive
because, as hooks goes on to say: "[e]xcitement is generated through collective effort,"
(hooks, 8). To generate this collective excitement, this communal passion, the professor
must both model it and participate in it: "most students at every level of the academic
system will rise to the challenge to learn. But they will strive only if they are convinced
the professor is there beside them and has equal dedication, something far more valuable
than charisma," (Aronowitz, 193). "Co-creation" is not a buzz term but is a practice that
must be deeply engaged by the professor for the students to also participate in this
dialogic system.
Importantly, this absolutely does not mean a lessening in rigor. It may appear so,
but if, as literature teachers, as history teachers, as philosophy teachers, we can remember
a text that has moved us, brought us to tears, made us shake with anger, then we can
remember that this not easy. Especially in the modern environment of alienation,
distraction, and cynicism, the effort it takes to actually bring emotion to the fore is an
incredible display of empathic ability that should not be discouraged. That being said, the
classroom is not a place to air grievances and rap about emotional difficulties. It is
centrally and fundamentally a place for development, and this must still be headed by the
will of the intellectual mind. We must simply engage this mind on all levels rather than
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privileging certain pieces.
Engaging all elements of the students will also involve the content restructuring of
not merely recycling the traditional canon but focusing on an inclusion that will actively
engage the student. This means bringing in elements of popular culture and modern
literature, as well as supplementing older pieces with modern perspectives. Before the
outcry gets too loud, this is not an effort to make things more "relatable", because the
effort of education should not be to make students comfortable but uncomfortable in a
space of challenge, a bid that demands them to stretch beyond themselves: "[t]he engaged
voice must never be fixed and absolute but always changing, always evolving in dialogue
with a world beyond itself," (hooks, 11). The student must always be ready, always
willing to learn how to change itself in order to make discourse possible.
Including context and conflict
Still, students need to cross historical divides and modernization can do a lot to
help that. Classical literature should never be introduced as isolated pieces of mastery but
as elements of a process in progress, as pieces generated by human history. This inclusion
of context in teaching must too remember "[a] context is always a construction rather
than some objective truth lying in wait for the critic or reader to discover, and the
decision about what qualifies as a 'context' is never disinterested," (Newman, 28). The
inclusion of context is then never politically neutral either but must be designed with a
certain direction, a purpose I recommend being that of understanding social production.
Students should not be airlifted into isolated islands of history but immersed in
enough historical context to see how these pieces were created and the social language
available at the time to articulate such a thing. Through this contextual history, lines can
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be drawn from those times to now that connect the concerns those historical persons had
to ours. These efforts are not bland, superficial attempts to make Shakespeare hip but are
to widen the context of his writings so that students can understand he was dealing with
similar social problems. If anything, canonical texts require a special effort, the
"illusion or appearance of isolation or autonomy which a printed text projects
must now be systematically undermined. Indeed, since by definition the cultural
monuments and masterworks that have survived tend necessarily to perpetuate
only a single voice in this class dialogue, the voice of a hegemonic class, they
cannot be properly assigned their relational place in a dialogical system without
the restoration or artificial reconstruction of the voice to which they were initially
opposed, a voice for the most part stifled and reduced to silence, marginalized, its
own utterances scattered to the winds, or reappropriated in their turn by the
hegemonic culture," (Jameson, 85).
Canonical texts have largely survived by the oppression and repression of the
multiplicities of contradictions within them, so a special effort must be made to
retexualize them, to open them up once again as human texts made in meaningfully
human ways.
To actually complete such a historical understanding, the canon will have to be
stretched to include distinctly modern works as well. If we are to legitimate the problems
in the past we must also validate the problems students face now. If we are to engage our
students as historical subjects, we need to engage them in a discourse that spans across
temporal restraints. This not only means giving them the ability to empathize across time
and space but to connect such historical struggles to their modern ones by creating a
space that allows for both of their legitimacies. If modern students are to engage in
historical discourse, then their modern texts should also be put in context with historical
texts. Students must be immersed in a study that is not merely past-focused but discourse
focused, a historical discourse that encompasses history as a totality with students that
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can actively engage in it as co-creators of this discourse.
Further, Jameson shows that this history is in fact inaccessible without this
discourse: "history is not a text, not a narrative, master or otherwise, but that, as an absent
cause, it is inaccessible to us except in textual form, and that our approach to it and to the
Real itself necessarily passes through its prior textualization, its narrativization in the
political unconscious," (Jameson, 35). To access history, one must use the texts it leaves
behinds which sediment society within themselves. For the student, as Jameson warns: "if
the modern reader is bored or scandalized by the roots such texts send down into the
contingent circumstances of their own historical time, this is surely testimony as to his
resistance to his own political unconscious and to his denial (in the United States, the
denial of a whole generation) of the reading and the writing of the text of history within
himself," (Jameson, 34). The students must confront the texuality of the texts so that the
students can confront their own textuality.
Within this discourse, we cannot merely enhance narratives but encourage the
intersection of counter narratives, in a sense creating conflict where there wasn't open
tension before. In this way, students will have narratives they previously relied on
questioned by narratives of other peoples. While this is certainly meant to be disruptive, it
is not meant to be purely destructive. The overall goal of this is the creation of a critical
discourse that encompasses ever-growing swathes of humanity. According to
Spivak, "the task of the educator is to learn to learn from below, the lines of conflict
resolution undoubtedly available, however dormant, within the disenfranchised cultural
system," (Spivak, 551). Transcendence, authority, emancipation, and individualism must
be relented to reach the dormant radicalism of oppressed peoples.
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Rather than relying on narratives that are disseminated from a dominant culture,
ideas that come from a dominant group, we must proliferate a multiplicity of counter
narratives. Limited narratives, both in scope, inclusion, and variance contribute to
oppression. As alluded to before, the American Dream narrative, for instance, is one of
the few ways we are told to explain the success of a rich person. When looking at a
wealthy banker, we are encouraged to reach for this narrative that explains his wealth in a
fashion that supports market ideology, namely, that he got his wealth purely by his own
effort. The narratives made available to us only explain in a manner that supports
conservative common sense and dominant ideology. We must cultivate counter narratives
that defy this limited explanation. Similarly, on the opposite end, dominant culture only
supplies us with a limited set of narratives to explain poverty, namely, ones that blame
the individual for being lazy or stupid. Again, counter narratives must be brought in that
show different stories, different explanations that are also valid. A special focus must be
brought on people that are entirely erased, on people that don’t have narratives to
represent them and so have no space from which to articulate themselves. Due to being
entirely marginalized from the wider set of recognized narratives, structural violence can
be invisibly implemented that normalizes and institutes their oppression. These
conflicting sets of narratives can be accessed through texts and through the co-created
meanings read from them.
To make this accessible, the text must not be presented as a united front and
neither should the interpretations. Students are to be co-creators not only of the external
discussion but the internal meaning of what is being read. As Jameson shows, texts are
actually constituted by the ideological resolution of material contradictions, so if society
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is to be taught through the text, "[t]he aim of a properly structural interpretation or
exegesis thus becomes the explosion of the seemingly unified text into a host of clashing
and contradictory elements," (56). In the words of Adorno, "art is [...] the truth of society
insofar as in its most authentic products the irrationality of the rational world order is
expressed," (84). Through art and its interpretation, the fundamental irrationality of
contradictions can be studied.
Textual direction
With all of this going on in a sort of vastly abstract democracy, we must, as John
Dewey says, find direction. This direction must be constituted by the texts. Students
cannot be expected to engage in this discourse fully from the beginning, so texts will be
useful as introductory materials to this kind of analysis, foundations for this criticism,
spaces for discussion, and centering points for focused labor. Rather than spinning off
into conversation about anything and everything, students must be engaged in work that
focuses on understanding and interpreting texts. Though discussion is important, its
primary use is to bring to the fore a collective effort of understanding. True textual
understanding requires a transgressive focus for, as Benjamin says: "[a] man who
concentrates before a work of art is absorbed by it. […] In contrast, the distracted mass
absorbs the work of art," (239). Understanding requires the suspension of self in the
immersion of the text, resistance to commodity capitalism's addiction to absorbing things
as products.
The texts are to be the mediators of discussion, the central and common lived
experience through which other experiences can be discursively reflected and refracted.
The students constitute the discussion around and through the text while the professor
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facilitates. This is an active role that, when done well, becomes less involved as time goes
on. As Readings say,
"[i]n order to open up the question of pedagogy we do not need, therefore, to
recenter teaching but to decenter it. By the decentering of the pedagogic situation
I mean to insist that teaching is not best understood from the point of view of a
sovereign subject that takes itself to be the sole guarantor of the meaning of that
process, whether that subject is the student, the teacher, or the administrator.
Decentering teaching begins with an attention to the pragmatic scene of teaching.
This is to refuse the possibility of any privileged point of view so as to make
teaching something other than the self-reproduction of an autonomous subject,"
(153).
There is then never a transaction of reproduction or an emancipation from such structures
but a free decentering that focuses the students on creating meaning as a collective,
placing the text in the center not as an authority of meaning but a locus of meaning
creation.
The texts must be understood as historical human acts, not isolated strokes of
divine genius. Further, "[a]rtworks have the immanent character of being an act, even if
they are carved in stone, and this endows them with the quality of being something
momentary and sudden. […] Under patient contemplation, artworks begin to move,"
(Adorno, 79). The artwork is an act unto itself, not an ideal object or a holy text but a
human act objectified from moment to moment as an appearance by a conscious
interpreter. Students must be taught not to unearth some core transcendent meaning or
authorial intention but to patiently contemplate, as Adorno says, until the art too takes on
the aspect of its humanity and begins to move. It is once art has been freed, become
nomadic in its internal and eternal history, that art can open viewers up to their social
consciousness. The art itself is objectified but it appears differently to every viewer, thus
opening each viewer up to the perspectives of the other. Texts are then perfect mediators
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of discussions because they should, with the right approach, open students up to each
other. The professor can guide this study, but the students must constitute it because they
must fundamentally open up to each other and open up to all that is in the text.
The professor should not rule over the discussion but is a necessary authority for
keeping things on track and retaining focus. Professors can also equalize and democratize
education by clarifying points students make, summarizing positions, collating reactions,
and ensuring that all voices are heard and respected, especially those oppressed along
gender and race lines. Of course, the professor must also be the one to provide contextual
detail and organize the discussions that will be held. Importantly, tests and essays will
also have to be retained, not just to fit into traditional educational structure but to enforce
the rigor of asking a student to learn from a discussion but also translate and individuate
that knowledge through their own reflective work.
Grading must then be engaged not as an external force of authority and
subjugation but as a marker of progress. Grades should beckon students onward rather
than drag them forward or push them down. They must also not represent an inflexible
and inhuman authority but mend themselves with the situation: "[a] more flexible grading
process must go hand in hand with a transformed classroom. Standards must always be
high. Excellence must be valued, but standards cannot be absolute and fixed," (hooks,
157). To humanize the grading procedure, it too must be transformed to something
historical, active, and malleable.
The discussion dialectic
Within the discussion itself, students must engage generally in that process of
consciousness widening, but specifically in a dialectic of critical and creative thinking.
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Both modes have been partially commodified, but their authentic forms, especially when
put into conversation with each other, still have radical potential. Adorno correctly says
that "[s]ociety […] constitutes artworks as their true subject," (86) and under that banner,
so is it the true subject of history and philosophy. Students must dialectically engage with
society with texts as mediators, as models of society. Texts are, after all, in Adorno's
terms, sedimented layers of society, and in Jameson's, ideological resolutions to material
societal contradictions. Untying the text not only teaches the valuable methodology of
analyzing society but goes a good way toward direct analysis of society itself: "[h]istory
is the content of artworks. To analyze artworks means no less than to become conscious
of the history immanently sedimented in them," (Adorno, 85). Because of this, while
contextual information must constantly be streamed in, the direction of the discussion
must always be toward understanding the text itself. The society it represents must
certainly be critiqued, but the text must be understood before this critique means
anything.
Critical thinking is certainly an essential value but an exclusive focus on it brings
what Jacques Ranciére calls "police-reason" wherein "[t]he apprentices of bourgeois
knowledge are trained in a universe of discourse where words, arguments, ways of
questioning, deduction are prescribed by the discursive forms – forms which are those of
the repressive practices of power," (11). This involves a harsh reason that only engages
in the “interrogation of concepts, demanding their authorization, questioning
their identity, restraining those which without a passport wandered out of their proper
province…" (11). This kind of criticality actually detaches students from the text, giving
the illusion of engagement when what is actually being enacted is a cynical, dismissive,
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criticism that does not productively take from the text but merely pushes it away. This
translates into interpersonal discussion that privileges disagreements over agreements. In
this fashion, criticality is pretended when discussion is reduced to a pure relativism that
settles everyone into their own unchangeable opinions. True criticality requires the
creativity of seeking agreement despite critical disagreements. Through this, students will
not be able to detach but must actually construct and defend their arguments rather than
merely settling into them.
Students must then be tasked not just with a negative influence over the text but a
positive one, a creative one. Creativity completes the dialectic of thinking by
complimenting critique with use. What is gathered from the text should not merely be
swept up but actively used to understand other things. Again, this can reflect back on
contextual information as well as students' lived experiences, but it must also be put into
conversation with other texts. This kind of education greatly suffers when texts are
fragmented from each other, so they must individually and collectively be put into wider
conversations with the students and themselves. "The type of interpretation here proposed
is more satisfactorily grasped as the rewriting of the literary text in such a way that the
latter may itself be seen as the rewriting or restructuration of a prior historical or
ideological subtext," (Jameson, 81). The text must be opened and rewritten into
multiplicities of conversations, including conversations with its own subtext, its context,
and its metatextual theory.
Essential to this dialectic as well as any other, is the focus on movement and
contradiction rather than metaphysical stagnation. While discourses do enact stable
structural consequences, they are also always on the move, so students must learn to keep
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up. The text is then a moment in a standstill, to be engaged with as a temporary cessation
of movement. As Marcel Proust so lovingly described, the happy discovery of the
novelist (and other writers) is the ability to slow down lived experience into a textual
form that can be re-experienced and thus analyzed.
“A 'real' person, profoundly as we my sympathize with him, is in a great measure
perceptible only through our senses, that is to say, he remains opaque, offers a
dead weight which our sensibilities have not the strength to lift. [...] The novelist's
happy discovery was to think of substituting for those opaque sections,
impenetrable by the human spirit, their equivalent in immaterial sections, things,
that is, which the spirit can assimilate to itself. After which it matters not the
actions, the feelings of this new order of creatures appear to us in the guise of
truth, since we have made them our own, since it is in ourselves that they are
happening, that they are holding in thrall, while we turn over, feverishly, the
pages of the book, our quickened breath and staring eyes. And once the novelist
has brought us to that state, in which, as in all purely mental states, every emotion
is multiplied tenfold, into which his book comes to disturb us as might a dream,
but a dream more lucid, and of a more lasting impression than those which come
to us in sleep; why, then, for the space of an hour he sets free within us all the
joys and sorrows in the world, a few of which, only, we should have to spend
years of our actual life in getting to know, and the keenest, the most intense of
which would never have been revealed to us because the slow course of their
development stops our perception of them. It is the same in life; the heart changes,
and that is our worst misfortune; but we learn of it only from reading or by
imagination; for in reality it alteration, like that of certain natural phenomena, is
so gradual that, even if we are able to distinguish, successively, each of its
different states, we are still spared the actual sensation of change,” (Proust, 72).
This analysis, in its critical creativity must then engage in both its movement and
its stability, learning to leave the text necessarily incomplete. Analysis does not end but is
merely stopped. If the text were arrived at later again in life or in a different context, its
nomadic meaning would have moved. Students must accept their interpretations with a
confident humility that respects partial understanding rather than reducing the text to a
discrete number of meanings to be ingested.
Bold humility and radical empathy
These discussions will stoke students toward understanding what I call a bold
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humility that asks students to bravely take on their own limitations. This is a worthwhile
trait to encourage that involves bluntly accepting one's limitations as an individual in a
social realm, as necessarily being limited to one’s own experiences. This kind of humility
would not only allow but encourage listening to other people's voices. Importantly, this
listening, especially in a discussion setting, can't merely be a passive silence, a waiting
for a turn to speak. It has to be an active assimilation of what is being said with
constructive responses that prove said listening. If a classroom is to become exciting and
in so doing generate passion and engagement, it must first set the conditions of listening.
"As a classroom community, our capacity to generate excitement is deeply
affected by our interest in one another, in hearing one another's voices, in
recognizing one another's presence. Since the vast majority of students learn
through conservative, traditional educational practices and concern themselves
only with the presence of the professor, any radical pedagogy must insist that
everyone's presence is acknowledged. That insistence cannot be simply stated. It
has to be demonstrated through pedagogical practices," (hooks, 8).
In order for this to work, students must learn to be humble enough to accept other
people's experiences and incorporate them into the discussion.
Professors can model this too by listening attentively to all voices and validating
them through repetition and constructive discussion. In fact, professors too must
specifically and attentively acknowledge the listening required of them in order to engage
with "[t]hinking along with a new generation, being moved by their concerns and
introducing them into ours. A present of humility borne in a relationship of listening,
reflecting, and judging. There is no room here for vanguardism, no place to tell others
that they must be what we tell them to be; instead there is a space that recognizes how I
am bound to and separated from others in a complicated drama of which I do not know
the final act," (Todd, 82). As hooks says: "[j]ust the physical experience of hearing, of
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listening intently, to each particular voice strengthens our capacity to learn together,"
(hooks, 186). Listening is an essential, even fundamental part of building communities of
learning.
Another trait that can be cultivated through intersubjective text-based discussions
is what I call a radical empathy. This is an empathy that crosses mere sympathetic
boundaries wherein something is only "relatable." Students often refer to relatability as a
requirement for texts, but it often relents from anything demanding and simply presents
situations that are immediately relevant without any need for reflection. A radical
empathy would demand the student cross greater distances in time, space, history,
culture, and identity to actually empathize with a person as if one could live as they do.
As the artist Artur Zmijewski says about art, though it applies too to humanities
education that centrally uses art, “the ethical challenge is to activate your empathy”
because in this marketized world, we are taught to “need indifference and distance. We
are trained to keep our distance. That’s why it is easy to be passive when you see people
suffer. These are the qualities that capitalism encourages in order to “live successfully”
(4), so we must teach students in an opposite fashion. This must be a process that
humanizes them in order to reach across such distances in order to feel for and with the
other across boundaries that capitalism has cleaved.
Of course, one must constantly be aware that there is an uncrossable limit to this
action because one can never understand the entirety of another's history but despite the
impossibility, because of it even, students and professors must leap anyway. We must
remain especially conscious of various intersecting lines of oppression, such as race,
gender, and sexuality, but complete empathy will remain the impossible goal to
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ultimately seek. While we may have a utopian desire for a humanity that is not fractured
by these faults of oppression, we must also remember that, materially, these oppressions
still exist and we cannot pretend this utopia has arrived simply because we want it to, as
if we can already eliminate these divides. To ignore this reality would be to subsume
difference, even with good intentions, and continue a pattern of marginalization that
ignores the different lived realities that coexist, the different narratives that constitute this
collective text.
Importantly, these patterns of thinking, though best realized in discussions, are not
exclusive to this format. Such things as excitement, humility, and empathy are all capable
of being cultivated within other formats as well, including the lecture. It will be harder to
ensure active engagement on the part of the student so at least supplemental discussions
are always worthwhile, but more information-based lectures can provide a useful piece
too.
The Maintenance of Knowledge
Radical empathy and bold humility both take part in inherently anti-capitalist
action because they engage in knowledge maintenance rather than knowledge accrual. In
the market, knowledge can only be valued as an object to be acquired, as a commodity
that can be circulated for profit. The circuit of accumulation transplants itself here too
and learning becomes a process of pure accumulation.
Radical empathy and bold humility subvert this process by finding their value not
in writing but in revision. A perspective involving maintenance engages a fuller
realization of humanity, not merely focusing on what one can make but on what one can
develop within oneself. People’s development, their humanities, are stunted in the
dialectic of the market, wherein humanity is reduced to an ideological resolution between
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identity and culture that only legitimates identity as commodity and culture as market.
Maintenance engages in a subversive process that this withered resolution to widen and
deepen itself, to not merely be satisfied with mere production but enliven the dialectic
with revision. Humanity is not something to be produced and set aside or sold but is
something that must be continually developed, something that must be continually
maintained and improved.
Further, especially in the conflict of narratives, the humanities can engage in a
process of unlearning coupled with learning. Unlearning is a process fundamentally
counter to capitalist agenda because it not only involves effort tangential to the market
but effort that undoes work the market has done. In unlearning, students use empathy and
humility to begin the process of reconstructing themselves first by taking apart what used
to be there. For white male students, this most often involves the gradual stripping of
patriarchal and colonial influences that been inculcated in them since birth. For oppressed
students, it requires the unlearning of subjugated identities that have been implanted into
them by dominant societies. Both paths involve the peeling back of taut layers of identity,
culture, and ideology, the excavation of sedimented layers of being. Students must to
learn to realize themselves as social beings, as figures that cannot purely transmit
intentions through actions but must take heed of their effects. Most white students would
not connect their actions to racist effects because they don’t intend it, but through training
in self-consciousness, they can see how effects ripple out socially despite intentions.
Upon learning this, they can begin the laborious process of untying the gnarled
ideological narratives that had made them ignorant. They must unlearn patterns, disrupt
repetition, and break out into new understandings.
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Unlearning is a revolutionary process of tracing the dialectic back, following it
and untying it where it is found to be ideologically resolved. It is only with unlearning
that students can open themselves up to further learning. Learning cannot merely be a
process of acquisition but also be a process of continuous re-creation. Students must be
able to learn something but also be able to unlearn something, learn around something
problematic, rescind knowledge that used to be held dear, relinquish beliefs, admit
ignorance, and ultimately, open themselves up to knowledge. It is only on this basis that
thought can advance.
Rethinking Thought
At the core of this work, the cell around which these methods grow is a focus on
thought, perhaps even Thought with a capital T. As analyzed beforehand, marketization
reduces the student, knowledge, and thought itself to a commodified process of profit
production. The mind is streamlined in favor or capital circulation, anything tangential to
that being sloughed off as superfluous. Reality itself is honed to the market, the
corresponding contiguity making them appear one and the same. The mind follows suit as
personal and cultural narratives are hewn to a shape meant to fit into the market, facets
that don't fit being sanded off as mere immature roughness. As Readings showed, what
was ultimately a cultural battle for legitimacy has been reduced to a battle over thought
itself. The ideological poles have moved, culture now becoming a conscious
battleground, meaning ideology has withdrawn to something deeper, a struggle over the
very definition and limit of thought.
Thought was certainly ideologically foreclosed beforehand, but within metacultural theory, thought was a requirement for cultural judgment and it was often an
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implicit consequence of reading classic texts, even if the major goal was for interpersonal
superiority. Now, however, as marketization becomes the primary reality of education,
thought itself is reduced to merely being the building blocks of marketability. Education
has been reduced to initiating the student not in a wider range of thinking but a narrower
one. Students don't have their minds opened but closed, as they learn to shape themselves
into commodities, relent on their dreams and ambitions, and define their humanity by
their marketability.
The market model has replaced the cultural model, but it still retains a roughly
similar hierarchy of motion with cultural accrual being replaced by wealth accrual. In the
culture model, the high culture was vaunted and low culture was explicitly detested, with
sub cultures being repressed and silently marginalized. High culture defined itself against
low culture, but sub culture was excluded from the document entirely. When sub cultures
eventually constituted a cultural revolution in the 60s, it turned into a cultural civil war
because the inclusion of sub cultures in the normal cultural paradigm does not constitute
a mere reform but has the incendiary potential of radically restructuring culture as a
whole and meta cultural theory. Ultimately, market reality constituted itself as a base and
became impossible to surmount, but radical potential still translated into important
changes.
Though this will not of course constitute the whole of a revolutionary praxis, I
believe a similar effort can be made on the behalf of thought itself. Similarly, wealth
defines itself against poverty, a simpler negation and a vaster one as shown by current
material wealth inequality. Wealth is associated with intelligence, success, happiness, and
life while poverty us associated with stupidity, failure, depression, and death. Like sub
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cultures, thought in the theoretical forms of criticality, creativity, empathy, and humility
and in the practical forms of subversiveness, collectivity, communality, and revolutionary
action, is repressed as tangential. What remains can hardly be called thought. To contrast
them, thought is certainly less capable of making itself visible than sub culture and it is
more ideologically entrenched. Struggling on behalf of it will be less able to constitute a
visible cultural war but will need to function as more of a subversive force.
This is not an idle difference but is in fact a difference created by fragmentation.
Neoliberal ideology thrives by fracturing people from raising collective consciousness so
cultural consciousness will certainly be made less possible. Still, they are nefariously
allowed as long as it conforms to marketized thinking. Any culture, any kind of person
can be valuable and worthwhile in modern society, as long as they know how to make a
buck. Thinking that differs from this market process is now what is more distinctly
repressed. Groups can collect and move as they see fit, but they are all disabled from
thinking in a critical and creative fashion. Material collectives are useless when they are
incapable of forming theoretical collectives.
Through textual and collective social immersion, students must learn the radical
value of thinking. It is only through a radical form of thinking that students will be able to
re-think enough to question structural ideology; only then will they become selfconscious enough to understand the society that limits them. Combatting ideology must
fundamentally begin as an educative act.
The greatest limitation, as of anything in capitalism, is the inherent risk of such
efforts being commodified and neutralized. Critical and creative thinking are already
largely commodified. This process smothers and neutralizes any political edge so must be

239
continually resisted. At all points, thinking must always predominate over thought,
meaning that thought in a mobile, malleable, nomadic form must be sought over thought
in a stable, stagnant, settled form. Thinking must be valued over thought, engagement
over apathy, questions over answers, activity over passivity, humanity over commodity,
the dialectical over the metaphysical, and the relational over the singular. The subversive
power in education is in resisting this commodification: "the transgressive force of
teaching does not lie so much in matters of content as in the way pedagogy can hold open
the temporality of questioning so as to resist being characterized as a transaction that can
be concluded, either with the giving of grades or the granting of degrees," (Readings, 19).
Thought must always be on the move so that commodification cannot reduce it to an
object to be circulated for profit. Emphasis must be placed on thought's nomadic nature,
on its ability to hold itself open as a question rather than merely settling into an answer.
As Readings demands: "[n]o authority can terminate the pedagogic relation, no
knowledge can save us the task of thinking," (Readings, 154).
John Dewey agrees in a certain sense as he requires democracy to be constantly
remade, the meaning of equality not being merely set by a constitutional document but
needing consistent updating. Thought and through it democracy must be constantly
reasserted in the wake of new conditions. Through this and the continual effort to assert
equalized conditions in the classroom, pedagogy takes on an ethical edge. According to
Readings, pedagogy must be rephrased with
"teaching and learning as sites of obligation, as loci of ethical practices, rather
than as means for the transmission of scientific knowledge. Teaching thus
becomes answerable to the question of justice, rather than to the criteria of truth.
We must seek to do justice to teaching rather than to know what it is. A belief that
we know what teaching is or should be is actually a major impediment to just
teaching. Teaching should cease to be about merely the transmission of
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information and the emancipation of the autonomous subject, and instead should
become a site of obligation that exceeds an individual's consciousness of justice,"
(154).
The ethical side of this teaching must then be irreducible to calculated transaction but still
be held "accountable without accounting" to the ideal of thought and even more deeply,
to the ideal of the thinking oppressed: "[t]he pedagogic effort that may bring about lasting
epistemic change in the oppressed is never accurate, and must be forever renewed.
Otherwise there does not seem much point in considering the Humanities worth
teaching," (Spivak, 529). Calculable accuracy can never be the goal. Administration must
be replaced with the meta-discursive ideal of justice.
Adding to our previous analyses of Graff including institutional conflict and
Jameson learning by studying contradiction, Readings recommends "a self-conscious
exposure of the emptiness of Thought that replaces vulgarity with honesty," wherein the
content of thought too is honestly exposed as empty because it is constantly on the move.
It cannot be strictly held down with one definition of meaning but must be always
shifting between contexts, always shaping itself relationally and dialectically rather than
settling itself. Further,
"[k]eeping the question of what Thought names open requires a constant vigilance
to prevent the name of Thought from slipping back into an idea, from founding a
mystical ideology of truth. We can only seek to do justice to a name, not to find
its truth. […] As a horizon, the name of Thought cannot be given a content with
which consciousness might fuse, or a signification that would allow the closure of
debate. Debate may occur as to its signification, but this will always be an
agonistic contest of prescriptives about what Thought should be. Nothing in the
nature of Thought, as a bare name, will legitimate any one or other of these
accounts. To put this another way, any attempt to say what Thought should be
must take responsibility for itself as such an attempt," (159).
Thought then, remains as thinking, and so, as Julia Hölzl explains: "[w]e must stay with
the question, with the elsewhere, that is, for only from such elsewhere can the call for and
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of thinking be answered. Thinking must be called forth, always; thinking, unlike thought,
is an away, always, just as ‘to call’ means to set in motion, to get something underway,”"
(128).
In this way, the always moving, always resistant thought should be able to resist
commodification and neutralization. Rather than centering education on a particular
content idea, this theory would found education on a relation that by nature never defines
itself in a settled enough way to be absorbed as a market value: "thinking remains to be
thought, always" (Hölzl, 128).
"Thought is, in this sense, an empty transcendence, not one that can be worshiped
and believed in, but one that throws those who participate in pedagogy back into a
reflection upon the ungroundedness of their situation: their obligation to each other and to
a name that hails them as addressees, before they can think about it," (Readings, 161).
This theory then internalizes thought as an interpellation of one's subjecthood, making
this social necessity an imperative of individual articulation. The ethical nature of
pedagogy then surfaces as a need to constantly reflect upon the context of one's always
shifting situation, the interpellated duty to one another in this historical struggle.
The call of thought as the call of the other
Though radical empathy and bold humility will forge connections between
people, justice itself will demand "respect for an absolute Other, a respect that must
precede any knowledge about the other," (Readings, 162). This Other is absolute in its
historical social transcendence, in its ever-present nature as humanity before, around, and
beyond. Thought in this sense can then humanize the student in relation to humanity as a
whole. The student, by way of education, must do justice to humanity. This requires the
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ability to think critically and creatively, relationally and discursively.
Through humanities education, students must learn the practice of "suspending
oneself into the text of the other— for which the first condition and effect is a suspension
of the conviction that I am necessarily better, I am necessarily indispensable, I am
necessarily the one to right wrongs, I am necessarily the end product for which history
happened, and that New York is necessarily the capital of the world," (Spivak, 532).
Students must suspend themselves through textuality, with the Other being the literal and
figurative text at the heart of the discussion. Art and text, as the core of the humanities,
constitutes a uniquely equipped medium, a metaphor through which to channel such
suspension. "The telos of artworks is a language whose words cannot be located on the
spectrum, a language whose words are not imprisoned by a prestablized universality,"
(Adorno, 83). Art is itself always a historical human act, always transient, always
nomadic, always different. It is this in focal point with a multiplicity of narratives
coinciding through it that the self is suspended.
The ultimate precondition (which is also simultaneously the goal) of this work is
the breaking up of reified ideology. Adorno, as one of many critics of modernism,
worried that capital circulation reified reality into a circuit of accumulation. Ideas lose
their stature as ideas, as instances of humanity, and become instrumental tools to be used,
ideological structures that shape reality as objective. "Absolute reification, which
presupposed intellectual progress as one of its elements, is now preparing to absorb the
mind entirely. Critical intelligence cannot be equal to this challenge as long as it confines
itself to self-satisfied contemplation," (Adorno, 210). With the ever-present threat of
marketization ready to swallow up all that is not market, criticality cannot rest as
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transcendent, as internal, as individualistic, but must be inescapably social.
Further, thought itself cannot rest at any moment but must be positioned
relationally so that it can never be completely settled. In the humanities classroom, art
must reassert itself as the text with ultimate centrality and take on itself as a moment at a
standstill. As an instance of humanity, it is, like thought, ever moving and ever transient,
but as art, it is a moment temporally objectified within the gaze of the other. Art then
simultaneously makes every student and all reality other, but makes "[e]verything in [the
artwork] become other," (Adorno, 81). Art can then stand in as the ultimate call of the
other. What must be cultivated in students then, in Adorno's term, is the capacity to
“shudder” within the gaze of this other as it interpellates them as ultimately being human
and historical, being free and determined. He describes in detail these requirements:
"Ultimately, aesthetic comportment is to be defined as the capacity to shudder, as
if goose bumps were the first aesthetic image. What later came to be called
subjectivity, freeing itself from the blind anxiety of the shudder, is at the same
time the shudder's own development; life in the subject is nothing but what
shudders, the reaction to the total spell that transcends the spell. Consciousness
without shudder is reified consciousness. That shudder in which subjectivity stirs
without yet being subjectivity is the act of being touched by the other. Aesthetic
comportment assimilates itself to that other than subordinating it. Such a
constitutive relation of the subject to objectivity in aesthetic comportment joins
eros and knowledge," (Adorno, 331).
The viewers must suspend modern subjectivity and define themselves by the call of the
other inherent in art, not to subsume it as an object but allow themselves to be swallowed
in its gaze, and perhaps even gaze back. The shudder is that primordial feeling before
subjectivity, the quaking of the embodied being that feels social determination and social
reality before the crashing waves of consciousness. This is not a state that one can or
should be in forever. Rather, people must have the capacity to momentarily free
themselves from reification, never letting ideas solidify too much, so they can be
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rethought and reconsidered. Like art, one must both be able to move and objectify oneself
in material reality in order to act in it.
The absolute other then constitutes a site wherein one can suspend oneself and
become self conscious of the structuring of society. We must learn that "[w]e are all
subjects in history. We must return ourselves to a state of embodiment in order to
deconstruct the way power has been traditionally orchestrated in the classroom, denying
subjectivity to some groups and according it to others. By recognizing subjectivity and
the limits of identity, we disrupt that objectification that is so necessary in a culture of
domination," (hooks, 139). Students must then learn "to think beside each other and
beside ourselves, […] to explore an open network of obligations that keeps the question
of meaning open as a locus of debate. Doing justice to Thought, listening to our
interlocutors, means trying to hear that which cannot be said but that which tries to make
itself heard. And this is a process incompatible with the production of (even relatively)
stable and exchangeable knowledge. Exploring the question of value means recognizing
that there exists no homogeneous standard of value that might unite all poles of the
pedagogical scene so as to produce a single scale of evaluation," (Readings, 165). This
opens thought up to the intersubjective constitution of oppressed people by way of Freire,
as students of all kinds are demanded to do justice to thought, and, through this, justice to
people and to their own humanities.
Students must then take the leap of faith of engaging in thought and the
suspension of the self in favor of the other. This requires faith because this essentially
relational movement cannot be reduced to a calculable risk but must be approached as a
matter of duty, as an obligation to suspend the self in favor of an other that may not
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come. "A training in literary reading is a training to learn from the singular and the
unverifiable. Although literature cannot speak, this species of patient reading, miming an
effort to make the text respond, as it were, is a training not only in poiesis, accessing the
other so well that probable action can be prefigured, but teleopoiesis, striving for a
response from the distant other, without guarantees," (Spivak, 532). Practically, this
means the necessity of recognizing that though we engage with each other, we will be
unable to completely understand each other. This seeming limitation is actually a
transgressive satisfaction against a dominant masculine ideology of capital
possession: "we do not necessarily need to hear and know what is stated in its entirety,
that we do not need to 'master' or conquer the narrative as a whole, that we may know in
fragments. I suggest that we may learn from spaces of silence as well as spaces of speech,
that in the patient act of listening to another tongue we may subvert that culture of
capitalist frenzy and consumption that demands all desire must be satisfied immediately,"
(hooks, 174). Recognizing the other involves recognizing the vast humanity of the other,
an inherently transgressive act as it humanizes rather than commodifies a fellow human
being.
The other as a collectivity of difference
Just as the other must be grasped in radical empathy, so must the absolute other be
reached for without guarantees of recuperation. We must seek the reestablishment of
unity and collectivity as an a priori condition of humanity, necessitating the act of
charging forward on behalf of justice without the calculable foreknowledge and
experience that it will work out as expected. "These matters can recover their original
urgency for us only if they are retold within the unity of a single great collective story;
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only if, in however disguised and symbolic a form, they are seen as sharing a single
fundamental theme–for Marxism, the collective struggle to wrest a realm of Freedom
from a realm of Necessity" (Jameson, 19). Once narrative is acknowledged as something
that is inherently conflicting, even this narrative of collective unity also implies
difference. Essential to such recognition of difference is that of conflict and contradiction.
We must not collapse all identities beneath one gaze but empower gazes to see their own
ways. This inherently involves the freeing of people along lines of oppression, freeing
them to not be defined by the white gaze or the male gaze. It is through their selfsustaining eyes they must see from, and society must recognize this self-sufficient
difference. It is only through this radical individuality that the person can be negated and
multiplied into a community, a collective, a multiplicity of individuals united.
Difference becomes not a force of separation, rather "[d]ifference is then here
understood as a relational concept, rather than as the mere inert inventory of unrelated
diversity," (Jameson, 41). Difference becomes a network of relations, of a collective
intersection. Through this recognition of intersecting difference, "we can restore, at least
methodologically, the lost unity of social life, and demonstrate that widely distant
elements of the social totality are ultimately part of the same global historical process,"
(Jameson, 226).
This cultivates the emergence of difference, a vast set of now respected, now well
thought out and critically and creatively engaged differences that cannot be reduced to
equivalent market values to be circuited for profit. Education must always “recognize
each classroom as different, that strategies must constantly be changed, invented,
reconceptualized to address each new teaching experience," (hooks, 10-11). Education

247
then becomes, in Adorno's sense, a transient artistic effort that both captures the
movement of pedagogy in an individualized set of different experiences and in a
continual movement toward collective engagement. hooks goes on to say that this "notion
of engagement threatens the institutionalized practices of domination. When the
classroom is truly engaged, it's dynamic. It's fluid. It's always changing," (hooks,
158). This form of transience, this continually changing difference shakes up authority,
frees the congealing habit of inertia, which Foucault fears from any power: "one of the
tasks, one of the meanings of human existence—the source of human freedom—is never
to accept anything as definitive, untouchable, obvious, or immobile. No aspect of reality
should be allowed to become a definitive and inhuman law for us," (Foucault). This
continual ability to break up calcification, find fluidity, and change is fueled by the
confrontation of differences: "[c]onfronting one another across differences means that we
must change ideas about how we learn; rather than fearing conflict we have to find ways
to use it as a catalyst for new thinking,” (hooks, 113). Confrontation, as long as it is done
with engagement and compassion, necessitates the changing of learning patterns, and
with that, the continued openness of mind suspended for another.
If the circuit for profit accumulation is to be resisted, the foundational ideological
step of reducing values to equivalents must be subverted, and this means the creation of a
justice of difference. In Spivak's terms, "being defined by the call of the other […] is not
conducive to the extraction and appropriation of surplus. […] The method of a
specifically literary training, a slow mind-changing process, can be used to open the
imagination to such mindsets," (Spivak, 533). The latter is her signaling that this different
way of thought, while resisting commodification, will also open the mind's dominant
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narratives up to other ways of thinking, being, and living. As said, largely because of
ideology and the inertia of cultural and personal narratives, this is a slow evolution of
thought, but it can be made if thought is freed from the restraint of thought, unchained to
reclaim itself as thinking. Thought must be taught to embrace thinking, to welcome
difference as something essential and fundamental.
"Difference must be [seen] as a fund of necessary polarities between which our
creativity can spark… Only then does the necessity for interdependency become
unthreatening. Only within that interdependency of different strengths,
acknowledged and equal, can the power to seek new ways of being in the world
generate, as well as the courage and sustenance to act where there are no charters.
Within the interdependence of mutual differences lies that security which enables
us to descend into the chaos of knowledge and return with true visions of our
future, along with the concomitant power to effect those changes which can bring
that future into being. Difference is that raw and powerful connection from which
our personal power is forged," (Lorde, 10).
Vision of a world beyond capital relies on the movement of thought, on the use of
difference. True interdependency relies not on a subsumption into similarity but a respect
for difference and a collective vision for collective prosperity.
Limitations
Though this does not constitute the whole of a revolutionary praxis, it can
possibly constitute the foundation. This is the base on which other demands can be made
to continue restructuring the university. One of its limitations for instance is the college's
structural price wall that still bars many people from attending and gaining the privilege
of this knowledge. The format will still implicitly be a model of exclusion and ascension.
The liberal arts college must absolutely be maintained as a place that will accept
and support anyone. As implied before, this will involve working not just at the surface
level of diversity quotas but working to alleviate material structural conditions. Ideally,
this would involve overcoming the fragmentation of society (another device of
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capitalism) to cross cultural and economic borders so that radical progressives could
actually deal with issues in a total sense and not merely in a fractured, one-sided way.
Even the most radical educator cannot solve race issues from one side of the university
application, for instance.
Though we have loaded the university with some abstract theoretical goals, with a
nearly utopian sense of promise, we must remember the overall goal of bringing this
education to everyone. One issue with the analysis so far is that we tacitly assumed that
higher education is the best path for learning and everyone should use it, which Sara
Ahmed discusses as being problematic: “one problem with being so used to the learning
= good equation, is that we might even think that everyone should aspire to such learning,
and that the absence of such learning is the ‘reason’ for inequality and injustice […]
There is of course a class elitism that presumes university is the place we go to learn, let
alone to think. This is the same elitism that says that those who don’t get to university,
have failed, or are deprived. The aspiration of ‘university for all’ offers at one level a
vital hope for the democratization of an elite culture, but at another, sustains the
bourgeois illusion that others ‘would want’ the culture that is constituted precisely
through not being available to all," (Ahmed). Here, Ahmed refers to the ascending
culture embedded in the university that survives in its structure of exclusion. To presume
that these expensive institutions are the only or best places to learn is certainly erroneous
and carries tones of classism and racism. As Paulo Freire absolutely proved, critical
pedagogy can certainly be done, and may be more productive and worthwhile, not with
middle class white young adults but with illiterate developing-world peasants. Perhaps,
after all, this is the ultimate education we should seek.
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As Gayatri Spivak says: "[i]f one wishes to make this restricted utopianism, which
extends to great universities everywhere, available for global social justice, one must
unmoor it from its elite safe harbors, supported by the power of the dominant nation’s
civil polity, and be interested in a kind of education for the largest sector of the future
electorate in the global South—the children of the rural poor—that would go beyond
literacy and numeracy and find a home in an expanded definition of a 'Humanities to
come,’" (Spivak, 526). Perhaps the end goal of this educational revolution must extend
past America to the shores of its colonized globe. My experience as a student has already
been stretched to its limit, so this is simply not something I can say for sure and
absolutely not something I can analyze.
Visionary Politics
In this revised context, what we have discussed so far may then be the foundation
to a foundation. With this teaching in mind, maybe students in late capitalist countries
can leverage the privilege they have to aid in the critical consciousness raising of the
globally oppressed. And while the direct, hands-on work of Freire must certainly be
continued, so must internal work done within the oppressor country itself. Oppression
does not dominantly work from individual to individual but is sustained through the
inertia of institutions and their discourses of frozen power relations. People cannot be
saved one at a time but must be saved from the institutions that oppress them through the
destruction of said institutions. This requires the political engagement of the electorate
within these institutions.
Before active politics, students must bring the "essentially anti-empiricist"
revolution described through literal texts to figurative texts. Their mission must be one
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that "drives the wedge of the concept of a 'text' into the traditional disciplines by
extrapolating the notion of 'discourse' or 'writing' onto objects previously thought to be
'realities' or objects in the real world, such as the various levels or instances of a social
formation: political power, social class, institutions, and events themselves. When
properly used, the concept of the 'text' does not, as in garden-variety semiotic practice
today, 'reduce' these realities to small and manageable written documents of one kind or
another, but rather liberates us from the empirical object—whether institution, event, or
individual work— by displacing our attention to its constitution as an object and its
relationship to the other objects thus constituted," (Jameson, 296). Students must attain
their humanity through education and beyond that, realize the humanity of society itself.
All history is human, and all humans are historical, so in this way reality can be expanded
from merely being empirically observable but to be textualized as something that can be
read, reread, written, and rewritten. This is the basis of political action.
With a political vision, university students can then begin to constitute the
foundation to a foundation of critical global consciousness. To construct a true political
vision, students must engage in the composition of dialectally engaged thought, which
requires everything described previously. It must also fundamentally take as its substance
the praxis dialectic of practice and theory. The above analysis is not merely a theory to be
taught to students but a theory that must arise from their previous practices as alienated
students. Students will not accept nor truly understand a theory that is merely transmitted
to them; to do so would continue the pattern this theory fights against. In fact, if this
theory can only be accepted that way, it would show some error deep within it for "[o]nly
social practice can be the criterion of truth," (Zedong, 68). Instead, this theory must
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merge alongside the relinquishing of alienated practice for engaged practice. It must arise
naturally as a reaction and as a setting toward action. Mao describes this beautifully:
"Discover the truth through practice, and again through practice verify and
develop the truth. Start from perceptual knowledge and actively develop it into
rational knowledge; then start from rational knowledge and actively guide
revolutionary practice to change both the subjective and the objective world.
Practice, knowledge, again practice, and again knowledge. This form repeats itself
in endless cycles, and with each cycle the content of practice and knowledge rises
to a higher level. Such is the whole of the dialectical-materialist theory of
knowledge, and such is the dialectical-materialist theory of the unity of knowing
and doing," (Zedong, 81-82).
To complete the circuit of this dialectic, we cannot end with the high abstract
theory of thought described above but must take it back down into practice. After all,
without the dynamism of this dialectic, "the material of studies loses vitality, becomes
relatively dead, because it is separated from situations," (Dewey, 182). If the abstract goal
of this theory is the never resting, never freezing, never ossifying of thought then that
very theory must be submerged in practice before emerging as theory again.
All of this engagement must not be caged purely to the text and to the classroom
but must be freed to analyze the world. We must resist, subvert, and free ourselves from
the norm that education can only take place in the classroom. Foucault shows the error of
this in the university's structural constitution: “[t]he student is put outside of society, on a
campus. Furthermore, he is excluded while being transmitted a knowledge which is
traditional in nature, obsolete, ‘academic’ and not directly tied to the needs and problems
of today […] Young people from 18 to 25 are thus, as it were, neutralized by and for
society, rendered safe, ineffective, socially and politically castrated. There is the first
function of the university: to put students out of circulation," (Foucault, 194). Despite its
many problems and even the very structure of the university as an institution of
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exclusion, we must work with what we have. We must subvert these walls and
reintroduce students back into society through texts that connect them to it, perspectives
that enable empathy and understanding of it, and direct experiences that engage the
student in whatever community is around their campus. They must lean how to embed
grand theory into minute practice. This is the basis of a political vision. As more and
more public spaces are privatized and commodified, higher education must be defended,
maintained, and extended as a space that engages people communally.
In Readings' analysis, "the University loses its privileged status as the model of
society and does not regain it by becoming the model of the absence of models.
Rather, the University becomes one site among others where the question of beingtogether is raised, raised with an urgency that proceeds from the absence of the
institutional forms (such as the nation-state), which have historically served to mask that
question for the past three centuries or so," (20). The university must not be an ideal or
higher place of being but simply another place of being. The uniqueness of the university
must be found not in its constitution but in its reflexivity as a self-critical institution.
Though it only has a relative autonomy from the market base, it is one of the best
institutions situated to incorporate within itself the praxis of self-reflection.
We must remember Stuart Hall's maxim that “[t]he university is a critical
institution or it is nothing.” Necessarily wrapped up in this self-criticism is a criticism
that spirals outward into society. As Marx so wonderfully put it: "[c]riticism has plucked
the imaginary flowers from the chain, not in order that man shall bear the chain without
caprice or consolation but so that he shall cast off the chain and pluck the living flower,"
(54). The political vision of the university is charged with the above analysis that
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conceives of reality as something fundamentally human, historical, and malleable but
combines it with the idea that, as we must do justice to thought, we must to justice to all
those that produce thought – a fundamentally political idea. After all, "[u]nless the ideals
expressed in great works of literature and art (not to mention religion, which the
humanities sometimes claim to have reluctantly superseded) can and do become
politically empowered, there seems to be no point in teaching them. Departments of
English, for example, could just as easily and even more practically teach great
advertisements as great books, if the only purpose is the merely rhetorical one of learning
to read and write effectively," (Brantlinger, 6). The humanities must become political, not
only for it to survive but for it to have a purpose.
Further, this should not be exclusively focused on academic thinkers but on
thinkers that have been dehumanized from thought. It is from the oppressed that thought
will gain its most radical edge: "[w]hen the ‘repressed’ of their culture and their society
returns, it's an explosive, utterly destructive, staggering return, with a force never
yet unleashed and equal to the most forbidding of suppressions," (Cixous, 81). Through
Adorno, we can see that a liberation movement must use thought that breaks down
ideologies: "the unideological thought is that which does not permit itself to be reduced
to 'operational terms' and instead strives solely to help the things themselves to that
articulation from which they are other-wise cut off by the prevailing language," (Adorno,
206). Counter ideological education must make available the sociolinguistic tools by
which the oppressed can articulate themselves not merely as subordinated utterances of
an oppressive langue but as human articulators with their own active, political power in
their individuation. Only with the oppressed marshaled under a collective narrative of
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engaged, historical, critical, creative, and political thinking can there be the foundation
for a mass based movement for freedom and equality.
This foundation is not to be settled in static identities but in interlocked
recognitions of difference. Too much focus on difference can fracture people; it can make
the uncrossable chasms between them too frightening to leap. Difference must be upheld
as primary but the collective narrative that unites must find its similarity not in a arbitrary
similarities but in charged, relational, and active solidarities. The similarities that unite us
are not idle aspects of identity but similar struggles in this collective project of meaning
making. We must find ourselves and each other enmeshed in such a project, a narrative in
which we must struggle together to make meaning for ourselves. This struggle must be
intersectional, self-differentiating, self-conflicting, and ultimately open-ended. As it is a
struggle for, it must also be a struggle against, as it must also necessarily include effort to
disestablish and dislodge those that would preclude meaning, those that would
dehumanize collective meaning making capabilities, and those that would sever the social
connections that constitute such meanings. We cannot found a collectivity individually
but must be collective to establish a collective.
Fearing Collectivity
Such a collectivity is always staved off by the triplet fears of theology,
totalitarianism, and fascism that it is presumed to be liable to. True, similar narratives of
collective action have united people only to weaponize them, to blind them, and use
them. However, these narratives were based in much different sentiments, much different
desires and reasons, almost always taking part in the ascending culture model brought to
an extreme of exclusion by elimination. Their utopias always necessitated the destruction
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of others. They always made the essential mistake of founding their collectivities on a
specific content, which must either be merely divisive or wholly fascistic.
This narrative is instead founded on something entirely different by its basis in
difference. Difference, by its very nature, cannot mean the same thing twice and in so
doing has no specific content. It is a relational concept that must always be dialectically
related between people, their social reality, and each other. Rather than giving the text
and thus the other primacy, fascism places authority in an ideal content but a wholly
objectified one, a content that is to be worshiped as whole unto itself, as perfect in its
inhumanity.
Benjamin argues that "[f]ascism sees its salvation in giving these masses not their
right, but instead a chance to express themselves. The masses have a right to change
property relations; Fascism seeks to give them an expression while preserving property,"
(241). This art is mere beauty, grasping the surface of meaning and holding it aloft as
primary, as they focus on worship rather than co-creative interpretation. The right to
activity in materiality is denied in favor of an idle idealism that merely floats above
reality as distraction or escapism. Humanity is not united in difference, certainly not in
the idea that they must feel the gaze of each other in history and do justice to it, but is
collected in worship, not looking to each other but looking up, looking away. This is done
so that mankind can be alienated from its own humanity: "self-alienation has reached
such a degree that it can experience its own destruction as an aesthetic pleasure of the
first order. This is the situation of politics which Fascism is rendering aesthetic.
Communism responds by politicizing art," (Benjamin, 242). Fascism makes its politics
aesthetic, reducing art to a mechanism of the political while what is being suggested here
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is Communism's response, that of politicizing art by engaging it in historical social
reality. Art is not held aloft but is held here, held in between us, and in so doing, this
embedding makes it political.
Politicizing the Humanities
As such, this movement must also be rooted in the struggles of the oppressed.
Despite culture being exposed and made less ideological, it is still an important struggle
to be had. Vestiges of ascending culture still exist everywhere, and it is often called upon
to dull the blade of marketization as it kills. Further, for a true recognition of difference,
the oppressed must come to consciousness of their oppression, and that necessitates
articulating themselves as oppressed beings both damaged and free from their social
determination. Similarly, oppressors must make a similar but opposite journey to become
self-conscious of their social determinations as beneficiaries from oppression. Despite the
existence of a few good people in any given class of oppressors, they all benefit from the
oppression done to others on their behalf by people in their class. They must become
conscious of their development at the expense of others and how this development too is
irreparably warped by this oppression.
As radical feminists have noted, though gender is itself an oppressive social
structure, its alleviation does not come from masculinizing women. Men too must be
feminized, and in this recognition, understand that neither side of the oppressive matrix is
then the better but that all are divided and worsened by oppression with the difference
that one class gets the advantage in terms of dominant power in the use of the other
class. In order to assert universal difference, people must be free enough to assert their
cultural and individual differences. This must develop and be recognized before a
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universalization can occur. It is a similar path of development as socialism is to
communism. It is a necessary and fundamentally important step, but it also must be
conceived as historical as well, as a goal to be reached in line for another goal.
Development is always paramount.
We must eventually expand the social dialectic past national and cultural borders
to conceive of the absolute individual as a contradiction of absolute humanity, of the
person as subject within the planet (of course, gradations will and should continue to
exist within this dialectic but the dominant contradiction must be expanded). As with
thought, we must do justice to this as yet unrealized future, to a “humanities to come,”:
"we have to ask the question of the formation of collectivities without necessarily
prefabricated contents," (Spivak, 26).
"If we imagine ourselves as planetary subjects rather than global agents, planetary
creatures rather than global entities, alterity remains underived from us; it is not
our dialectical negation, it contains us as much as it flings us away. And thus to
think of it is already to transgress, for, in spite of our forays into what we
metaphorize, differently, as outer and inner space, what is above and beyond our
own reach is not continuous with us as it is not, indeed, specifically
discontinuous. We must persistently educate ourselves into this peculiar mindset,"
(Spivak, 73).
This is our connection to Marx's species-being and is perhaps one of the only ways of
wholly dealing with problems such as global poverty and climate change that effect
humanity on a wider scale than anyone is yet capable of conceiving. We must be
contained as much as we stretch, we must be constrained as much as we reach, and we
must find thought’s limitations so that it can surmount them.
A Ruthless Critique of Everything Existing
The foundation of this movement must be built on the ashes of neoliberalism's
foundational ideologies. Its original sin, the seed of its failure, can be found in its basis in
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the enlightenment. As Adorno analyzes: "[a]ll enlightenment is accompanied by the
anxiety that what set enlightenment in motion in the first place and what enlightenment
ever threatens to consume may disappear: truth," (80). Each modernization of
enlightenment, through positivism and marketization, has been an updating of this
anxiety. Consumed by this concern, devoured by it because they are founded on it,
enlightenment thinkers must dig deeper into a reality they increasingly define as
objective, natural, and material. What becomes the strictest, the most congealed,
calcified, and reified of all ideologies is the idea that this reality, whatever it may be at
the time, is all there is.
During classical enlightenment it was one thing, but in modern market society,
even history is denied for the fact that this reality is all there is. History is either a relic or
a fossil, left behind as useless or useful only for a stepping-stone. All that matters to the
anxiety of the enlightenment is that we have some foundation to count on for truth.
Market reality does define a certain material truth but it is not the only one. The
reification inherent to enlightenment's desperate anxiety ensures that no vision can see
beyond this reality. To combat this, we must both creatively posit a new reality and
mercilessly critique the claims of this one.
At all points, “we must rigorously demonstrate the noncorrespondence between
what is claimed and what is, and the techniques of power that allow the claimed world to
appear not merely as the actual world but the best of all actual worlds," (Povinelli). The
abstract theory of our vision must always root itself as an active reaction against the
material oppressiveness of the current material reality. There is danger to this, as Sara
Ahmed discusses: "[t]he figure of the raging revolutionary or angry activist teaches us
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something: those who fight for alternative futures are seen as committing acts of
senseless violence, which stops any hearing of the ways in which revolution makes sense.
Indeed, we might consider the very politics of who or what gets seen as the origin of
violence: the revolutionaries expose violence, but the violence they expose is not
recognized as violence: structural violence is violence that is veiled,” (Ahmed). Counter
ideological struggle is then fundamentally an educative act meant to unveil the structural
violence embedded in our cultures, identities, discourses, and institutions. Further, we
must unveil the falsity of narratives that define these institutions as innocent and name
them both as being violent.
To do this, we must also recognize that capitalism sets its own reality so within its
own marketized discourse, it may appear right. Opposition then cannot be founded on a
merely empirical claim of falsity. Terry Eagleton shows a different angle: “[i]deological
statements may be true to society as at present constituted, but false in so far as they
thereby serve to block off the possibility of a transformed state of affairs,'" (Eagleton,
27). Again, we must confront the opposition as something inherently totalitarian in that it
freezes and insulates itself from the possibility of change. We must then transform from
merely being critical to being oppositional.
An Oppositional Humanities
This opposition must sustain itself between the dialectic of criticality and
creativity. It must clearly critique as is described above but clearly create as well. This is
where academics start to tread some treacherous waters. Edward Said reflects
that “[t]heory is taught so as to make the student believe that he or she can become a
marxist, a feminist, an afrocentrist, or a deconstructionist with about the same effort and
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commitment required in choosing items from a menu," (Said) a clearly commodified
version of a radical politics. In a 1996 interview, Ajiaz Ahmad counters this idea with a
discussion of the bewildering need to restate and reiterate what are the now obvious
truths of global poverty, wealth inequality, and environmental degradation. He chalks it
up to the pattern of
"institutionalizing of certain kinds of radicalism [which] has gone hand in hand
with a certain sanitization of vocabulary, which is ultimately quite devastating for
thought itself. […] the critique of capitalism is sundered from any forthright
affirmation of what might replace it. So, the more anti-bourgeois, and anticolonial etc. one becomes, the less one talks about socialism as a determinate
horizon. […] To speak of any of that directly and simply is to be “vulgar,'”
(Ahmad).
Theoretical language, even whilst maintaining a critical edge, has been dulled from its
creative one. Even the most incisive of critics will find critiques blunted without a
creative framing. This sanitized discourse makes radicalism all the more ripe for
commodification. bells hooks studies a specific form of this process in relation to
feminism:
"any feminist transformational process that seeks to change society is easily coopted if it is not rooted in a political commitment to mass-based feminist
movement. Within white supremacist capitalist patriarchy, we have already
witnessed the commodification of feminist thinking (just as we experience the
commodification of blackness) in ways that make it seem as though one can
partake of the ‘good’ that these movements produce without any commitment to
transformative politics and practice. In this capitalist culture, feminism and
feminist theory are fast becoming a commodity that only the privileged can
afford. This process of commodification is disrupted and subverted when as
feminist activists we affirm our commitment to a politicized revolutionary
feminist movement that has as its central agenda the transformation of society.
From such a starting point, we automatically think of creating theory that speaks
to the widest audience of people," (70-1).
Radicalism must resist its sanitization and through its commitment to collective action,
resist commodification. There will always be a latent tendency in academic discourse to
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make such theories exclusive, to hole them up in obscure jargon that will make them the
exclusive and thus valuable possessions of an elite class. This must be resisted through a
radical effort to continually bring what is gained in the university out to the rest of
society. As implied before, this opposition will not be stranded but be founded on a
narrative that can and should be subverted and reappropriated from the traditionalists that
abuse it: democracy.
John Dewey stated and restated the need to modernize democracy but he has not
been heard, even as his thoughts are appropriated into a classical canon of educational
philosophy. His respect is largely transmuted only through his neutralization. His
writings still reveal, however, the radical potential of an authentic democracy that
genuinely ensures equality, one that does not stabilize itself but continually modifies
itself to new situations. As he says, "[i]t is because the conditions of life change, that the
problem of maintaining a democracy becomes new, and the burden that is put upon the
school, upon the educational system is not that of stating merely the ideas of the men who
made this country, their hopes and their intentions, but of teaching what a democratic
society means under existing conditions," (Dewey, 40). This idea would open up
democracy to the kinds of reflexive criticisms that would modernize it and further, it
would reveal itself as having been appropriated by those that would restrict it.
If we truly want to fight for the authentic forms of freedom and equality, we must
capture this narrative from those that would misuse it and reveal that very misuse. A true
democracy is a radical one:
"[a] democratic education rests on the ideal of a society that is inclusive
and celebrates the rich diversity of human beings, not as ‘capital’, but as creative,
intelligent, and feeling beings open to the rich possibilities of human life. This
view of democracy as encompassing the inclusion and participation of all groups

263
and individuals is at the heart of struggles over education. It is the potential of
educational institutions to be sites for critique and open and heated discussion that
makes them dangerous and feared by those who want acquiescence and ignorance
about the realities of power and privilege," (Weiler, 221).
Weiler further describes how this ideal of democratic education can be theorized against
the current regime: "[t]he struggle over the meaning of education and democracy in the
post-modern world continues a long battle between those who would restrict access to
knowledge and power to elites and those who seek a more equal and participatory
society," (Weiler, 208). We must democratize knowledge and thinking not in an effort to
reduce it but to spread it, to open it up, to free it and empower it. Education, from the
humanities in particular, must “fuel [democracy] by inventing and handing over to the
people new instruments of political expression, by enfranchising people politically,
turning them into political subjects,” (Zmijewski, 68). Students must be treated not as
containers to be subjected to knowledge but democratic, political, human subjects in
themselves. The classroom can model this as it practices a progressive way of being
together that is rarely experienced in the marketplace. Humanities education must
introduce humanity and teach students not to let it go, to fight for it for themselves and
for everyone else.
“Education either functions as an instrument which is used to facilitate integration
of the younger generation into the logic of the present system and bring about conformity
or it becomes the practice of freedom, the means by which men and women deal critically
and creatively with reality and discover how to participate in the transformation of their
world," (Freire, 34). With this radical choice in mind, we must commit to the latter.
Within education, theory and practice can be united (but never completed) within efforts
that constitute the best foundation currently available to us for an absolute transformation
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of society. bells hooks ends her incredible Teaching To Transgress: Education as the
Practice of Freedom with such an idea:
"The quest for knowledge that enables us to unite theory and practice is one such
passion. To the extent that professors bring this passion, which has to be
fundamentally rooted in a love for ideas we are able to inspire, the classroom
becomes a dynamic place where transformations in social relations are concretely
actualized and the false dichotomy between the world outside and the inside
world of the academy disappears," (195).
The university can begin to pass through its own boundaries as democratic reflexes and
new habits of being are created, cultivated, and taught, as they are propagated beyond the
walls of the college to the rest of the world. We must remember that "[t]he academy is
not paradise. But learning is a place where paradise can be created. The classroom, with
all its limitations, remains a location of possibility. In that field of possibility we have the
opportunity to labor for freedom, to demand of ourselves and our comrades, an openness
of mind and heart that allows us to face reality even as we collectively imagine ways to
move beyond boundaries, to transgress. This is education as the practice of freedom,"
(hooks, 207).
In the end, radical empathy, species being, bold humility, the call of the other, and
consciousness raising are all metaphors for the same as yet unarticulated channel through
which this ultimate dialectic is routed. Education can be the foundation to this dialectic of
freedom, one that sets together the absolutely transient moment of interpersonal
transformative pedagogy with the absolutely universal struggle for freedom and equality.
In the negation of either we find the other and only with both set together can humanities
education actively take part in transforming itself, the college in general, society, and the
world.
We must recognize that even within our social determinism, even within our
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individual articulations of a socially defined language, an infinite possibility can be
derived from a finite set. As in language itself, a limited set of letters and sounds both
restrict the user and offer the possibility of composing something new from the same
material through the forging of new relations, new networks of intersubjective meanings.
There is an infinite potential humanity encased within our finite sociality, a finitude that
we cannot escape but an infinity for which we must reach without being able to calculate
it beforehand, without knowing that it will actualize at all or in any way we could
currently imagine.
Humanities education must centralize itself within the core of the liberal arts
college as something that engages in the critical creative re-envisioning of what it means
to be together. By founding itself on the text as a focal point for intersubjective
discussion and realization, the humanities classroom can be a model for posing this
eternal question of how people can be with each other. More importantly, the humanities
classroom must not answer this question but open up what was ideologically answered to
a question that can only be solved from moment to moment, never forever, with the
collective effort of intersubjective interlocutors. The question must be freed from the
reification of an answer, opened up to the possibility of radically different ways of being
together that can be explored, tested, analyzed, criticized, created, discussed, shared, and
hoped.
The text is the center of this realization, an object that embodies the dialectic by
materially existing in a finite, objective sense and immaterially existing in an infinite,
intersubjective sense. Art must be freed from the realms of absolute objectivity in
intention and absolute subjectivity in relativism, pushed beyond interpersonal bounds to
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being both a product of collectivity and a mediator toward the developing of its future
realizations. The question to be opened then, is not whether it’s art or not or what it
means, but what it does. What habits does it break? What patterns does it disrupt? How
does it challenge preconceptions? Does it create new space? What does it show us that
we have forgotten? How does it capture society and what does it make us see in that
vision? What does it move us toward? Is it worthwhile? Is it good? Does it do justice to
thought and to humanity? The text must be used to expose contradictions, make the need
for their communal solving apparent and in so doing, keep meaning open and
intersubjective, as well as the practice that will enact it. Through texts, we can reach
toward the realization of collectivity.
We have to take the first step, a leap of faith toward a future collectivity that we
may never see, that may never come. The college in generally must redefine one of its
core missions, that of raising the next generation. Education must raise a generation that
may never come, a collectivity that may never realize itself politically. Educators cannot
calculate beforehand what this movement must be, lest it be commodified by the ever
hungry apparatus, but must engage students in their very humanities as historical, critical,
creative beings capable not merely of seeing but learning to re-see and re-envision the
world, so that it can be changed. Calcification cannot merely be broken to be replaced by
something else that will itself be commodified, but the ideology of allowing things to
calcify into naturalness must itself be fractured, opened to the freedom of thinking
thought.
Further, this seeming abstractness must be continually practiced inside and
outside the classroom, opening up these theories of collectivity to change by way of them
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finding actualization, closure, and potential reopening. We must not merely theorize but
practice, for it is always in the relational dialectic that potential remains open and
commodification impossible. Practice and theory must be found to be transient, mobile,
and ever changing, ever adapting. Outside or inside of the humanities classroom, they
find their dialectic embodied in pedagogy, in the teacher-student relationship that keeps
knowledge open and learning coming. The humanities classroom is not sufficient but it
can be the first, with faith that it will not be the last, in posing a future beyond the way
things are now, not a utopia but a potential, a difference.
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